Special Bibliography Series


Book Description







U.S.-Iran Misperceptions


Book Description

Can Iranians and Americans find common ground to overcome their troubled history? U.S.-Iran Misperceptions is the first written dialogue on the key issues that separate these two great countries. Bringing together former policy makers and international relations experts from the United States and Iran, U.S.-Iran Misperceptions: A Dialogue provides new insights into and arguments about how each country's elites view the other, and how misperceptions have blocked the two from forging a normal and productive relationship. Guided by the leading theorist of misperceptions in international relations, Columbia University Professor Robert Jervis, the book moves from Jervis's opening essay to consider mutual perceptions of ideology, nuclear weapons, neo-imperialism, regional hegemony, and the future of the relationship. It presents authoritative, clear-eyed assessments, while seeking plausible ways the two countries can avoid a catastrophic war and rebuild the relationship. U.S.-Iran Misperceptions: A Dialogue offers uncompromising analysis and cautious optimism.




Oil and the Kurdish Question


Book Description

Oil and the Kurdish Question critiques the conventional narrative of the Iran-Iraq War and the associated Anfal campaign. This narrative claims that in the last two years (1987-88) of the Iran-Iraq War the Ba’thists dominated the fighting using gas attacks. According to this narrative, the Ba’thists also used gas in a fearsome campaign of extermination against the Kurds of northern Iraq. This book argues that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the Iraqis trained hard to turn the tables on Iran in the last months of the war and won by superior generalship without the use of gas. Further, it was only when the Iranians conceded defeat that the Iraqi army went north and—in the space of nine days, using conventional arms—suppressed pockets of Kurdish insurgent unrest. The book also examines how publicists exploited the myth of the Kurdish holocaust as justification for America to declare war on Iraq. It exposes a scheme laid out before the war that aimed to defeat Iraq, deconstruct it, and create an autonomous Kurdish Regional Government which would then let lucrative oil concessions to interests mainly in the west. The intrigue accomplished two things: it subverted Iraq’s oil nationalization law which forbade granting concessions to foreigners, and it ended Iraq’s existence as a sovereign nation-state.




Iran, Israel, and the United States


Book Description

This book analyzes the process of evaluating Iran’s nuclear project and the efforts to roll it back, resulting in the 2015 nuclear agreement known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPA). Despite its aura of scientific exactitude, nuclear intelligence is complex and susceptible to methodological disagreements and political bias at the international oversight level—the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)—and within the countries involved in the rollback project – Israel and the United States. To highlight both the technological problems of assessing compliance and the politicization, each chapter in the book uses a real-time comparison of the nuclear developments in Iran, and the perception of Israel and the United States. This methodology yielded some significant results. Essentially, two camps had formed in each country; those who were pushing for an agreement with Iran and those who opposed it. The Israeli intelligence agencies – the Mossad and the Military Intelligence – as well as the highly secretive Israeli Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) which advised them considered the program to be weak and slow moving. The right-wing government of Benjamin Netanyahu suggested that Iran was steps away from the “point of no return,” making it an existential threat to Israel. A virtually identical split emerged in Washington. While the intelligence community and the advising scientists from the National Nuclear Laboratories, considered Iran progress to be relatively modest, the Republicans and the Israel lobby - the Jewish organizations and the Christian Zionists— warned of the imminent danger of a nuclear Iran. With the Obama administration pushing for the JCPOA, a fierce debate took place in Congress. The Israeli intelligence and military chiefs led by the Mossad chief Meir Dagan, which had previously blocked Netanyahu from a preemptive action, quietly supported the agreement. In Washington, the Israel lobby, and the Republicans, helped by Netanyahu, mounted an all-out effort to defeat the deal in Congress. The pro-deal coalition fought back by mobilizing the scientific community, military and intelligence officials, the business lobby, and grassroots Democrats. The JCPOA represents the first successful effort of peaceful counterproliferation. At the same, excessive politicization has clouded its legitimacy and cast doubt about its future.




Deviant Conduct in World Politics


Book Description

A long list of countries - labelled outcasts, pariahs and rogues - have failed to meet international standards of good conduct. In the Cold War years Rhodesia, Israel, Chile, Taiwan and South Africa, among others, featured among the ranks of the disreputable. In modern world politics, the serious sinners not only include states: terrorists, rebels, criminals and mercenaries also participate in the great game of who gets what, when and how. Highlighting the rules of good behaviour that both state and non-state actors have violated, Geldenhuys takes a novel approach that breaks through the narrow parameters of the rogue state paradigm and of other state-centric perspectives.