Israeli Combined Arms Employment: Um Katef, 1967 & Suez Canal, 1973


Book Description

The next desert war the United States fights could be against an enemy more comparable to us in training, motivation, and technology than the recent conflict in the Persian Gulf. The Middle East is a dangerous part of the world where we have limited experience in the use of high technology weapons, or in large-scale combat even given the recent war against Iraq. Since we have limited experience in these areas, this thesis analyzes two of the most recent historical examples of such combat from the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars to reveal conclusions useful to U. S. war fighters. This thesis examines the Battle of Um Katef, Abu Ageila from the 1967 War, and the Sinai Campaign from the 1973 War. They were examined primarily from secondary sources, using the U. S. Army battlefield operating systems, as the framework to evaluate success or failure. The resulting keys to success or reasons for failure were then further evaluated against the four tenets of U. S. Airland Battle Doctrine (Agility, Initiative, Depth, and Synchronization). The result of this investigation is a number of conclusions regarding modern combined arms combat. These conclusions are categorized as strengths or weaknesses and presented as lessons learned. Surprisingly enough, none of the lessons learned proved to be environment specific.




Israeli Combined Arms Employment


Book Description

The next desert war the United States fights could be against an enemy more comparable to us in training, motivation, and technology than the recent conflict in the Persian Gulf. The Middle East is a dangerous part of the world where we have limited experience in the use of high technology weapons, or in large-scale combat even given the recent war against Iraq. Since we have limited experience in these areas, this thesis analyzes two of the most recent historical examples of such combat from the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars to reveal conclusions useful to U.S. warfighters. This thesis examines the Battle of Um Katef, Abu Ageila from the 1967 War, and the Sinai Campaign from the 1973 War. They were examined primarily from secondary sources, using the U.S. Army battlefield operating systems, as the framework to evaluate success or failure. The results keys to success or reasons for failure were then further evaluated against the four tenets of U.S. Airland Battle Doctrine (Agility, Initiative, Depth, and Synchronization). The result of this investigation is a number of conclusions regarding modern combined arms combat. These conclusions are categorized as strengths or weaknesses and presented as lessons learned. Surprisingly enough, none of the lessons learned proved to be environment specific.













Key to the Sinai


Book Description




Armored Forces


Book Description

This volume analyzes the development of tanks and traces their history from the British attack at Cambrai in 1917 during World War I through the AirLand Battle of Operation Desert Storm in 1991. This text gives a short history of the rise and development of armored warfare in the 20th century, an assessment of the significant literature on tank doctrine, and an evaluation of the role of prominent commanders, theoreticians, and tacticians. A chronology of important dates and pictures depicting major changes in tanks across the years enrich this teaching tool and reference guide for teachers and students of military history, history buffs, and professional soldiers.




Israel's Army


Book Description




Seek, Strike, and Destroy


Book Description

In the seventy years that have passed since the tank first appeared, antitank combat has presented one of the greatest challenges in land warfare. Dramatic improvements in tank technology and doctrine over the years have precipitated equally innovative developments in the antitank field. One cycle in this ongoing arms race occurred during the early years of World War II when the U.S. Army sought desperately to find an antidote to the vaunted German blitzkrieg. This Leavenworth Paper analyzes the origins of the tank destroyer concept, evaluates the doctrine and equipment with which tank destroyer units fought, and assesses the effectiveness of the tank destroyer in battle.




Governing Gaza


Book Description

Marred by political tumult and violent conflict since the early twentieth century, Gaza has been subject to a multiplicity of rulers. Still not part of a sovereign state, it would seem too exceptional to be a revealing site for a study of government. Ilana Feldman proves otherwise. She demonstrates that a focus on the Gaza Strip uncovers a great deal about how government actually works, not only in that small geographical space but more generally. Gaza’s experience shows how important bureaucracy is for the survival of government. Feldman analyzes civil service in Gaza under the British Mandate (1917–48) and the Egyptian Administration (1948–67). In the process, she sheds light on how governing authority is produced and reproduced; how government persists, even under conditions that seem untenable; and how government affects and is affected by the people and places it governs. Drawing on archival research in Gaza, Cairo, Jerusalem, and London, as well as two years of ethnographic research with retired civil servants in Gaza, Feldman identifies two distinct, and in some ways contradictory, governing practices. She illuminates mechanisms of “reiterative authority” derived from the minutiae of daily bureaucratic practice, such as the repetitions of filing procedures, the accumulation of documents, and the habits of civil servants. Looking at the provision of services, she highlights the practice of “tactical government,” a deliberately restricted mode of rule that makes limited claims about governmental capacity, shifting in response to crisis and operating without long-term planning. This practice made it possible for government to proceed without claiming legitimacy: by holding the question of legitimacy in abeyance. Feldman shows that Gaza’s governments were able to manage under, though not to control, the difficult conditions in Gaza by deploying both the regularity of everyday bureaucracy and the exceptionality of tactical practice.