Political and Military Leadership in the World Wars


Book Description

This book approaches the World Wars and the decades between them as a single unit in modern history. It is impossible to understand either the cause or conduct of the 1939–45 war without an appreciation of the issues not wholly answered in the conflict of 1914–18. Bridging the World Wars was the establishment, revision, and ultimate collapse of the Versailles settlement and the League of Nations system between 1919 and 1939. The 1919 settlement was contested in the 1920s by Fascist Italy and began to unravel irreparably in 1931 with Japan’s incursion into Manchuria. The strategic thought of the interwar years is therefore especially instructive in assessing the prosecution of WWII, as the military ventures of these two revisionist powers pointed toward future developments even before Germany thrust a new way of war upon Eastern and Western Europe. Meanwhile, Britain, France, and the United States began an incremental conversion to new approaches to war in the air and on the sea in particular. The interwar decades are best understood as a period of calibrated rearmament by all the powers based on assumptions about the probability of a future war and the nature of its prosecution.




Political and Military Leadership in the World Wars


Book Description

This book approaches the World Wars and the decades between them as a single unit in modern history. It is impossible to understand either the cause or conduct of the 1939-45 war without an appreciation of the issues not wholly answered in the conflict of 1914-18. Bridging the World Wars was the establishment, revision, and ultimate collapse of the Versailles settlement and the League of Nations system between 1919 and 1939. The 1919 settlement was contested in the 1920s by Fascist Italy and began to unravel irreparably in 1931 with Japan's incursion into Manchuria. The strategic thought of the interwar years is therefore especially instructive in assessing the prosecution of WWII, as the military ventures of these two revisionist powers pointed toward future developments even before Germany thrust a new way of war upon Eastern and Western Europe. Meanwhile, Britain, France, and the United States began an incremental conversion to new approaches to war in the air and on the sea in particular. The interwar decades are best understood as a period of calibrated rearmament by all the powers based on assumptions about the probability of a future war and the nature of its prosecution.




Leadership in War


Book Description

A comparison of nine leaders who led their nations through the greatest wars the world has ever seen and whose unique strengths—and weaknesses—shaped the course of human history, from the bestselling, award-winning author of Churchill, Napoleon, and The Last King of America “Has the enjoyable feel of a lively dinner table conversation with an opinionated guest.” —The New York Times Book Review Taking us from the French Revolution to the Cold War, Andrew Roberts presents a bracingly honest and deeply insightful look at nine major figures in modern history: Napoleon Bonaparte, Horatio Nelson, Winston Churchill, Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin, George C. Marshall, Charles de Gaulle, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and Margaret Thatcher. Each of these leaders fundamentally shaped the outcome of the war in which their nation was embroiled. Is war leadership unique, or did these leaders have something in common, traits and techniques that transcend time and place and can be applied to the essential nature of conflict? Meticulously researched and compellingly written, Leadership in War presents readers with fresh, complex portraits of leaders who approached war with different tactics and weapons, but with the common goal of success in the face of battle. Both inspiring and cautionary, these portraits offer important lessons on leadership in times of struggle, unease, and discord. With his trademark verve and incisive observation, Roberts reveals the qualities that doom even the most promising leaders to failure, as well as the traits that lead to victory.




Leadership and Responsibility in the Second World War


Book Description

Leadership is crucial in every conflict and the willingness to accept responsibility is a vital dimension of leadership. Leadership and Responsibility in the Second World War examines of how well political, diplomatic, and military leaders, particularly in Great Britain, handled the daunting challenge of a worldwide conflagration. It seeks to determine if a connection can be delineated between leadership, responsibility, success, and failure -specifically if any connection can be found between reluctance to shoulder responsibility and failure to produce results. In so doing, the authors challenge widely accepted views on major wartime controversies, such as the role of Neville Chamberlain and his Conservative Party at the outbreak of the war, the reasons why the British failed to reach an alliance with the Soviet Union in 1939, and the motives that drove Claus von Stauffenberg to attempt to assassinate Adolf Hitler. Leadership and Responsibility in the Second World War provokes reflection about questions of character, context, and circumstances in wartime leadership.




Leadership and Responsibility in the second World War


Book Description

Leadership and Responsibility in the Second World War examines how well political, diplomatic, and military leaders, particularly in Great Britain, handled the daunting challenge of a worldwide conflagration. It seeks to determine if a connection can be delineated between leadership, responsibility, success, and failure - specifically if any connection can be found between reluctance to shoulder responsibility and failure to produce results. In doing so, the authors challenge widely accepted views on major wartime controversies, such as the role of Neville Chamberlain and his Conservative party at the outbreak of the war, the reasons the British failed to reach an alliance with the Soviet Union in 1939, and the motives that drove Claus von Stauffenberg to attempt to assassinate Adolf Hitler.




Political Victory


Book Description

Success in war has always been difficult to measure. What is judged successful by military leaders may not be judged so by political leadership, nor by the wider public, at least in a Western-style democracy. The public is generally inclined to applaud military victory, but it instinctively reserves the right to ask afterwards: Was it really worth it? In Political Victory, Brian Crozier looks at modern wars involving democracies to evaluate victory and defeat by the success or failure of political outcomes.Crozier begins with the two world wars, where in both cases the German aggressor was defeated by three key democracies: the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. In World War I military victory was squandered by treaty terms that led to the advent of Hitler and Nazism. By contrast, the total defeat of Nazism in 1945 left the Western Allies in charge of some two-thirds of Germany's population, thus enabling the victors to convert the vanquished to democracy. Crozier also deals with the break up of empires following World War II, comparing how Britain avoided full-scale war in contrast with France's violent confrontations in Southeast Asia and Algeria.America's involvement in Vietnam is analyzed in the wider context of the Cold War and the mounting challenge of international communism to Western democracies. His assessment stresses the lack of popularity in America for the idea of democratizing a region to which the U.S. has no historical or sentimental attachment. Among the smaller conflicts considered in this volume are the Suez crisis of 1956, the Falkland Island war between Britain and Argentina, and the fateful Soviet involvement in Afghanistan that helped bring about the collapse of the Soviet system. Crozier concludes with analyses of the 1991 Gulf War and the Western intervention in the former Yugoslavia.Crozier's final chapters focus on looming threats around the world with particular emphasis on international terrorism and the challenge of radical Islam. Both historical and timely, Political Victory will be of interest to military historians, political scientists, and foreign affairs specialists.




A Military Leadership Analysis of Adolf Hitler


Book Description

In order to perform a leadership analysis of Adolf Hitler, one must understand the compelling asp cts of his personality. First and foremost, Hitler saw himself as "an agent of Providence, a man of Destiny, whose vision of the future was infallible."1 Hitler was convinced beyond any doubt that it was he, and he alone, who possessed the vision, the will power, and the political and military insight to restore Germany to her rightful place among the other nations of the world. This awe-inspiring self-confidence did, however, have its drawbacks as demonstrated by Hitler's inability to accept criticism from those who may not have agreed with his enlightened opinions, views, or decisions. It was not uncommon for Hitler to break into a violent rage and behave much like a spoiled child who didn't get his way whenever his judgment was questioned. This type of personality made it extremely hard for Hitler to change his mind once he had reached a decision or to modify the goals he felt destined to achieve.2 Hitler's career was characterized by the awesome power he achieved over the German people and how he was able to use it to attain his political goals. His power over the people was partly due to his extraordinary talent as an orator. "His speeches were an instrument of political intoxication that inspired a degree of fervor in his listeners that seems to defy definition and explanation. Hitler was a master at the use of the spoken word and a genius at the art of manipulating mass propaganda for his political ends. His uncanny ability to appeal to the subconscious and irrational needs of his audience and to solicit the desired response made him a formidable political figure."3




A Military Leadership Analysis Of Adolf Hitler


Book Description

“Before the war, and still more during the conquest of the West, Hitler came to appear a gigantic figure, combining the strategy of a Napoleon with the cunning of a Machiavelli and the fanatical fervour of a Mohomet. After his first check in Russia, his figure began to shrink, and towards the end he was regarded as a blundering amateur in the military field, whose crazy orders and crass ignorance had been the Allies’ greatest asset. All the disasters of the German Army were attributed to Hitler; all its successes were credited to the German General Staff.” - B. H. Liddell Hart Liddell Hart goes on to say that while this description of Adolf Hitler may not be entirely true, there is certainly some truth to it. While conducting the research for this project, it became increasing apparent that in the late 1930s Hitler was indeed a successful military leader. The impetus behind this success was partly due to Hitler’s political decision making process which, in effect, laid the foundation for World War II. However, as his success continued to mount, he became more and more involved in the intricacies of battlefield tactics and strategy. This is where Hitler’s and Germany’s eventual downfall for the conquest of Europe began. Upon examining Hitler’s strengths, weaknesses, and decision making processes as a military leader one can begin to fully appreciate how the infamous “stop” order at Dunkirk and his “no retreat” policy at Stalingrad are often referred to as Hitler’s greatest blunders of World War II.




Why Leaders Fight


Book Description

The history of political events is made by people. From wars to elections to political protests, the choices we make, our actions, how we behave, dictate events. Not all individuals have the same impact on our world and our lives. Some peoples' choices alter the pathways that history takes. In particular, national chief executives play a large role in forging the destinies of the countries they lead. Why Leaders Fight is about those world leaders and how their beliefs, world views, and tolerance for risk and military conflict are shaped by their life experiences before they enter office - military, family, occupation, and more. Using in-depth research on important leaders and the largest set of data on leader backgrounds ever gathered, the authors of Why Leaders Fight show that - within the constraints of domestic political institutions and the international system - who ends up in office plays a critical role in determining when and why countries go to war.




Political Success in War


Book Description

What is success in war? Who defines success? A review of past theorists such as Sun Tzu, Thucydides, Jomini and Clausewitz along with modern scholars such as William Martel, Azar Gat, and J. Boone Bartholomees produces a model for understanding success. First, success must be defined using political terms. Since war is a political endeavor at the strategic level, success in war must be defined using political language. Politicians and military leaders must define the objectives of war and convince the population that the political condition has improved using whatever political language is required for the given situation. Military tactical language is not sufficient for defining success at the political level. Second, the political leaders must define the desired objective for the military campaign. Political leaders understand politics and the nature of the population. Military leaders should help political leaders define success in war. Politicians understand the population and military leaders understand the theory and history of war. Third, the political condition that exists at the end of the war determines whether the war was successful. Victory in battle is important but is not always necessary for success. War must improve the political condition. Finally, a review of two US conflicts in Lebanon against the success model demonstrates its utility. The political and military leaders in Lebanon 1958 followed the theory of the model and achieved a successful outcome for the conflict. The political and military leaders of Lebanon 1983 did not adhere to the theory of the success model and were unable to achieve success. Although adherence to the model will not ensure future success, it can be used to help political and military leaders better prepare for future conflict.