Book Description
This paper studies market liquidity and stock prices components of information asymmetry around non-mandated earnings announcements by focusing on effective bid-ask spreads and trading volumes. Using event study methodology for 309 voluntary earnings announcements from 1998 to 2001, we found that voluntary earnings disclosures exhibit significant stock market reactions around news releases. We also noticed a significant decrease in effective spreads and an increase in trading volumes when good and bad news are released. Moreover, investors react more aggressively to bad news announcements suggesting that these news are more credible. Panel-data regression analyses were also used to examine both categories of voluntary earnings announcements: earning forecasts and quarterly earning announcements separately. They show that quarterly announcements enhance market liquidity by reducing bid-ask spreads and increasing trading volumes in the announcement window. However, earnings forecasts exacerbate information asymmetry before and after the announcement date. This result suggests that earning forecasts are subject to earning manipulation and less credible, then for the market.