Legal Theory of Auction


Book Description

The widespread understanding of auction structure considers auction as consisting of three contracts: contract between the seller and the auctioneer, contract between the auctioneer and the buyer and the sale contract between the seller and the buyer. The book challenges this concept, arguing that the traditional tripartite concept of auction is too narrow and does not correspond to the actual structure of auction relations. Demonstrating that an auction structure consists of a plethora of legal relationships, including noncontractual relations, this book explores the legal concept of auction sale and the structure of accompanying relations. The book provides a historical overview of auctions and different auction models. Following a brief introduction to the economic theory, auction models are examined against the following legal criteria: price formation, publicity, parties’ autonomy, legal form and applied technology to find a legal concept and nature of auction. The book explores the legal position of key auction figures and auction objects to identify the categories of legal relations that appear at auction. It explores the legal nature of the main contract, as well as the relations between the consignor and the auctioneer, the auctioneer and the bidders, the bidders themselves, the consignor and the bidders. The book covers relations arising from droit de suite, financial and bidding agreements to provide a comprehensive overview of lesserknown legal relations that commonly arise in auction practice.




Putting Auction Theory to Work


Book Description

This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.




Auction Theory for Computer Networks


Book Description

Do you have the tools to address recent challenges and problems in modern computer networks? Discover a unified view of auction theoretic applications and develop auction models, solution concepts, and algorithms with this multidisciplinary review. Devise distributed, dynamic, and adaptive algorithms for ensuring robust network operation over time-varying and heterogeneous environments, and for optimizing decisions about services, resource allocation, and usage of all network entities. Topics including cloud networking models, MIMO, mmWave communications, 5G, data aggregation, task allocation, user association, interference management, wireless caching, mobile data offloading, and security. Introducing fundamental concepts from an engineering perspective and describing a wide range of state-of-the-art techniques, this is an excellent resource for graduate and senior undergraduate students, network and software engineers, economists, and researchers.




Game Theory in Wireless and Communication Networks


Book Description

This unified 2001 treatment of game theory focuses on finding state-of-the-art solutions to issues surrounding the next generation of wireless and communications networks. The key results and tools of game theory are covered, as are various real-world technologies and a wide range of techniques for modeling, design and analysis.




Auctions


Book Description

Governments use them to sell everything from oilfields to pollution permits, and to privatize companies; consumers rely on them to buy baseball tickets and hotel rooms, and economic theorists employ them to explain booms and busts. Auctions make up many of the world's most important markets; and this book describes how auction theory has also become an invaluable tool for understanding economics. Auctions: Theory and Practice provides a non-technical introduction to auction theory, and emphasises its practical application. Although there are many extremely successful auction markets, there have also been some notable fiascos, and Klemperer provides many examples. He discusses the successes and failures of the one-hundred-billion dollar "third-generation" mobile-phone license auctions; he, jointly with Ken Binmore, designed the first of these. Klemperer also demonstrates the surprising power of auction theory to explain seemingly unconnected issues such as the intensity of different forms of industrial competition, the costs of litigation, and even stock trading 'frenzies' and financial crashes. Engagingly written, the book makes the subject exciting not only to economics students but to anyone interested in auctions and their role in economics.




Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design


Book Description

An international team of experts covers the pros and cons of different auction formats and lessons learned in the field.




Optional Law


Book Description

Spurred by the advances in option theory that have been remaking financial and economic scholarship over the past thirty years, a revolution is taking shape in the way legal scholars conceptualize property and the way it is protected by the law. Ian Ayres's Optional Law explores how option theory is overthrowing many accepted wisdoms and producing tangible new tools for courts in deciding cases. Ayres identifies flaws in the current system and shows how option theory can radically expand and improve the ways that lawmakers structure legal entitlements. An option-based system, Ayres shows, gives parties the option to purchase—or the option to sell—the relevant legal entitlement. Choosing to exercise a legal option forces decisionmakers to reveal information about their own valuation of the entitlement. And, as with auctions, entitlements in option-based law naturally flow to those who value them the most. Seeing legal entitlements through this lens suggests a variety of new entitlement structures from which lawmakers might choose. Optional Law provides a theory for determining which structure is likely to be most effective in harnessing parties' private information. Proposing a practical approach to the foundational question of how to allocate and protect legal rights, Optional Law will be applauded by legal scholars and professionals who continue to seek new and better ways of fostering both equitable and efficient legal rules.




Cartels, Competition and Public Procurement


Book Description

ÔThis volume is long overdue. Integrated legal and economic analysis of competition law is crucial given the nature of the sector. However to carry this off successfully, one either needs intensive editorial work to bring different teams together; or one has to rely on the few who master both economic and legal analysis to a tee. Stefan WeishaarÕs analysis not only looks at a stubborn issue in competition law. He does so in three jurisdictions, in detailed yet clear fashion, with clear insight and ditto conclusions. Over and above its relevance to academic analysis, this book can go straight into competition authoritiesÕ decision making, and therefore also in compliance and remediation advice.Õ Ð Geert Van Calster, University of Leuven, Belgium Cartels, Competition and Public Procurement uses a law and economics approach to analyse whether competition and public procurement laws in Europe and Asia deal effectively with bid rigging conspiracies. Stefan Weishaar explores the ways in which economic theory can be used to mitigate the adverse effects of bid rigging cartels. The study sheds light on one of the vital issues for achieving cost-effective public procurement Ð which is itself a critical question in the context of the global financial crisis. The book comprehensively examines whether different laws deal effectively with bid rigging and the ways in which economic theory can be used to mitigate the adverse effects of such cartels. The employed industrial economics and auction theory highlights shortcomings of the law in all three jurisdictions Ð the European Union, China and Japan Ð and seeks to raise the awareness of policymakers as to when extra precautionary measures against bid rigging conspiracies should be taken. Students and researchers who have a keen interest in the relationship between law and economics, competition law and public procurement law will find this topical book invaluable. Practitioners can see how economic theory can be used to identify situations that lend themselves to bid rigging and policymakers will be informed about the shortcomings of existing legislation from a legal and economics perspective and will be inspired by approaches taken in different jurisdictions.




Art Law and the Business of Art


Book Description

Art Law and the Business of Art is a comprehensive and practical guide to the application of UK law to transactions and disputes in the art world. Written by Martin Wilson, an art lawyer with over 20 years’ experience in the field, it outlines and explains the relevant law and how the art business operates in practice, as well as offering a discussion of the most pressing ethical questions involving artworks.




Auctioning Public Assets


Book Description

In many countries all over the world, governments are privatising firms that were previously under public control. This is happening, for example, in public utility sectors such as gas, water and electricity, in transport sectors (such as rail and metro) and in radio and telephony. This book provides an overview of the economic issues that are involved in this transfer of ownership of public assets. Combining a theoretical framework with a set of case studies of recent sales of state-owned assets from Europe and the USA, it asks which sort of allocation mechanism can a government adopt? Which is most suited to a particular sale? And how will the choice of allocation mechanism affect future market outcomes? With contributions from international experts, this book offers an accessible introduction to auction theory and an invaluable, non-technical analysis of existing knowledge. It will be of interest to students, non-specialists and policy-makers alike.