The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited


Book Description

The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited provides a comprehensive overview of the new materials recently released by the Soviet Union, United States, and Cuba. The authors have all had a major role in bringing to light either significant reevaluations of the crisis, or in some cases, truly startling challenges to the conventional wisdom surrounding much of the crisis. This important collection, edited by a long-time student of the crisis, is a coherent, original, and up-to-date work that bears on a moment when the world, for good cause, held its breath in fear that the morning might bring the apocalypse.




The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited


Book Description

The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited is a comprehensive overview of the great cornucopia of new materials recently released by the Soviet Union, United States, and Cuba. The authors, some of whom were participants in the crisis, have all had a major role in bringing to light either significant reevaluations of the crisis, or in some cases, truly startling revelations of the extant wisdom surrounding much of the crisis. The collection, edited by a long-time student of the crisis, is a coherent, original, and up-to-date work that bears on a moment when the world, for good cause, held its breath in fear that the morning might bring the apocalypse.




Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis


Book Description

"A minor classic in its laconic, spare, compelling evocation by a participant of the shifting moods and maneuvers of the most dangerous moment in human history." —Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. During the thirteen days in October 1962 when the United States confronted the Soviet Union over its installation of missiles in Cuba, few people shared the behind-the-scenes story as it is told here by the late Senator Robert F. Kennedy. In this unique account, he describes each of the participants during the sometimes hour-to-hour negotiations, with particular attention to the actions and views of his brother, President John F. Kennedy. In a new foreword, the distinguished historian and Kennedy adviser Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., discusses the book's enduring importance and the significance of new information about the crisis that has come to light, especially from the Soviet Union.




Report to JFK


Book Description

"The Anglo-American crisis arose from a massive misunderstanding between the two governments. The British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, had been operating on the assumption that Washington would proceed with, and sell for British use, an airborne missile system named Skybolt. In its defense planning the United Kingdom relied on Skybolt to sustain its nuclear deterrence. The Americans, however, decided to cancel the program. This decision rocked the British government and seriously strained Anglo-American relations, while its hasty resolution gave President de Gaulle of France an excuse to veto British membership in the European Economic Community."--BOOK JACKET. "This volume adds to the report itself Kennedy's comments about it, a glossary, a cast of characters, new information gleaned from recently declassified British files, and Neustadt's comparison of British and American governments both at the time of the Skybolt affair and at present."--BOOK JACKET.







The Cuban Missile Crisis


Book Description

Why did the Cuban Missile Crisis happen? How was it resolved? By focusing on the roles of a number of key individuals, such as JFK, Robert Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev, and by using recently declassified materials, this book frames answers to these questions. In so doing, it presents a cluster of new findings and arguments, including a fresh interpretation of Khrushchev's motives for putting missiles in Cuba, new information on the mystery surrounding Senator Kenneth Keating's secret sources, and evidence indicating that JFK planned to carry out a military strike on Cuba at the start of the crisis.




Nuclear Folly


Book Description

*Shortlisted for the Duke of Wellington Medal for Military History* 'An enthralling account of a pivotal moment in modern history. . . replete with startling revelations about the deception and mutual suspicion that brought the US and Soviet Union to the brink of Armageddon in October 1962' Martin Chilton, Independent The definitive new history of the Cuban Missile Crisis from the author of Chernobyl: History of a Tragedy, winner of the Baillie Gifford Prize For more than four weeks in the autumn of 1962 the world teetered. The consequences of a misplaced step during the Cuban Missile Crisis could not have been more grave. Ash and cinder, famine and fallout; nuclear war between the two most-powerful nations on Earth. In Nuclear Folly, award-winning historian Serhii Plokhy tells the riveting story of those weeks, tracing the tortuous decision-making and calculated brinkmanship of John F. Kennedy, Nikita Khrushchev and Fidel Castro, and of their advisors and commanders on the ground. More often than not, Plokhy argues, the Americans and Soviets simply misread each other, operating under mutual distrust, second-guesses and false information. Despite all of this, nuclear disaster was avoided thanks to one very human reason: fear. Drawing on an impressive array of primary sources, including recently declassified KGB files, Plokhy masterfully illustrates the drama of those tense days. Authoritative, fast-paced and unforgettable, this is the definitive new account of the Cold War's most perilous moment.







DEFCON-2


Book Description

The closest we've ever come to the end of the world "DEFCON-2 is the best single volume on the Cuban Missile Crisis published and is an important contribution to the history of the Cold War. Beyond the military and political facts of the crisis, Polmar and Gresham sketch the personalities that created and coped with the crisis. They also show us how close we came to the edge without becoming sensationalistic."—Larry Bond, bestselling author of Dangerous Ground Spy-satellite and aerial-reconnaissance photos reveal that one of the United States's bitterest enemies may be acquiring weapons of mass destruction and the means to use them against the American homeland. Administration officials refuse to accept intelligence professionals' interpretation of these images and order an end to spy missions over the offending nation. More than a month later, after vicious infighting, the president orders the spy missions to resume. The new photos reveal an array of ballistic missiles, capable of carrying nuclear warheads and striking deep within U.S. territory. It appears that the missiles will be fully operational within one week. This is not a plot setup for a suspense novel; it is the true story of the most terrifying moment in the 45-year Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union: the Cuban Missile Crisis. DEFCON-2 tells this tale as it has never been told before—from both sides, with the help of hundreds of recently declassified U.S. and Soviet documents, as well as interviews with numerous former spies, military figures, and government officials who speak out here for the first time.




The Polythink Syndrome


Book Description

Why do presidents and their advisors often make sub-optimal decisions on military intervention, escalation, de-escalation, and termination of conflicts? The leading concept of group dynamics, groupthink, offers one explanation: policy-making groups make sub-optimal decisions due to their desire for conformity and uniformity over dissent, leading to a failure to consider other relevant possibilities. But presidential advisory groups are often fragmented and divisive. This book therefore scrutinizes polythink, a group decision-making dynamic whereby different members in a decision-making unit espouse a plurality of opinions and divergent policy prescriptions, resulting in a disjointed decision-making process or even decision paralysis. The book analyzes eleven national security decisions, including the national security policy designed prior to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the decisions to enter into and withdraw from Afghanistan and Iraq, the 2007 "surge" decision, the crisis over the Iranian nuclear program, the UN Security Council decision on the Syrian Civil War, the faltering Kerry Peace Process in the Middle East, and the U.S. decision on military operations against ISIS. Based on the analysis of these case studies, the authors address implications of the polythink phenomenon, including prescriptions for avoiding and/or overcoming it, and develop strategies and tools for what they call Productive Polythink. The authors also show the applicability of polythink to business, industry, and everyday decisions.