National Biosurveillance Science and Technology Roadmap


Book Description

The National Strategy for Biosurveillance (Strategy), published in July 2012, calls for “a coordinated approach that brings together Federal, state, local, and tribal governments; the private sector; nongovernmental organizations; and international partners” to enhance existing biosurveillance capabilities and, where necessary, develop new ones that provide decision makers and responders with the essential information they need to mitigate impacts of threats to health and associated economic, societal, and political consequences. The Strategy recognizes that a well-integrated national biosurveillance enterprise can saves lives by providing essential information for better decision making at all levels.The interagency Biosurveillance Science and Technology Working Group (BST WG), chartered in May 2012, was established under the Subcommittee on Biological Defense Research and Development of the National Science and Technology Council's Committee on Homeland and National Security to develop national biosurveillance research and development priorities to enable the Core Functions of the Strategy.




National Biosurveillance Strategy and Associated Science and Technology Roadmaps


Book Description

A well-integrated, national biosurveillance enterprise is a national security imperative. The United States' ability to detect quickly and characterize a potential incident of national significance that affects human, animal, or plant health is of paramount importance. Rapid detection and enhanced situational awareness are critical to saving lives and improving incident outcomes, whether the result of a bioterrorism attack or other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat, an emerging infectious disease, pandemic, environmental disaster, or a food-borne illness. Beyond the need to protect domestic interests, and because health threats transcend national borders, the United States also plays a vital role within an international network of biosurveillance centers across the globe. This book focuses on the national strategy for biosurveillance and the national biosurveillance science and technology roadmap. (Imprint: Novinka)




National Biosurveillance Strategy and Associated Science and Technology Roadmaps


Book Description

A well-integrated, national biosurveillance enterprise is a national security imperative. The United States' ability to detect quickly and characterise a potential incident of national significance that affects human, animal, or plant health is of paramount importance. Rapid detection and enhanced situational awareness are critical to saving lives and improving incident outcomes, whether the result of a bioterrorism attack or other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat, an emerging infectious disease, pandemic, environmental disaster, or a food-borne illness. Beyond the need to protect domestic interests, and because health threats transcend national borders, the United States also plays a vital role within an international network of biosurveillance centres across the globe. This book focuses on the national strategy for biosurveillance and the national biosurveillance science and technology roadmap.







Biological Response and Recovery Science and Technology Roadmap


Book Description

The report categorizes key scientific knowledge gaps, identifies technology solutions, and prioritizes research areas to enable government, at all levels, to make decisions more effectively during the response to and recovery from a biological incident, whether naturally occurring or intentional. A catastrophic biological incident could threaten the Nation's human, animal, plant, environmental, and economic health, as well as America's national security. Such an event would demand a rapid and effective response in order to: (1) minimize loss of life and other adverse consequences associated with the incident and (2) thwart ongoing threats and follow-on attacks in the case of suspected criminal activity or terrorism. The new roadmap sets near-term objectives and long-term goals for coordinated research and development (R&D) activities among Federal agencies to strengthen evidence-based decision making and response and recovery efforts during a biological incident or after one occurs.




Information Sharing and Collaboration


Book Description

After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and subsequent anthrax mailings, the U.S. government prioritized a biosurveillance strategy aimed at detecting, monitoring, and characterizing national security health threats in human and animal populations, food, water, agriculture, and the environment. However, gaps and challenges in biosurveillance efforts and integration of biosurveillance activities remain. September 8-9, 2011, the IOM held a workshop to explore the information-sharing and collaboration processes needed for the nation's integrated biosurveillance strategy.




Environmental Biodetection and Human Biosurveillance Research and Development for National Security


Book Description

Environmental biodetection (BD) and human biosurveillance (BSV) are part of the foundation of national biodefense. The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) chemical and biological defense (CBD) research and development (R&D) portfolio improves technologies and operations in both of these areas. In the context of evolving technologies, greater adversary capabilities, and unpredictable federal budgets, this report examines S&T's CBD R&D portfolio to identify priorities for future investments. The policy context includes multiple national strategies addressing biodefense, biosurveillance, health security, and national security; multiple federal agencies have missions and programming in this space. The R&D outputs of most CBD projects and most projects in illustrative inventories of non-S&T CBD R&D are not ready for deployment. S&T's CBD R&D has focused more on environmental BD than on human BSV. While S&T has supported some projects to develop tests for environmental or human samples, other federal agencies have supported more studies in this area. There is less R&D-supported by S&T or other sources-that targets system configuration or concept of operations (CONOPS). The recommendations are to (1) develop a DHS strategic plan for environmental BD and human BSV R (2) prioritize environmental BD over human BSV for future DHS R&D investments, given the department's unique role in this area; (3) prioritize R&D addressing CONOPS; (4) actively monitor R&D supported by other agencies, and adapt relevant outputs to meet DHS needs; (5) shorten the timeline for real-world application by prioritizing midstage and later stage R&D over early stage research.




BioWatch and Public Health Surveillance


Book Description

Following the attacks of September 11, 2001 and the anthrax letters, the ability to detect biological threats as quickly as possible became a top priority. In 2003 the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) introduced the BioWatch program-a federal monitoring system intended to speed detection of specific biological agents that could be released in aerosolized form during a biological attack. The present volume evaluates the costs and merits of both the current BioWatch program and the plans for a new generation of BioWatch devices. BioWatch and Public Health Surveillance also examines infectious disease surveillance through hospitals and public health agencies in the United States, and considers whether BioWatch and traditional infectious disease surveillance are redundant or complementary.




Improving the Nation's Ability to Detect and Respond to 21st Century Urgent Health Threats


Book Description

"Achievement of comprehensive, effective domestic and international biosurveillance is compromised by jurisdictional complexity and inefficiencies. Federal biosurveillance policy oversight should be established in the Executive Office of the President (EOP) with the National Security Staff (NSS) as the lead entity identified to coordinate investments, interagency collaboration, and program implementation including those activities in support of the President's Global Health Initiative. An outside representative advisory group should be established to facilitate key stakeholders' interface with White House policy and technology coordinating groups. Methods and metrics used in acquiring biosurveillance data are highly variable. This impedes data sharing and analysis, and recognition and response to health threats. Efficient, comprehensive aggregation and analysis of actionable biosurveillance data should be promoted through support for implementation of IHR 2005; integration of human, animal, food, vector, and environmental surveillance systems into a national biosurveillance strategy; and expansion of biosurveillance to include environmental aspects that are the greatest threat to human health, including water, food, animals, and vectors. The current biosurveillance workforce is inadequate to address existing challenges to biosecurity let alone those that are anticipated to arise with increasing data, globalization, and synthetic biology. The federal government should promote and ensure a sustainable interdisciplinary workforce with investments in expertise, especially in public health informatics; social and behavioral epidemiology; environmental, human and animal health; vector biology; and disaster response. The federal government should continue to invest in a new generation of research to develop and build on innovative technologies in molecular and cellular sciences, engineering, chemistry, physics, information technology, mathematics, and communications that will enhance the efficiency and sensitivity of regional, national and global biosurveillance. Understanding the baseline and variance of human and animal health using these emerging technologies with clear processes to select the best approaches and scale them will allow for the creation of the functional equivalent of a national and international immune system that can protect the public in real time."--Page ii.




BioWatch PCR Assays


Book Description

BioWatch is an air monitoring system deployed in jurisdictions around the country with the goal of detecting the presence of certain high risk pathogenic microorganisms. It relies on a network of federal and nonfederal collaborative relationships to be successful, and is one part of a larger array of disease surveillance, intelligence-gathering, and biomonitoring activities in support of public safety and health. The assays used in the BioWatch system to detect the presence of pathogens in collected samples rely on the technique of polymerase chain reaction (PCR) to sensitively and specifically amplify target nucleic acid sequences. BioWatch PCR Assays evaluates and provides guidance on appropriate standards for the validation and verification of PCR tests and assays in order to ensure that adequate performance data are available to public health and other key decision makers with a sufficient confidence level to facilitate the public health response to a BioWatch Actionable Response. This report discusses principles of performance standards, reviews information from several existing guidance documents and standards that might be applicable to BioWatch, and discusses assay testing efforts that have occurred or are ongoing. BioWatch PCR Assays provides recommendations on general principles and approaches for a performance standard and validation framework to meet BioWatch's mission. The report also considers how developments in technology, particularly in multiplex PCR and next-generation sequencing, can contribute to the ability of the BioWatch program to meet current and future challenges. This report has been determined to contain information exempt from disclosure under 5 U.S.C. 552(b). Section 15 of the Federal Advisory Committee Act provides that the National Academies shall make its final report available to the public unless the National Academies determines that the report would disclose matters described in one or more of the exemption provisions under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). In such case, the National Academies "shall make public an abbreviated version of the report that does not disclose those matters." This unrestricted, abbreviated version of the report represents, in so far as possible, the committee's findings, recommendations, and other substantive material without disclosing materials described in 5 U.S.C. 552(b).