Ownership Structure, Related Party Transactions, and Firm Valuation


Book Description

Examines the effect of ownership structure and the disclosure of related party transactions on the firm valuation of group-affiliated firms in India.




Are Related-Party Sales Value-Adding Or Value-Destroying? Evidence from China


Book Description

Prior literature provides mixed and relatively little evidence on the economic consequences of related-party transactions. We examine a hitherto underexplored issue of whether transactions among firms within the same business group increase or reduce firm value. Using a large sample of Chinese listed firms, we find that related-party sales increase firm value. However, this value enhancement disappears for firms with (i) large percentage of parent directors, (ii) high government ownership, or (iii) tax avoidance incentives that often couple with management's rent extraction activities. Although we find that intragroup sales improve firm value in general, we also find that corporate insiders use intragroup sales to deprive value from minority shareholders. Overall, our findings highlight the interplay between ownership structure and tax avoidance incentives in determining the economic consequences of related-party transactions.




Advances in Financial Economics


Book Description

Advances in Financial Economics Vol. 16 contains a set of empirical papers by a set of global scholars who examine corporate governance and market regulation from a variety of perspectives.




Related Party Transactions and Minority Shareholder Rights


Book Description

The publication reviews provisions covering related party transactions and the protection of minority shareholder rights in 31 jurisdictions, both OECD and non-OECD. In addition, the regulatory and legal systems that have beeen developed in five jurisdictions are reviewed in detail.




The Law and Finance of Related Party Transactions


Book Description

A globe-spanning group of leading law and finance scholars bring together cutting-edge research to comprehensively examine the challenges legislators face in regulating related party transactions in a socially beneficial way. Combining theoretical analysis of the foundations of efficient regulation with empirical and comparative studies, readers are invited to draw their own conclusions on which regulatory responses work best under differing circumstances. The careful selection of surveyed jurisdictions offers in-depth insight into a broad variety of regulatory strategies and their interdependence with socioeconomic and political conditions. This work should be read by scholars, policymakers, and graduate students interested in a critical, much-debated area of corporate governance.




The Benefits and Costs of Group Affiliation


Book Description

This paper investigates the benefits and associated agency costs of using internal capital markets through affiliating with groups using data of two thousand firms from nine East Asian economies between 1994-96. We find that mature and slow-growing firms with ownership structures more likely to create agency problems gain more from group affiliation, while young and high-growth firms more likely lose. Agency problems are important explanatory factors of firm value in economies outside Japan, but less so in Japan. Consistent with the literature, financially-constrained firms benefit from group affiliation. Our results are robust to different time periods and estimation techniques.




Investor Protection and Corporate Governance


Book Description

'Investor Protection and Corporate Governance' analyzes the impact of corporate governance on firm performance and valuation. Using unique datasets gathered at the firm-level the first such data in the region and results from a homogeneous corporate governance questionnaire, the book examines corporate governance characteristics, ownership structures, dividend policies, and performance measures. The book's analysis reveals the very high levels of ownership and voting rights concentrations and monolithic governance structures in the largest samples of Latin American companies up to now, and new data emphasize the importance of specific characteristics of the investor protection regimes in several Latin American countries. By and large, those firms with better governance measures across several dimensions are granted higher valuations and thus lower cost of capital. This title will be useful to researchers, policy makers, government officials, and other professionals involved in corporate governance, economic policy, and business finance, law, and management.




International Corporate Governance


Book Description

Presents research on corporate governance from a number of countries across the world, including the United States, Spain, Malaysia, Israel and others. This title examines many important corporate governance mechanisms, such as board characteristics, ownership structure, legal protection of shareholders, and annual general meetings.




The Control of Corporate Europe


Book Description

Written by an international team of authors, this book provides the first systematic account of the control of corporate Europe based on voting block data disclosed in accordance with the European Union's Large Holdings Directive (88/627/EEC). The study provides detailed information on the voting control of companies listed on the official markets in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and, as a benchmark comparison, the United States. The authors record a high concentration of control of corporations in many European countries with single blockholders frequently controlling more than fifty per cent of corporate votes. In contrast, a majority of UK listed companies have no blockholder owning more than ten per cent of shares, and a majority of US listed companies have no blockholder with more than six per cent of shares. Those chapters devoted to individual countries illustrate how blockholders can use legal devices to leverage their voting power over their cash-flow rights, or how incumbents prevent outsiders from gaining voting control. It is shown that the cultural and linguistic diversity of Europe is (almost) matched by its variety of corporate control arrangements.




Disproportional Ownership Structure and IPO Long-Run Performance of Entrepreneurial Firm in China


Book Description

This paper examines the relationship between ownership structures and IPO long-run performance in China. Although entrepreneurial firms underperform the market in general after IPO but the poor performance is mainly caused by the IPOs with ownership control wedge. Entrepreneurial firms with one share one vote structure outperform those with ownership control wedge by 30% for 3 years post-IPO in either buy-and-hold or cumulative monthly returns. Entrepreneurial firms with excess ownership control wedge have higher frequency of undertaking value-destroying related party transactions. These findings suggest that entrepreneurial firms need to improve corporate governance such as disproportional ownership structure to better safeguard the interest of long-run shareholders.