Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq


Book Description

Years after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, a loosely organized insurgency continues to target American and Coalition soldiers, as well as Iraqi security forces and civilians, with devastating results. In this sobering account of the ongoing violence, Ahmed Hashim, a specialist on Middle Eastern strategic issues and on irregular warfare, reveals the insurgents behind the widespread revolt, their motives, and their tactics. The insurgency, he shows, is not a united movement directed by a leadership with a single ideological vision. Instead, it involves former regime loyalists, Iraqis resentful of foreign occupation, foreign and domestic Islamist extremists, and elements of organized crime. These groups have cooperated with one another in the past and coordinated their attacks; but the alliance between nationalist Iraqi insurgents on the one hand and religious extremists has frayed considerably. The U.S.-led offensive to retake Fallujah in November 2004 and the success of the elections for the Iraqi National Assembly in January 2005 have led more "mainstream" insurgent groups to begin thinking of reinforcing the political arm of their opposition movement and to seek political guarantees for the Sunni Arab community in the new Iraq.Hashim begins by placing the Iraqi revolt in its historical context. He next profiles the various insurgent groups, detailing their origins, aims, and operational and tactical modi operandi. He concludes with an unusually candid assessment of the successes and failures of the Coalition's counter-insurgency campaign. Looking ahead, Hashim warns that ethnic and sectarian groups may soon be pitted against one another in what will be a fiercely contested fight over who gets what in the new Iraq. Evidence that such a conflict is already developing does not augur well for Iraq's future stability. Both Iraq and the United States must work hard to ensure that slow but steady success over the insurgency is not overshadowed by growing ethno-sectarian animosities as various groups fight one another for the biggest slice of the political and economic pie. In place of sensational headlines, official triumphalism, and hand-wringing, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq offers a clear-eyed analysis of the increasingly complex violence that threatens the very future of Iraq.




Volatile Landscape


Book Description

Violence in Iraq has declined since its civil war of 2005-07 due to the implementation of the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy, Shi'a militia ceasefires, and the emergence of Iraq's Awakening Movement. But as the U.S. military draws down its forces, Iraq remains a fragile, unreconciled state, riddled with sectarian tensions and new political rivalries that may negatively affect its future security and stability. Al Qaeda in Iraq, Ba'athist elements, and Sufi insurgents alike have learned to adapt to the new challenges they face, while gradually evolving into a movement dominated by indigenous fighters. More determined on targeting and undermining the Iraq government, this new generation of militants is bound to pose a considerable threat to Iraq's security for the foreseeable future. Volatile Landscape provides advanced and in depth perspectives on the Iraqi insurgency, the various insurgent groups and leaders that shape the insurgency, and the tactics and strategies they employ. Contributors include Mahan Abedin (Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, New Delhi), Rafid Fadhil Ali (BBC World Service), Abdul Hameed Bakier (intelligence expert on counterterrorism, crisis management, and terrorist-hostage negotiations), Ahmed S. Hashim (U.S. Naval War College), Lydia Khalil (Council on Foreign Relations), Erich Marquardt (CTC Sentinel), Andrew McGregor (Aberfoyle International Security and Jamestown Foundation's Global Terrorism Analysis), Babak Rahimi (University of California-San Diego), David Romano (Rhodes College and Inter-University Consortium for Arab and Middle East Studies), Michael Scheuer (formerly with the CIA Counterterrorist Center), Rachel Schneller (Council on Foreign Relations), Murad Batal al-Shishani (analyst of Islamic groups and terrorism), Pascale Combelles Siegel (independent defense consultant), Emrullah Uslu (Center for Middle Eastern Studies, University of Utah), Reidar Visser (Norwegian Institute of International Affairs), Wladimir van Wilgenburg (Kurdish newspaper Rudaw), and Joel Wing ( Musings on Iraq blog)




Why We Lost


Book Description

A high-ranking general's gripping insider account of the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and how it all went wrong. Over a thirty-five-year career, Daniel Bolger rose through the army infantry to become a three-star general, commanding in both theaters of the U.S. campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. He participated in meetings with top-level military and civilian players, where strategy was made and managed. At the same time, he regularly carried a rifle alongside rank-and-file soldiers in combat actions, unusual for a general. Now, as a witness to all levels of military command, Bolger offers a unique assessment of these wars, from 9/11 to the final withdrawal from the region. Writing with hard-won experience and unflinching honesty, Bolger makes the firm case that in Iraq and in Afghanistan, we lost -- but we didn't have to. Intelligence was garbled. Key decision makers were blinded by spreadsheets or theories. And, at the root of our failure, we never really understood our enemy. Why We Lost is a timely, forceful, and compulsively readable account of these wars from a fresh and authoritative perspective.




Iraqi Insurgents


Book Description

Explains the motivation behind the primarily Sunni insurgency to preserve Baathist authority in Iraq by providing a brief history of the Iraq War and a description of the insurgents' resistance to coalition forces and the formation of a democratically elected government.




The Terrorists of Iraq


Book Description

The Terrorists of Iraq: Inside the Strategy and Tactics of the Iraq Insurgency 2003-2014, Second Edition is a highly detailed and exhaustive history and analysis of terror groups that both formed the Iraq insurgency and led to the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). It places heavy emphasis on the history, organization, and personal




Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003-2006)


Book Description

Examines the deleterious effects of the U.S. failure to focus on protecting the Iraqi population for most of the military campaign in Iraq and analyzes the failure of a technologically driven counterinsurgency (COIN) approach. It outlines strategic considerations relative to COIN; presents an overview of the conflict in Iraq; describes implications for future operations; and offers recommendations to improve the U.S. capability to conduct COIN.




The Insurgents


Book Description

A finalist for the Pulitzer Prize The inside story of the small group of soldier-scholars who—against fierce resistance from within their own ranks—changed the way the Pentagon does business and the American military fights wars. The Insurgents is the inside story of the small group of soldier-scholars, led by General David Petraeus, who plotted to revolutionize one of the largest, oldest, and most hidebound institutions—the United States military. Their aim was to build a new Army that could fight the new kind of war in the post–Cold War age: not massive wars on vast battlefields, but “small wars” in cities and villages, against insurgents and terrorists. These would be wars not only of fighting but of “nation building,” often not of necessity but of choice. Based on secret documents, private emails, and interviews with more than one hundred key characters, including Petraeus, the tale unfolds against the backdrop of the wars against insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan. But the main insurgency is the one mounted at home by ambitious, self-consciously intellectual officers—Petraeus, John Nagl, H. R. McMaster, and others—many of them classmates or colleagues in West Point’s Social Science Department who rose through the ranks, seized with an idea of how to fight these wars better. Amid the crisis, they forged a community (some of them called it a cabal or mafia) and adapted their enemies’ techniques to overhaul the culture and institutions of their own Army. Fred Kaplan describes how these men and women maneuvered the idea through the bureaucracy and made it official policy. This is a story of power, politics, ideas, and personalities—and how they converged to reshape the twenty-first-century American military. But it is also a cautionary tale about how creative doctrine can harden into dogma, how smart strategists—today’s “best and brightest”—can win the battles at home but not the wars abroad. Petraeus and his fellow insurgents made the US military more adaptive to the conflicts of the modern era, but they also created the tools—and made it more tempting—for political leaders to wade into wars that they would be wise to avoid.




Who Are the Insurgents?


Book Description




Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias


Book Description

By focusing on four specific hotbeds of instability-Somalia, Chechnya, Afghanistan, and Iraq-Richard H. Shultz Jr. and Andrea J. Dew carefully analyze tribal culture and clan associations, examine why "traditional" or "tribal" warriors fight, identify how these groups recruit, and where they find sanctuary, and dissect the reasoning behind their strategy. Their new introduction evaluates recent developments in Iraq and Afghanistan, the growing prevalence of Shultz and Dew's conception of irregular warfare, and the Obama Defense Department's approach to fighting insurgents, terrorists, and militias. War in the post-Cold War era cannot be waged through traditional Western methods of combat, especially when friendly states and outside organizations like al-Qaeda serve as powerful allies to the enemy. Bridging two centuries and several continents, Shultz and Dew recommend how conventional militaries can defeat these irregular yet highly effective organizations.




They Fought for Each Other


Book Description

They Fought for Each Other presents a searing chronicle of the soldiers of Battalion 1-26 who confronted the worst neighborhood in Baghdad and lost more men than any battalion since the Vietnam War. Based on "Blood Brothers," the award-nominated series that ran in Army Times, this is the remarkable story of a courageous military unit that sacrificed their lives to change Adhamiya, Iraq from a lawless town where insurgents roamed freely, to a safe and secure neighborhood. Army Times writer Kelly Kennedy was embedded with Charlie Company in 2007, went on patrol with the soldiers and spent hours in combat support hospitals, leading to this riveting chronicle of an Army battalion that lost 31 soldiers in Iraq. During that period, one soldier threw himself on a grenade to save his friends, a well-liked first sergeant shot himself to death in front of his troops, and a platoon staged a mutiny. The men of Charlie 1-26 would earn at least 95 combat awards, including one soldier who would go home with three Purple Hearts and a lost dream. This is a timeless story of men at war and a heartbreaking account of American sacrifice in Iraq.