Reminiscences of Adm. George W. Anderson Jr., USN (Ret.), Vol. 1


Book Description

This oral history traces the early career of a future Chief of Naval Operations from Naval Academy graduation in 1927 through command of Carrier Division Six in the Mediterranean in 1958-59. Along the way, he discusses flight training, aviation duty in light cruisers and patrol planes, and service in aircraft carriers, including putting the USS Yorktown (CV-10) into commission under Captain "Jocko" Clark. Admiral Anderson held a number of important planning jobs ashore, including with the Bureau of Aeronautics, the AirPac staff under John Towers, and CominCh staff. He commanded the carriers USS Mindoro (CVE-120) and Franklin D. Roosevelt (CVB-42). In the early 1950s, he was on the Sixth Fleet staff, helped establish the NATO command in Europe, and was essentially chief of staff to Admiral Arthur Radford as Chairman of the JCS. As a flag officer, he was Commander Formosa Patrol Force before taking command of CarDiv Six. The concluding volume of this memoir deals with Admiral Anderson's command of the Sixth Fleet from 1959 to 1961, his stormy tenure as Chief of Naval Operations from 1961 to 1963, his tour as U.S. Ambassador to Portugal from 1963 to 1966, and his activities since retirement from government service. In describing his time as fleet commander, Admiral Anderson tells of the fleet's combat capabilities and role as a goodwill ambassador for the nation. When he became CNO during the administration of President John F. Kennedy, Admiral Anderson had good relations with Secretary of the Navy John Connally. Admiral Anderson is much less kind in discussing SecNav Fred Korth and SecDef Robert McNamara. The admiral tells of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and his widely publicized disagreements with civilian authority over the Tactical Fighter Experimental (TFX) fighter program that later became the F-111 Aardvark. The memoir also tells of his removal in 1963, when he was not reappointed CNO. He went instead to serve in Portugal. He tells of his dealings with the Portuguese government and with various offices within the U.S. State Department. Following his retirement from active government service, Admiral Anderson served on several corporate boards and was a member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board in the Nixon administration.




Reminiscences of Adm. George W. Anderson Jr., USN (Ret.), Vol. 2


Book Description

This oral history traces the early career of a future Chief of Naval Operations from Naval Academy graduation in 1927 through command of Carrier Division Six in the Mediterranean in 1958-59. Along the way, he discusses flight training, aviation duty in light cruisers and patrol planes, and service in aircraft carriers, including putting the USS Yorktown (CV-10) into commission under Captain "Jocko" Clark. Admiral Anderson held a number of important planning jobs ashore, including with the Bureau of Aeronautics, the AirPac staff under John Towers, and CominCh staff. He commanded the carriers USS Mindoro (CVE-120) and Franklin D. Roosevelt (CVB-42). In the early 1950s, he was on the Sixth Fleet staff, helped establish the NATO command in Europe, and was essentially chief of staff to Admiral Arthur Radford as Chairman of the JCS. As a flag officer, he was Commander Formosa Patrol Force before taking command of CarDiv Six. The concluding volume of this memoir deals with Admiral Anderson's command of the Sixth Fleet from 1959 to 1961, his stormy tenure as Chief of Naval Operations from 1961 to 1963, his tour as U.S. Ambassador to Portugal from 1963 to 1966, and his activities since retirement from government service. In describing his time as fleet commander, Admiral Anderson tells of the fleet's combat capabilities and role as a goodwill ambassador for the nation. When he became CNO during the administration of President John F. Kennedy, Admiral Anderson had good relations with Secretary of the Navy John Connally. Admiral Anderson is much less kind in discussing SecNav Fred Korth and SecDef Robert McNamara. The admiral tells of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and his widely publicized disagreements with civilian authority over the Tactical Fighter Experimental (TFX) fighter program that later became the F-111 Aardvark. The memoir also tells of his removal in 1963, when he was not reappointed CNO. He went instead to serve in Portugal. He tells of his dealings with the Portuguese government and with various offices within the U.S. State Department. Following his retirement from active government service, Admiral Anderson served on several corporate boards and was a member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board in the Nixon administration.




Reminiscences of Adm. George W. Anderson Jr., USN (Ret.), Vol. 2


Book Description

This oral history traces the early career of a future Chief of Naval Operations from Naval Academy graduation in 1927 through command of Carrier Division Six in the Mediterranean in 1958-59. Along the way, he discusses flight training, aviation duty in light cruisers and patrol planes, and service in aircraft carriers, including putting the USS Yorktown (CV-10) into commission under Captain "Jocko" Clark. Admiral Anderson held a number of important planning jobs ashore, including with the Bureau of Aeronautics, the AirPac staff under John Towers, and CominCh staff. He commanded the carriers USS Mindoro (CVE-120) and Franklin D. Roosevelt (CVB-42). In the early 1950s, he was on the Sixth Fleet staff, helped establish the NATO command in Europe, and was essentially chief of staff to Admiral Arthur Radford as Chairman of the JCS. As a flag officer, he was Commander Formosa Patrol Force before taking command of CarDiv Six. The concluding volume of this memoir deals with Admiral Anderson's command of the Sixth Fleet from 1959 to 1961, his stormy tenure as Chief of Naval Operations from 1961 to 1963, his tour as U.S. Ambassador to Portugal from 1963 to 1966, and his activities since retirement from government service. In describing his time as fleet commander, Admiral Anderson tells of the fleet's combat capabilities and role as a goodwill ambassador for the nation. When he became CNO during the administration of President John F. Kennedy, Admiral Anderson had good relations with Secretary of the Navy John Connally. Admiral Anderson is much less kind in discussing SecNav Fred Korth and SecDef Robert McNamara. The admiral tells of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and his widely publicized disagreements with civilian authority over the Tactical Fighter Experimental (TFX) fighter program that later became the F-111 Aardvark. The memoir also tells of his removal in 1963, when he was not reappointed CNO. He went instead to serve in Portugal. He tells of his dealings with the Portuguese government and with various offices within the U.S. State Department. Following his retirement from active government service, Admiral Anderson served on several corporate boards and was a member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board in the Nixon administration.




Diplomacy, Force, And Leadership


Book Description

Alexander L. George is a paragon of scholarship-an academic who successfully crosses boundaries between theory and policy, political science and several different disciplines, and case study analysis and theory building. Most of all, he bridges the gap between the ivory tower of research and the world of people, power, and politics. In these original essays, former students, colleagues, and admirers collaborate in portraying the research program of Alexander George's scholarship in all its diversity and complexity, examining subjects ranging from the role of beliefs in foreign policy-making to the factors involved in diplomacy and the use of force. Taken together, these essays offer strong testimony to Alexander George's extraordinary vision, erudition, and humanity.




High Seas Buffer


Book Description

it ensured that friction over the Taiwan Strait did not escalate into a full-blown war. In fact, the Taiwan Patrol Force did its job so well that virtually nothing has been written about it. U.S. Navy ships acted both as a buffer between the two antagonists and as a trip wire in case of aggression. The force fulfilled the latter function twice in the 1950s -- during the first (1954-55) and second (1958) Taiwan Strait crises --




Whitey


Book Description

Whitey is the first complete biography of one of the last surviving World War II U.S. Navy aces, and one of the Navy’s most respected officers of any period. Following a typical American, mid-western boyhood, Whitey Feightner was in the vanguard of the huge group of young men thrust into World War II. Upon receiving his commission and his gold wings, he was assigned to a fighter squadron in the Pacific and soon found himself flying with the likes of Jimmy Flatley and Butch O’Hare, two leaders who imparted their own brand of flying skill and leadership to the young ensign. He flew through many of the war’s most hectic and dangerous campaigns, such as Guadalcanal and the Marianas, gaining nine official kills. There were times he should not have returned from a mission, but his own skill and positive outlook helped him make it through all the dangers. After the war, Whitey became a member of the Regular Navy and was assigned to several of the Navy’s most secret and action-filled projects at Patuxent River, Maryland. He flew and helped develop legendary fighters like the F7U Cutlass, F9F Banshee, and Cougar and the attack aircraft AD Skyraider as they joined the fleet, and was one of only two men who flew the radical F7U Cutlass in Blue Angels colors. Returning to the fleet in command of a squadron, and later of an air group, he continued to develop fighter tactics. In between tours at sea, he served in the Pentagon dealing with all the personalities and political turmoil of the time while trying to bring naval aviation into the future. Working with such luminaries as Hyman Rickover and Elmo Zumwalt was not for the feint-hearted, and even Whitey did not come away unscathed. Yet, through it all, he retained the affable demeanor that characterized this rare and highly skilled naval aviator. His life story could serve as a model for any young aviator to follow.




Taiwan Straits


Book Description

In Taiwan Straits: Crisis in Asia and the Role of the U.S. Navy, historian Bruce Elleman surveys the situation that has led to the current tensions between China and Taiwan. Starting in 1949, the final phase of the civil war in China, which ended with Communist rule of the mainland and nationalist control of Taiwan, this work explores how the 100-mile wide passage of water, known as the Taiwan Strait has served as the geographic flashpoint between the two nations. Even though U.S. Navy destroyers have patrolled this body of water from 1950 to 1979, it has seen four crises—1954-55, 1958, 1962, and, after the withdrawal of the U.S. Navy, 1995-96—that threatened to push Taiwan and China to the brink of war. Notwithstanding the role of the United States in defusing cross-strait tensions for some three decades and the cold peace that has settled in since then, the Taiwan Strait continues to be a major source of anxiety for the region and the world. Taiwan Straits: Crisis in Asia and the Role of the U.S. Navy traces the evolution of this tension between the two nations, details the history of the crises between them, and brings this story forward into the present by considering continuing sources of conflict, present diplomatic efforts by the aggrieved nations, and other key interests—from the United States and Europe to other regional powers—and future possible outcomes in the ongoing struggle between China and Taiwan relations. Simply written and cogently argued, it is the ideal source for military personnel, diplomats, and scholars and student of the modern Far East.




Gambling with Armageddon


Book Description

From the Pulitzer Prize-winning author of American Prometheus comes the first effort to set the Cuban Missile Crisis, with its potential for nuclear holocaust, in a wider historical narrative of the Cold War—how such a crisis arose and why, at the very last possible moment, it never happened. “Fresh and thrilling.... A fascinating work of history that is very relevant to today’s politics.” —Walter Isaacson, bestselling author of The Code Breaker Pulitzer Prize-winning author Martin J. Sherwin introduces a dramatic new view of how luck and leadership avoided a nuclear holocaust during the October 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Set within the sweep of the Cold War and its nuclear history, every chapter of this gripping narrative of the origins and resolution of history’s most dangerous thirteen days offers lessons and a warning for our time. Gambling with Armageddon presents a riveting, page turning account of the crisis as well as an original exploration of the evolving place of nuclear weapons in the Post-World War II world.




Rhetoric in Martial Deliberations and Decision Making


Book Description

In this study of the discourse involved in martial deliberations, Ronald H. Carpenter examines the rhetoric employed by naval and military commanders as they recommend specific tactics and strategies to peers as well as presidents. Drawing on ideas of rhetorical thinking from Aristotle to Kenneth Burke, Carpenter identifies two concepts of particular importance to the military decision-making process: prudence and the representative anecdote.




Managing Military Operations in Crises


Book Description

This report documents the results of a conference on Military Operations and Crisis Management, held at RAND in January 1990 to explore issues concerning the use of military force in crises. The conference brought together active-duty and retired military officers, analysts, academic experts, and policy officials. Together they examined the constraints on and special requirements for force employment in crises that potentially involve the superpowers in a nuclear escalation. Tension can arise between the conflicting logics and imperatives of force and diplomacy when two nuclear-armed superpowers seek to have a war without shooting at each other. The logic of force employment in crisis thus differs from that in war. Conference participants concluded that the political signal that might be intended by the manipulation of military forces may not be understood by the adversary. Political leaders must understand the possible costs and risks in military terms of actions taken with military forces. Military leaders, on the other hand, must recognize the nature of the crisis management challenge to political leaders. Finally, political leaders must communicate their objectives clearly to those in charge of implementing them.