Tax Delinquency in Philadelphia


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Deterring Property Tax Delinquency in Philadelphia


Book Description

Municipal governments commonly confront the problem of tardy or delinquent property tax payments. We implement an experiment in property tax collection for tardy taxpayers in the City of Philadelphia for the calendar year, 2015. The experiment sent one of seven reminder letters to the tardy taxpayers, testing the efficacy of a simple reminder, two alternative reminders stressing economic sanctions, and four alternative reminders emphasizing either that taxpayers receive neighborhood services or city-wide services for their tax payments, that most of their neighbors pay their taxes on time, or that as a citizen in a democracy it is a civic duty to pay taxes on time. Compliance behaviors were compared to a holdout sample that received no reminder letter. The most effective letters were those that threatened an economic sanction for continued non-compliance. These letters were particularly cost-effective in raising additional city revenues. There was no evidence that those receiving a reminder for the calendar year 2015 improved their tax compliance behavior in the calendar year 2016.




Deterring Tax Delinquency in Philadelphia


Book Description

Municipal governments commonly confront problems with property tax collection. We model tardy taxpayers as procrastinators that have a present bias. Late payments arise due to lack of salience, lack of deterrence or lack of tax morale. To test the importance of the different theoretical explanations, we developed and implemented a randomized controlled experiment conducted with the City of Philadelphia. The structure of the experiment allows us to identify the relative importance of the three key sets of parameters of our model. We find that lack of salience and lack of deterrence are key components of non-compliance behavior.













The Financial Burdens of Property Taxes


Book Description

This paper investigates the financial burdens of changes in property taxes on homeowners, a margin that is not well studied in the literature. Exploiting a unique reform in Philadelphia that generated changes in property taxes across census tracts without changing the provision of public goods and services, I measure how sensitive homeowners are to increases in their property tax bills. Using a border discontinuity design, I find that a $100 increase in property taxes raises property tax delinquency by 3.9% after one year and 7.7% after two years. Home sales also increase by 4.1% after two years, but there is is no evidence of price capitalization. Further, the financial burdens vary considerably by owner race and occupancy status: White owners are more likely to recover from delinquency and sell their homes than Black and minority owners, and owner-occupied properties are more likely to undergo a sales transaction than absentee owner properties.