Moral hazards in partnerships
Author : Martin Gaynor
Publisher :
Page : 32 pages
File Size : 35,26 MB
Release : 1990
Category :
ISBN :
Author : Martin Gaynor
Publisher :
Page : 32 pages
File Size : 35,26 MB
Release : 1990
Category :
ISBN :
Author : Martin Gaynor
Publisher :
Page : 32 pages
File Size : 23,4 MB
Release : 1990
Category : Competition
ISBN :
Author :
Publisher :
Page : 32 pages
File Size : 32,69 MB
Release : 1990
Category :
ISBN :
Author : Martin Gaynor
Publisher :
Page : 23 pages
File Size : 25,19 MB
Release : 1996
Category : Group medical practice
ISBN :
Author : María Paz Espinosa
Publisher :
Page : 31 pages
File Size : 33,91 MB
Release : 2000
Category :
ISBN :
Author : Nolan H. Miller
Publisher :
Page : 152 pages
File Size : 19,94 MB
Release : 1999
Category :
ISBN :
This dissertation consists of three essays, each of which considers a different aspect of the moral hazard problem.
Author : Juan Flores Zendejas
Publisher : Routledge
Page : 167 pages
File Size : 36,71 MB
Release : 2021-12-30
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 1000515028
Moral Hazard is a core concept in economics. In a nutshell, moral hazard reflects the reduced incentive to protect against risk where an entity is (or believes it will be) protected from its consequences, whether through an insurance arrangement or an implicit or explicit guarantee system. It is fundamentally driven by information asymmetry, arises in all sectors of the economy, including banking, medical insurance, financial insurance, and governmental support, undermines the stability of our economic systems and has burdened taxpayers in all developed countries, resulting in significant costs to the community. Despite the seriousness and pervasiveness of moral hazard, policymakers and scholars have failed to address this issue. This book fills this gap. It covers 200 years of moral hazard: from its origins in the 19th century to the bailouts announced in the aftermath of the COVID-19 outbreak. The book is divided into three parts. Part I deals with the ethics and other fundamental issues connected to moral hazard. Part II provides historical and empirical evidence on moral hazard in international finance. It examines in turn the role of the export credit industry, the international lender of last resort, and the IMF. Finally, Part III examines specific sectors such as automobile, banking, and the US industry at large. This is the first book to provide an interdisciplinary analysis of moral hazard and explain why addressing this issue has become crucial today. As such, it will attract interest from scholars across different fields, including economists, political scientists and lawyers.
Author : Martin Gaynor
Publisher :
Page : 68 pages
File Size : 36,4 MB
Release : 1993
Category : Medical partnership
ISBN :
Partnerships provide a classic example of the tradeoff between risk spreading and moral hazard. The degree to which firms choose to spread risk and sacrifice efficiency incentives depends upon risk preferences, for which data are typically unavailable. The authors use a unique data set on medical group practice to investigate the degree to which firms which report more risk aversion have greater departures from first-best organizational incentive structures and the consequences for physician productivity. Increased risk aversion leads to compensation arrangements which spread more risk through diminished incentives. The authors also find that compensation arrangements that have greater degrees of revenue sharing across physicians significantly reduce each physicians's productivity, whereas reductions in group size significantly increase productivity. The estimated efficiency loss associated with risk aversion accounts for over ten percent of gross income, comparing the most risk averse to the least risk averse physicians in the sample. The authors use the results to show that changing the way physicians are paid from fee-for-service to capitation will dramatically reduce physician productivity.
Author : Ayca Kaya
Publisher :
Page : 0 pages
File Size : 31,55 MB
Release : 2020
Category :
ISBN :
We examine how equilibrium sorting patterns in a matching market for partnerships are impacted by the presence of bilateral moral hazard in a repeated production setting. We find that this impact depends on how the cost of moral hazard manifests itself - whether efficient effort is not feasible or desirable from the beginning, or whether inefficient effort is resorted to only as a punishment equilibrium. Which of these is the case depends both on the details of the technology and the contractual environment. In the former case, the presence of moral hazard moves the market away from positive sorting. In the latter case, whether moral hazard favors positive or negative sorting depends on how the power of incentives needed to implement effort varies with the observable types of the agents.
Author : Claude d' Aspremont
Publisher :
Page : 21 pages
File Size : 43,3 MB
Release : 1993
Category :
ISBN :