Book Description

The struggle for Biak Island, waged by soldiers, sailors and airmen of General Douglas MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific Area during mid-1944, was one of the most harrowing and least satisfying episodes of the Pacific War. Almost everything about it was nasty: the terrain; the climate; the prevalence of tropical diseases; the lack of water; the tenacity and fighting power of the enemy; the acrimony that developed among the American commanders; and the time pressure imposed by MacArthur himself. Perhaps this is why Biak has remained one of the least-known major battles fought by U.S. forces in World War II. But Biak came perilously close to being a first-class disaster for MacArthur, which could have materially affected the subsequent conduct of the Pacific War and MacArthur’s vision for liberating the Philippines. The fact that victory was achieved, at considerable cost, directly resulted from the heroic fighting qualities of the U.S. troops and the hands-on leadership of a great field commander, little heralded at the time, who had also saved MacArthur’s reputation on an earlier difficult occasion. World War II in the Southwest Pacific was a bitterly-contested aspect of hell. For the most part, there were no towns, or much civilization of any kind. Malaria, dengue fever, and scrub typhus were ever-present threats. Lucky soldiers could sometimes swing temporary leave to rest camps or cities in Australia, but most of the men sent forward to the gigantic island of New Guinea and beyond stayed there for the duration. Some never saw a bottle of Coca-Cola the entire time they were in New Guinea. But there was always the jungle – green, wet, and so thickly disorienting that many men who got lost in it were never seen or heard from again. The heat was unbearable and the enemy was skilled in jungle fighting and utterly ruthless. No quarter would be given by either side. As MacArthur’s advance proceeded westward along the northern coast of New Guinea, its pace accelerated as his flow of troops and supplies increased. What had started out, in 1942, as a slow, grinding advance against a fanatically stubborn foe had turned into a classic case of “hit ‘em where they ain’t.” MacArthur could outfox the Japanese, in part due to his codebreakers. But MacArthur also was prone to taking dangerous gambles. He was in a hurry to seize forward airfields from which he could operate his big bombers against enemy troop concentrations and supply depots. He was involved in a great race to Tokyo with the U.S. Navy, and he could not afford to finish second. So after successfully executing his brilliant strategic landing at Hollandia, in Dutch New Guinea, his eye fell upon several islands to the west that would provide good operating fields for his heavy aircraft. Biak was principal among these. Due to its coral composition, Biak made a perfect platform for aerial operations, and its location off the northwest coast of New Guinea meant that Allied airfields there would pose a huge threat to Japanese military and naval activities south of the Philippines. For that reason, the Japanese were prepared to make a stiff fight for the island, even to the point of risking their major fleet assets in an attempt to keep control of it. Allied planning failed to comprehend these Japanese intentions, with nearly disastrous results. The defenses faced by MacArthur’s men on the island were among the most formidable encountered anywhere in the Pacific War. They rivaled those found later on Peleliu and Iwo Jima, were incredibly elaborate, and were manned by significant numbers of crack Japanese troops. These factors, had they been reckoned with beforehand, would have altered the approach taken by MacArthur and his subordinate commanders toward c