The Logic of Two-Level Games with Endogenous Lobbying


Book Description

International environmental agreements (IEAs) are increasingly important in a globalized economy. The aim of our paper is study the effect of political pressure groups-lobbies- on the size and stability of IEAs. To this purpose we use the framework of two-level games to explain how national political situation influences the decisions of governments at the international negotiations arena. we present an endogenous lobbying model in which we assume that lobbies try to influence the policy choice of governments by offering political contribution in return for policy compromise. Indeed, we use the “interest based explanation” of international environmental policy to describe the incentives of countries to join an agreement. This approach classifies countries in four categories: pushers, bystanders, intermediate and draggers. We found that, when government gives the same weight to contribution and to social welfare, the contributions from the industrial lobby give incentives to government (Pushers, intermediate) to participate in the grand coalition making it stable. Our results suggest that in order to sustain the grand coalition, weak global environmental agreements -- i.e. those involving small abatement targets-should be negotiated. The result is similar if governments are more interested by political contribution. However, if governments care less about political contribution than about social welfare, industrial contribution is not enough to limit the free riding incentives of each type of government. In this situation, pushers are the more expected to sustain a small stable coalition.







Economics, Game Theory And International Environmental Agreements: The Ca' Foscari Lectures


Book Description

The science and management of environmental problems is a vast area, comprising both the natural and social sciences, and the multidisciplinary links often make these issues challenging to comprehend. Economics, Game Theory and International Environmental Agreements: The Ca' Foscari Lectures aims to introduce students to the multidimensional character of international environmental problems in general, and climate change in particular.Ecology, economics, game theory and diplomacy are called upon and brought together in the common framework of a basic mathematical model. Within that framework, and using tools from these four disciplines, the book develops a theory that aims to explain and promote cooperation in international environmental affairs.Other books on the topic tend to be research-oriented volumes of various papers. Instead, this is a book that offers a reasonably-sized synthesis of the multidimensional societal problems of transfrontier pollution, particularly of climate change. It uses mathematical modeling of economic and game theory concepts to examine these environmental issues and demonstrate many results in an accessible fashion. Readers interested in understanding the links between ecology and economics, as well as the connection between economics and institutional decision-making, will find in this text not only answers to many of their queries but also questions for further thinking.




Game Theory and International Environmental Cooperation


Book Description

This text investigates various strategies to provide countries with an incentive to accede, agree and comply to an international environmental agreement.




Cap, Insure & Compensate


Book Description

Using Putnam's two-level game approach, we discuss the influence of domestic players that can veto the ratification of international environmental agreements on the breadth and depth of such treaties. We first show that in a symmetric Barrett-type payoff model, veto-players can restrict the bargaining set so that either all or only non-grand coalitions become “modest” endogenously, making the grand coalition stable and leading to either “broad but shallow” or “broad and deep” treaties, depending on the exact payoff function of the veto players. We then discuss the possibility of compensating veto-players via domestic policies and the involved timing and commitment problems, and present the novel policy scheme of “cap, insure & compensate” to overcome these problems. In this scheme, the government negotiates an international emissions cap, insures households against climate-related damages and uses the premium to compensate the domestic veto-player for its abatement costs, thus ensuring the ratification of the treaty. We finally analyze the performance of this scheme in a simple two-period model.




Guide for Negotiators of Multilateral Environmental Agreements


Book Description

A tool to help negotiators of Multilateral Environmental Agreements to prepare strategies and to participate more effectively in the negotiations and focus on environmental issues, their creation of binding international law, and their inclusion.




Environment, Society and International Relations


Book Description

Written in an accessible and lively style, this ground-breaking text marries a critique of current remedies towards environmental problems to original and viable alternatives. This text adopts an eco-centric rather than a traditional environmental management perspective to focuses on the key issues such as: * The effectiveness of international agreements in solving environmental problems * the role of the structures and constraints within which these agreements operate




Double-Edged Diplomacy


Book Description

This original look at the dynamics of international relations untangles the vigorous interaction of domestic and international politics on subjects as diverse as nuclear disarmament, human rights, and trade. An eminent group of political scientists demonstrates how international bargaining that reflects domestic political agendas can be undone when it ignores the influence of domestic constituencies. The eleven studies in Double-Edged Diplomacy provide a major step in furthering a more complete understanding of how politics between nations affects politics within nations and vice versa. The result is a striking new paradigm for comprehending world events at a time when the global and the domestic are becoming ever more linked. This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press's mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1995. This original look at the dynamics of international relations untangles the vigorous interaction of domestic and international politics on subjects as diverse as nuclear disarmament, human rights, and trade. An eminent group of political scientists demons




Voluntary Environmental Agreements


Book Description

Voluntary environmental agreements (VEAs) – generally agreements between government and business – have been regarded by many as a key new instrument for meeting environmental objectives in a flexible manner. Their performance to date has, however, also led to considerable criticism, with several parties arguing that they are methods for avoiding real action that goes beyond "business-as-usual". Is either of these positions justified? The aim of this book is to highlight and learn the lessons from existing experience, looking not just at results but also at specific elements of agreements and also at the process of the agreement itself. Lessons are drawn from experience from across the world, covering the full range of environmental challenges, and from the perspective of key stakeholder groups. Importantly, the book also presents tools for assessing and improving existing agreements and includes recommendations and guidelines for future agreements in key areas such as climate change. It also deals at length with the problem of how such agreements might be used in developing and transitional economies. The overall view of the book is that there is a real potential for the future use of VEAs as part of the policy mix and as a tool for sharing the responsibility for meeting environmental objectives. For the agreements to play this role, however, significant steps are needed to ensure that they are effective, efficient, equitable and appropriately linked to a portfolio of other instruments. The book is divided into four sections. First, existing agreements, their development and efficacy are considered; second, the prospects for voluntary agreements in developing and transitional economies are discussed; third, a range of authors examine the role of VEAs as part of the policy mix to combat climate change; and, finally, the book concludes with an examination of how new tools for evaluating and improving VEAs could be utilized in the future. Voluntary Environmental Agreements will be of interest not only to academics, governments and businesses wishing to understand this specific instrument, but also to those already implementing or considering applying VEAs to meet their environmental objectives.