Stylized Facts of Democratization and Economic Growth in the Long-Term


Book Description

Do democracy and economic growth exerts similar patterns in the long-run? This paper systematically examines the processes of democratization and Real GDP per capita growth and highlights the existence of common patterns, classified into four groups according to an originally developed taxonomy: synergic success, erratic democratization, synergic failure and authoritarian growth. The analysis, accomplished both in a static and in a dynamic framework, shows that synergic success is the strikingly prevailing outcome in the long-run. The results are robust to different data sources and time-spans (1972-2010; 1980-2010; 1960-2010). The present analysis embodies an important advantage, i.e. the possibility of bypassing the challenge of defining democracy according to arbitrary thresholds in quantitative indices: the focus is in fact on the process of political development (along an ideal continuum from autocracy to democracy) rather than on its final output. Finally, the paper offers a tentative exploration of the potential role of conflicts and region-specific characteristics in affecting the outcome of the democracy/growth relationship.




Inequality, Democracy, and Growth in Brazil


Book Description

In terms accessible to non-economists, Marcos José Mendes describes the ways democracy and inequality produce low growth in the short and medium terms. In the longer term, he argues that Brazil has two paths in front of it. One is to create the conditions necessary to boost economic performance and drive the country toward a high level of development. The other is to fail in untying the political knot that blocks growth, leaving it a middle-income country. The source of his contrasting futures for Brazil is inequality, which he demonstrates is a relevant variable in any discussion of economic growth. Inequality illuminates causes of seemingly-unconnected problems. This book, which includes freely-accessible documents and datasets, is the first in-depth analysis of an issue that promises to become increasingly prominent. Contrasting visions of Brazil’s future described in economic terms Easy-to-understand graphs and tables illustrate analytical arguments All Excel-based data available on a freely-accessible website







Democratization, Quality of Institutions and Economic Growth


Book Description

There are two innovations in the paper as compared to the previous literature on democracy and growth. First, we consider not only the level of democracy, but also changes in this level in the 1970s-1990s as measured by increments of Freedom House political rights indices. Second, the distinction is made between democracy and law and order (order based on legal rules); the latter is measured by the rule of law, investors' risk and corruption indices. We discuss two interconnected threshold hypotheses: (1) in countries where law and order is strong enough, democratization stimulates economic growth, whereas in countries with poor law and order democratization undermines growth; (2) if democratization occurs under the conditions of poor law and order (so that illiberal democracy emerges), then shadow economy expands, quality of governance worsens, and macroeconomic policy becomes less prudent. We adduce a number of stylized facts to support our hypotheses. However our econometric findings are mixed: we report results that support the hypotheses as well as regressions that contradict them.




One Road to Riches?


Book Description

Building effective state institutions before introducing democracy is widely presumed to improve different development outcomes. Conversely, proponents of this "stateness-first" argument anticipate that democratization before state building yields poor development outcomes. In this Element, we discuss several strong assumptions that (different versions of) this argument rests upon and critically evaluate the existing evidence base. In extension, we specify various observable implications. We then subject the stateness-first argument to multiple tests, focusing on economic growth as an outcome. First, we conduct historical case studies of two countries with different institutional sequencing histories, Denmark and Greece, and assess the stateness-first argument (e.g., by using a synthetic control approach). Thereafter, we draw on an extensive global sample of about 180 countries, measured across 1789-2019 and leverage panel regressions, preparametric matching, and sequence analysis to test a number of observable implications. Overall, we find little evidence to support the stateness-first argument.




Does Democratization Affect Growth Across Time Or Space?


Book Description

One research path has been to see whether the type of political regime, namely a democratic versus an authoritarian regime, influences economic growth. Much of the past literature has produced ambiguous results. But more recent studies using more sophisticated statistical techniques have often shown a positive effect of democratization upon economic growth. These studies have made welcome contributions. However, they often fail to examine how the effects of democratization could differ across countries or over time. In this dissertation, the text will look more closely at how the effects of democratization could differ depending upon country characteristics - corruption and adherence to rule of law - or when democratization occurs. Chapter 1 investigates whether the association between corruption and economic growth differs between democracies and authoritarian regimes. Chapter 2 examines both short and long-run effects of democratization upon economic growth and measures the extent they differ. Lastly, chapter 3 considers whether or not democratization improves institutions that have so often been argued to increase economic growth.







Democracy as a Curve


Book Description

This paper attempts to model the relationship between economic growth and democratization, with an emphasis on non-linearities. I adopt and explore the concept of “political capital” as a measure of democracy, which is extremely uncommon in the literature and brings considerable advantages in dynamic terms. My results indicate that the impact of democratization on growth is significant and does vary according to the stage of democratic development each country is in, which is likely to be an important factor in explaining the academic dissonance regarding this topic. Broadly, I find that initial democratization enacts a stronger and positive change in economic performance, which then subsides until a level of near zero at the intermediate democracy level. For more evolved democracies, further democratization may impact growth negatively, negligibly or positively (albeit more weakly so than in the initial stages). Additionally, this relationship is found to be significant both when accounting for more and less direct effects of democracy. Results for the more direct avenue are more optimistic, implying that the indirect impacts of democracy on growth, as a whole, might be negative. For most estimations, a (minimum) level of democracy that maximizes growth is found, which I call the “democracy maximum”. My results suggest this occurs for a democracy level of, on a scale of 1 to 10, around or above 6.




Why Democracies Outgrow Autocracies in the Long Run


Book Description

This paper argues that democracy enhances technological change, the most important determinant of long-term economic growth. It first presents an argument on how and why dictators restrict civil liberties and diffusion of information to survive in office, even if this reduces their personal consumption. The argument predicts that autocracies have slower technological change than democracies, which in turn impairs GDP per capita growth rates. These and other implications from the argument are tested empirically, and so are implications from alternative explanations on the association between democracy and technological change. Drawing on an extensive global dataset, with some time series going back to the early 19th century, the paper reports robust evidence that democracy increases not only technology-induced growth but also net economic growth rates. Notably, the results hold when accounting for the endogeneity of democracy, country-fixed effects, and sample-selection bias.




Leaders and Institutions As Joint Determinants of Long-run Economic Growth


Book Description

In this paper, I document two stylized facts on leaders, institutions, and economic development: (1) leaders in democracies have more experience than those in non-democracies; and (2) more experienced leaders lead to better economic performance in democracies and higher regime stability in non-democracies. I build a simple endogenous growth model with political selection and transition of institutions to rationalize these two facts. Quantitative exercises based on this model suggest that the differential channel of political selection and the role of leaders can explain the persistent gap of economic performance between democracies and non-democracies.