Some Principles of Maritime Strategy


Book Description

Reproduction of the original: Some Principles of Maritime Strategy by Julian Stafford Corbett




Some Principles of Maritime Strategy


Book Description

In his excellent book explaining naval strategy, Julian S. Corbett examines sound maritime strategy. Crucially, he advances the view that navies could perform much better if their role in assisting land warfare and amphibious forces were increased. Writing in the early 20th century, Corbett draws upon centuries of naval battles and identifies several common strains. The development of war strategies at sea often entailed trial and error - the author elects to explain how strategy evolved as much from calamity as practice. How naval force should be assembled, how it should form up, and how concentrations and dispersal of ships should be organized each receive discussion. Although naval warfare has substantially changed since this book's original publication, it continues to be consulted for its timeless and sound advice. Corbett's era predated the extensive use of submarines and aeroplanes in naval combat, but his conclusions remain sound and sought after even in the tutoring of modern maritime strategy.




Theory and Nature of War


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Masters of War


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This is the first comprehensive study based on a detailed textual analysis of the classical works on war by Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Mao Tse-tung, and to a lesser extent, Jomini and Machiavelli. Brushing stereotypes aside, the author takes a fresh look at what these strategic thinkers actually said—not what they are widely believed to have said. He finds that despite their apparent differences in terms of time, place, cultural background, and level of material/technological development, all had much more in common than previously supposed. In fact, the central conclusion of this book is that the logic of waging war and of strategic thinking is as universal and timeless as human nature itself. This third, revised and expanded edition includes five new chapters and some new charts and diagrams.




Mahan, Corbett, and the Foundations of Naval Strategic Thought


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At the turn of the twentieth century, Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian Stafford Corbett emerged as foundational thinkers on naval strategy and maritime power. Important in their lifetimes, their writings remain relevant in the contemporary environment. The significance of Corbett and Mahan to modern naval strategy seems beyond question, but too often their theories are simplified or used without a real understanding of their fundamental bases.Labeling a strategy, operation, or even a navy “Mahanian” or “Corbettian” tells very little. Mahan, Corbett, and the Foundations of Naval Strategic Thought provides an in-depth introduction and a means to stimulate discussion about the theories of Mahan and Corbett. Although there is no substitute for opening the actual writings of Mahan and Corbett, this requires time, not just to read but most importantly to understand how states exploit the sea in the strategic sense. Mahan, Corbett, and the Foundations of Naval Strategic Thought takes the reader from their grand strategic foundations of sea power and maritime strategy, through their ideas about naval warfare and strategy, to how Mahan and Corbett thought a navy should integrate with other instruments of national power, and finally, to how they thought states with powerful navies win wars. This window into naval strategy provides twenty-first-century readers an understanding of what navies can and perhaps more importantly cannot do in the international environment.




Mahan on Naval Warfare


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The Men Who Lost America


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Questioning popular belief, a historian and re-examines what exactly led to the British Empire’s loss of the American Revolution. The loss of America was an unexpected defeat for the powerful British Empire. Common wisdom has held that incompetent military commanders and political leaders in Britain must have been to blame, but were they? This intriguing book makes a different argument. Weaving together the personal stories of ten prominent men who directed the British dimension of the war, historian Andrew O’Shaughnessy dispels the incompetence myth and uncovers the real reasons that rebellious colonials were able to achieve their surprising victory. In interlinked biographical chapters, the author follows the course of the war from the perspectives of King George III, Prime Minister Lord North, military leaders including General Burgoyne, the Earl of Sandwich, and others who, for the most part, led ably and even brilliantly. Victories were frequent, and in fact the British conquered every American city at some stage of the Revolutionary War. Yet roiling political complexities at home, combined with the fervency of the fighting Americans, proved fatal to the British war effort. The book concludes with a penetrating assessment of the years after Yorktown, when the British achieved victories against the French and Spanish, thereby keeping intact what remained of the British Empire. “A remarkable book about an important but curiously underappreciated subject: the British side of the American Revolution. With meticulous scholarship and an eloquent writing style, O'Shaughnessy gives us a fresh and compelling view of a critical aspect of the struggle that changed the world.”—Jon Meacham, author of Thomas Jefferson: The Art of Power




The Leverage of Sea Power


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"Through colourful and lively historical illustrations as well as strategic theory, Gray shows how sea power, when integrated with land and air power, increases the combatant's opportunities and choices. With dozens of examples from the Greek and Persian wars of the fifth century B.C. through the recent war in the Gulf, Gray systematically demonstrates the ways sea power has been used, and how it might have been used, to win battles and wars. His thought-provoking commentary is certain to become essential reading for the makers of defense policy today. The Leverage of Sea Power is an important and original contribution to the science of warfare historically and in the nuclear age." --




Theorist of Maritime Strategy


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Since its publication in 1911, Sir Julian's Corbett's Some Principles of Maritime Strategy has remained a key document within naval strategic thinking. Yet despite his undoubted influence, Corbett's theories have not been subjected to scientific review and systematic comparison with other naval thinkers. In this assessment, Dr Widen has provided a fresh interpretation of Corbett's legacy and his continued relevance as a classic theorist of naval war. Divided into three parts, the book begins with a brief biographical overview of Corbett's life, highlighting in particular his bibliographic history and the influences on his thinking. The latter two sections then describe and assess Corbett's views on military and naval theory, respectively. Together these two parts represent his overall theory of maritime strategy, including his conception of limited war, his intellectual debt to Clausewitz, command of the sea, his critic of decisive battle, as well as the different methods of naval operations. By means of a thorough assessment of Corbett's theory of maritime strategy, Dr Widén highlights the continued relevance of his theories. Both the strengths and shortcomings of Corbett's thinking are discussed and reflections offered on their intellectual, practical and doctrinal value. In so doing, Dr Widen has written a book that deserves to be read by anyone with an interest in the past, present or future of maritime strategy. Contents: Foreword, Geoffrey Till; Introduction; Part I The Man, His Times and Scholarly Achievements: Life and historical works; Theoretical works and influences. Part II Military Theory in a Maritime Context: The epistemology of war; General theory of war. Part III Naval Theory as the Ends and Means in Naval Warfare: Theory of naval war; Theory of naval operations; General conclusions; Bibliography; Index. About the Author: Dr. J.J. Widen is Senior Lecturer in War Studies at the Swedish National Defence College, Stockholm, Sweden. Publisher's note.