Pollution Charges, Community Pressure, and Abatement Cost of Industrial Pollution in China


Book Description

Community pressure may be as strong an incentive for industrial firms to control pollution in China as pollution levies are.Wang evaluates the strength of the effect that community pressure and pollution charges have on industrial pollution control in China and estimates the marginal cost of pollution abatement. He examines a well-documented set of plant-level data, combined with community-level data, to assess the impact of pollution charges and community pressure on industrial behavior in China.He constructs and estimates an industrial organic water pollution discharge model for plants that violate standards for pollution discharge, pay pollution charges, and are constantly under community pressure to further abate pollution.He creates a model and estimates implicit prices for pollution discharges from community pressure, which are determined jointly by the explicit price, the pollution levy. He finds that the implicit discharge price is at least as high as the explicit price. In other words, community pressure not only exists but may be as strong an incentive as the pollution charge is for industrial firms to control pollution in China. Wang`s modeling approach also provides a way to estimate the marginal cost of pollution abatement. The empirical results show that the current marginal cost of abatement is about twice the effective charge rate in China.This paper - a product of Infrastructure and Environment, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to study environmental regulation in developing countries. The author may be contacted at [email protected].










Surviving Success


Book Description




Endogenous Enforcement and Effectiveness of China's Pollution Levy System


Book Description

How well air and water pollution regulation is implemented depends very much on both the level of economic development and the actual environmental quality. Pollution pricing is closer to the dictates of environmental economics than China's formal regulatory statutes would suggest, and there is considerable scope for using economic instruments to reduce China's industrial pollution problems.




How the Chinese System of Charges and Subsidies Affects Pollution Control Efforts by China's Top Industrial Polluters


Book Description

China's unique combination of emissions charges and pollution abatement subsidies has given China's most heavily polluting industrial firms incentive to invest in pollution abatement.There have been extensive theoretical studies of firms' responses to environmental regulations and enforcement but few empirical analyses of firms expenditures on pollution abatement in response to different regulations and enforcement strategies.Wang and Chen empirically analyze the pollution abatement efforts of Chinese industrial firms under a system combining pollution charges and abatement subsidies.Using data on China's top industrial polluters and on regional development in China, they find that the combination of charges and subsidies used in China has provided effective incentives for the most heavily polluting industrial firms to abate pollution.Chinese industries operate under a unique pollution control system, a market-based instrument combining emissions charges and abatement subsidies. This combination of charges and subsidies has given firms incentive to invest in wastewater treatment facilities. The pollution levy, although low, has significantly improved investments in abatement.Wang and Chen found that the more pollution a firm generates, the more likely it is to invest in pollution abatement.This study was only of top polluters, which are closely monitored by environmental agencies, so the results may not be valid for other sources of industrial pollution.This paper - a product of Infrastructure and Environment, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to identify appropriate policies for environmental regulation in developing countries. Hua Wang may be contacted at [email protected].




Surviving Success


Book Description

In this paper, Dasgupta, Wang and Wheeler analyze China's industrial pollution problem and the possibilities for significant improvement through policy reform. Their assessment is based on a large-scale econometric exercise, with data provided by China's National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA). They focus particularly on two major determinants of changes in the pollution intensity (or pollution per unit of output) of industry: General economic reforms, and China's pollution charge system. Using their econometric equations for forecasting, they develop three future pollution scenarios under varying assumptions about policies during the next two decades: (1) Continuation of the economic reforms with no further tightening of regulation: They find that organic water pollution will stabilize in many areas, and actually decline in some. Emissions of airborne particulates and sulfur dioxide will continue growing, but at a much slower pace than industrial output. However, most of China's waterways will remain heavily polluted and hundreds of thousands of urban residents will continue to die or suffer serious respiratory damage from air pollution. (2) Continued reforms, plus 5% annual increases in pollution charges (maintaining the trend for water pollution charges since 1987): Organic water pollution will decline sharply enough to restore the health of many waterways; air pollution will stabilize or decline in most cities, saving many thousands of lives. (3) Continued reforms, plus 10% annual increases in pollution charges: This option will eliminate most of the organic water pollution from regulated Chinese factories, and induce major improvements in urban air quality. During the next two decades, Beijing and Chongqing alone will have about 40,000 fewer deaths from air pollution if this option is chosen instead of the pure economic reform strategy. Dasgupta, Wang and Wheeler conclude the paper with a detailed analysis of the benefits and costs of tighter air pollution control. For a representative Chinese city, Zhengzhou, they find that the optimum charge rate for sulfur dioxide emissions is around $90/ton -- fifty times greater than the current rate. Their analysis also suggests that air pollution control is a very cost-effective lifesaving option, yielding a social rate of return in excess of 3,000% for further abatement in large cities. At the current level of pollution control, they find that continued regulatory inaction amounts to valuing a Chinese worker's life at less than $US 500, a figure which is tragically low by any standard.




How the Chinese System of Charges and Subsidies Affects Pollution Control Efforts by China's Top Industrial Polluters


Book Description

There have been extensive theoretical studies of firms' responses to environmental regulations ad enforcement but few empirical analyses of firms' expenditures on pollution abatement in response to different regulations and enforcement strategies. The authors empirically analyze the pollution abatement efforts of Chinese industrial firms under a system combining pollution charges and abatement subsidies. Using data on China's top industrial polluters and on regional development in China, they find that the combination of charges and subsidies used in china has provided effective incentives for the most heavily polluting industrial firms to abate pollution. Chinese industries operate under a unique pollution control system, a market-based instrument combining emissions charges and abatement subsidies. This combination of charges and subsidies has given firms incentive to invest in wastewater treatment facilities. The pollution levy, although low, has significantly improved investments in abatement. The authors found that the more pollution a firm generates, the more likely it is to invest in pollution abatement. This study was only of top polluters, which are closely monitored by environmental agencies, so the results may not be valid for other sources of industrial pollution.