Progress with VFM savings and lessons for cost reduction programmes


Book Description

This report discusses how much the Treasury's Value for Money savings programme has improved value for money across government. The programme aims to achieve government-wide annual savings of £35 billion from 2008-09 to 2010-11. Today's report concludes that the Treasury's design addressed some weaknesses in earlier savings programmes, and departments have made some progress in their management of their programmes compared with previous spending periods. Nevertheless, departments' planned programmes did not contain sufficient contingency and it is unlikely that departments will achieve the government-wide target of £35 billion of annual savings, which fully meet the Comprehensive Spending Review criteria, in 2010-11. To date the NAO has reviewed reported savings amounting to some £2.8 billion from five major departments which are to deliver around 40 per cent of the government-wide total. The NAO has concluded that 38 per cent fairly represented sustainable savings (green); 44 per cent may represent savings but with some uncertainty (amber); and 18 per cent do not represent, or significantly overstate, savings (red). Common problems include the use of unsuitable baselines for the calculation of savings, a lack of transparency over arms-length bodies' reporting processes, and difficulties in demonstrating links between savings and performance. This report is accompanied by the NAO's reviews of the value for money savings reported by the Ministry of Defence (HC 292, ISBN 9780102965407); HM Revenue Customs (HC 293, ISBN 9780102965414); and the Department for Education (HC 294, ISBN 9780102965421)




Progress with VFM savings and lessons for cost reduction programmes


Book Description

The £35 billion value for money target set as part of the 2007 Comprehensive Spending Review required public bodies to make sustainable cash-releasing savings, whilst maintaining the delivery of departmental priorities. The £35 billion target represented savings of 3 per cent a year for each department's expenditure at the start of the period. By March 2010, two years into the three-year programme, departments and local authorities had reported only £15 billion of savings, less than half of the total needed to reach the £35 billion target. Departments could not even measure adequately what savings they had made, and the Treasury failed to create a framework for reliable reporting. The current financial environment is fundamentally different, with substantial cash reductions required over the next four years by most departments. The results from the CSR07 programme raises concerns as to whether departments are ready to implement effectively a programme of value for money savings. There is a serious risk that departments will rely solely on cutting front-line services to reduce costs, without adequately exploring the potential to reduce costs through other value for money improvements. Whilst day to day responsibility for delivering savings will be for individual departments, the Committee expects to see the Treasury provide leadership, taking full responsibility for delivery across government and intervening where performance does not meet expectations.




Treasury minutes on the third to the thirteenth reports from the Committee of Public Accounts session 2010-11


Book Description

The reports published as HC 470 (ISBN 9780215555106); HC 440 (9780215555144); HC 471 (9780215555205); HC 439 (9780215555243); HC 538 (9780215555434); HC 424 (9780215555496); HC 553 (9780215555502); HC 503 (9780215555571); HC 573 (9780215555595); HC 610 (9780215555656); HC 594 (9780215555717), session 2010-11




Ofcom


Book Description

Over the last five years Ofcom has saved some £23 million, however, it is not possible to conclude on the extent to which Ofcom is delivering optimal value for the resources it uses. With its complex remit across the telecommunications sector, it needs a better articulation of the intended outcomes of its activities and how its work achieves those outcomes. Taking into account the expansion of its remit and inflation, Ofcom, the independent regulator and competition authority for the UK communications sector, costs around 27 per cent less in real terms (around £3 million per year more in cash terms) to run than its predecessors. Ofcom spends over £70 million managing the radio spectrum, which generates income for the Government of about £200 million per year. Analysis by the NAO suggests that there are many positive outcomes in the communications market: for example, prices have fallen and there is better choice and quality. However, there are still areas where improvements could be made. Three of the goods and services most complained about to the consumer helpline Consumer Direct are communications products (mobile phone service agreements, telephone landlines and internet service providers). Most of Ofcom's stakeholders feel that it conducts its consultations well, but 44 per cent of those the NAO surveyed felt that Ofcom does not go on to act in a timely manner. The frequency of appeals against Ofcom's regulatory decisions is an increasing challenge and they have cost Ofcom over £1 million per year since 2007-08.




Accountability for public money - progress report


Book Description

This report is a follow-up to the Committee's report on Accountability for Public Money (HC 740, session 2010-11 (ISBN 9780215559029)) an issue at the core of the relationship between Parliament and government. Accounting Officers remain accountable to Parliament for funds voted to their departments but the policy intention is that local bodies will have significant discretion over the services they deliver. In the Government's response, 'Accountability: Adapting to Decentralisation', Sir Bob Kerslake drew a distinction between those services that government delivers directly and those that it may fund but are delivered in more decentralised arrangements. He proposed that Accounting Officers set out, in Accountability System Statements, the arrangements they have in place to provide assurance about the probity and value for money of funds spent through devolved systems. All departments are expected to produce Statements by summer 2012. Departments have made a genuine effort to develop arrangements which reconcile accountability and localism but the Statements so far are unwieldy and considerably more needs to be done to improve their clarity, consistency and completeness. There is concern that accountability frameworks must drive value for money and, critically, are sufficiently robust to address the operational or financial failure of service providers. Departments are placing increasing reliance on market mechanisms such as user choice to drive up performance and value for money, but there are limits to what these mechanisms can achieve. The Treasury needs to take ownership of the system and ensure that the Comptroller and Auditor General has the necessary powers and rights of access to examine the value for money of funds spent through devolved systems




Sessional Returns


Book Description

On cover and title page: House, committees of the whole House, general committees and select committees




Lessons from PFI and other projects


Book Description

There are legitimate concerns being expressed about the continuing financial cost of PFI for public organisations such as NHS Trusts. The Committee believes that some of the Government's case for using PFI has not been based on robust analysis, but on ill-founded comparisons and invalid assumptions. The costs and benefits identified in business cases need to be revisited after contracts are signed and periodically thereafter, to inform future procurement decisions. In particular, the Committee's view is that the Government should revisit the tax assumptions it builds into the cost and benefit case for PFI. Taxpayers could get a much better deal from PFI, and the taxpayer's position is also made worse by poor transparency of investor and contract information alongside patchy public sector commercial skills. The Treasury and departments should make full use of existing contractual rights of access and further investor information to increase transparency and find ways for taxpayers to get a share of the profits made by PFI contractors. At present, PFI deals look better value for the private sector than for the taxpayer. Private sector funds have built up portfolios of PFI projects from the large market that government has created, benefiting from potential economies of scale without any obligation to share such volume gains. Government, in contrast, has a fragmented approach and is not making use of its bulk buying power. The Treasury is seeking further efficiency savings, but achieving any savings on existing contracts will depend on voluntary agreements with investors and suppliers.




Reducing costs in the Department for Transport


Book Description

As part of the 2010 Spending Review the government announced a significant reduction in the budget of the Department for Transport, with spending due to be 15% lower by 2014-15, in real terms, than the Department's £12.8 billion budget in 2010-11. The Department prepared early, identifying areas for budget reductions based on good analysis. But for road users, railway passengers and taxpayers, there are many questions which remain unanswered. The Department doesn't fully understand the impact of its cuts to road maintenance. There is concern that short-term budget cutting could prove counter-productive, costing more in the long-term as a result of increased vehicle damage and the higher cost of repairing the more severe road damage. Another area of concern is rail spending. The Department spends two-thirds of its budget through third party organisations such as Network Rail and Transport for London. While information and assurance have improved over some third party spending, there is still a lack of proper accountability and transparency for Network Rail. Rail budgets aren't being reduced as much as other areas, yet passengers still face high fares. The Department hands Network Rail over £3 billion each year, underwrites debt of over £25 billion and continues to treat it as a private sector company. The National Audit Office must be allowed full audit access as quickly as possible.. Better contingency plans for dealing with threats to its planned budget reductions also need to be developed - for example if some of its planned efficiency savings do not deliver or if inflation is higher than forecast




The Academies Programme


Book Description

Academies are state schools which are independent of local authorities and directly accountable to the Department for Education. This report focuses on the performance of sponsored academies (271 on 5 January 2011), usually established to raise educational standards at under performing schools in deprived areas. They have performed impressively to date, achieving rapid academic improvements and raising aspirations in some of the most deprived areas in the country. An important feature of the sponsored model is the role of the sponsors themselves: individuals or organisations who contribute financially, directly or in kind, and who bring expertise and a new approach to the schools they run. But there are concerns. There are already signs of potential financial and governance instability: there needs to be a strong framework with which academies must comply to ensure probity and effective governance across the Programme in the future. While the Department has issued guidance on internal controls and financial management, it has not made important elements mandatory, and many academies are not complying. The report notes some existing sponsors have failed to fulfil the financial contributions they originally pledged to their academies. The Young People's Learning Agency, responsible for funding and monitoring academies, are planning to overhaul academies' governance and accountability, with an emphasis on light-touch regulation. However, light-touch central regulation can only meet the standards for managing public money if it is accompanied by robust controls at academy level to ensure good governance and clear accountability.




Customer first programme


Book Description

Under the Customer First Programme, delivery of grants and loans to higher education students in England is being transferred from local authorities to the Student Loans Company (the Company), a non-departmental public body of the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (the Department). In 2009 the Company began assessing applications from new students; by 2011 it will be responsible for applications from all students in England. Performance in processing applications and communicating with students in this first year was completely unacceptable. Many students waited weeks or months for their financial support. Fewer than half of all applications were fully processed by the start of term, and applications took on average a third longer to process than local authorities had achieved. The Company answered fewer than half the calls it received in 2009; in September 87% of calls went unanswered. Disabled students suffered disproportionately in 2009, as the Company devoted too few staff to processing their applications. The Company also demonstrated a number of IT failings in 2009: most importantly, it did not sufficiently test its crucial document scanning - the failure of which was the catalyst for the failure of the entire system. The Department underestimated the risks in centralising the service, the Programme Board lacked skills and experience, and there was poor communication between the Programme Board, the Company's Board, and the Department. There has been limited improvement in 2010 but uncertainties remain over the Company's ability to deliver and maintain a service that provides value for money.