Book Description

This book provides a comprehensive account of the use of airpower in the first year of the Ukraine conflict. Airpower has been central to political, military, and public debates from the outset of the Russo‐Ukrainian war. After having started with whether the US and NATO should attempt to establish a No‐Fly Zone over Ukraine to protect the civilian population, the international discussion soon focused on the underperformance of Russian airpower. The fact that the initial contest for air superiority over Ukraine ended in an uneasy state of mutual denial came as a surprise to Western analysts, who suspected Kyiv would fall within a relatively short period of time. The surprise and relief that it did not only fueled urgent and ongoing discussions on how NATO nations could support the Ukrainian war effort. Regardless of nationality, age, level of education, or ethnicity, the near‐daily footage of Russian missiles, bombs and drones hitting residential areas and bombarding infrastructure to deprive an entire population of electricity and water has been emotionally imprinted on generations who have only known peace. Why the Russians have used airpower with such brutality, and how Ukraine and its allies have defended against this threat, is an important topic to understand even outside a specialist military audience. The aim of this book, therefore, is to provide an analysis on why the air war over Ukraine unfolded as it did during the first year of the war. This book will be of much interest to students of air power, military and strategic studies, Russian and eastern European politics, and International Relations.