The Impact of Government's ICT Savings Initiatives


Book Description

According to the National Audit Office, in 2011-12, government spent an estimated £316 million less on ICT than it would otherwise have done. The main challenge, however, will be to move to the delivery of ICT solutions that reform public services and the way that government works. The government announced in October 2012 that, subject to audit, it had already saved £410 million from its savings initiatives in 2012-13 and expected to save a further £200 million by the end of March 2013. The appointment of commercial experts has helped departments to claw money back, renegotiate contracts before they expire and, overall, spend less on ICT than they otherwise would have done. However, weaknesses in data held by the Cabinet Office have meant that the £348 million of savings reported by the Cabinet Office for 2011-12, resulting from its initiative to manage ICT suppliers as a single customer, could not be validated. To date, moreover, the Cabinet Office has measured only cost savings and has not published measures of the wider impacts of its initiatives. The department is starting to take steps to consider risk and performance on a more holistic basis, which should provide it with more information on wider impact. Views are mixed on the effect of reform on government's relationship with ICT suppliers. Suppliers consulted by the NAO were frustrated at the slow pace of change and the focus on cost-cutting, rather than exploring innovative opportunities to redesign public service and put services online. There have also been comments from government on resistance by suppliers to change




House of Commons - Committee of Public Accounts: Cabinet Office: Iimproving Government Procurement And The Impact Government's ICT Savings Initiatives - HC 137


Book Description

Central government spent a total of around £45 billion on buying goods and services in 2011-12, including an estimated £6.9 billion on ICT. Since 2010, the government has introduced a range of procurement reforms designed to save money. These include centralising the procurement of goods and services bought by all departments, such as energy and travel. All ICT spending over £5million must be approved by the Cabinet Office, and a programme to develop ICT infrastructure which can be shared across government organisations has been developed. These reforms are beginning to have an impact: the proportion of spending that goes through central contracts has increased steadily; the ICT initiatives have resulted in some savings; and there are signs that departments are starting to think more intelligently about why and how they use ICT. But the accountability arrangements for centralised procurement remain a barrier; the centre manages the contracts yet departments remain liable for their own spending decisions so they are reluctant to cede authority to the centre. Management information on spending and savings is incomplete, so departments do not always trust the figures on savings claimed. These gaps in accountability and data make it harder to make the case for procurement across central government and in the wider public sector to be centralised. The commitment to localism seems to be at odds with buying through central contracts, and government's desire to give more government business to small firms does not appear to have changed the way large procurements are managed.




ICT in Schools


Book Description




BBC Digital Media Initiative - HC 985


Book Description

The Public Accounts Committee concludes that the BBC's Digital Media Initiative (DMI) was a complete failure. The DMI was a transformation programme that involved developing new technology for BBC staff to create, share and manage video and audio content and programmes from their desktops. Siemens were contracted to build the DMI system, but the contract was terminated and brought in-house in 2009. But the BBC failed to complete the DMI Programme and in May 2013 cancelled it at a cost to licence fee payers of £98.4 million. The BBC was far too complacent about the DMI's troubled history and the very high risks involved in taking it in-house. The DMI was 18 months behind schedule when the BBC took it in-house from Siemens. The BBC did not obtain independent technical assurance for the system design or ensure that the intended users were sufficiently engaged with the Programme. Poor governance meant that these important weaknesses went unchallenged, even when things started to go badly wrong. Projects like the DMI need to be led by an experienced senior responsible owner who has the skills, authority and determination to see the project through to successful implementation. The BBC needs to report using clear milestones that give the Executive and the Trust an unambiguous and accurate account of progress and any problems. The BBC Executive should apply more rigorous and timely scrutiny to its major projects to limit potential losses and the BBC Trust must be more proactive in chasing and challenging the BBC Executive's performance.




The Rural Broadband Programme - HC 834


Book Description

The Government has failed to deliver meaningful competition in the procurement of its £1.2 billion rural broadband programme, leaving BT effectively in a monopoly position. Despite warnings the Department for Culture, Media and Sport has allowed poor cost transparency and the lack of detailed broadband rollout plans to create conditions whereby alternative suppliers may be crowded out. Whilst BT claims it is making further concessions, this is not impacting on rural communities. Local authorities are still contractually prevented from sharing information to see if they are securing best terms for the public money they spend. Communities can still not access the detailed data they need to understand whether they will be covered by BT's scheme in their area. The lack of transparency on costs and BT's insistence on non-disclosure agreements is symptomatic of BT's exploiting its monopoly position. The Department needs to work urgently with all local authorities to publish detailed mapping of their implementation plans, down to full (7-digit) postcode level. The information should include speed of service, as soon as that is available. The Department should collect, analyse and publish data on deployment costs in the current programme, to inform its consideration of bids from suppliers under the next round of fundingMargaret Hodge was speaking as the Committee published its 50th Report of this Session which, on the basis of evidence from the Department for Culture, Media and Sport and BT, examined the roll out of the rural broadband programme




House of Commons - Committee of Public Accounts: Whole of Government Accounts 2011-12 - HC 667


Book Description

The Whole of Government Accounts for 2011-12 presents the combined financial activities of some 3,000 organisations. It provides vital data on which Government needs to act. Key issues have been identified, such as the £19.4 billion liability for clinical negligence claims. But it is frustrating to see other issues seemingly ignored in long-term policy making and spending decisions. In one year, the public sector was defrauded of over £20 billion and the tax gap rose to £35 billion. The financial liabilities for dealing with nuclear waste also keep growing. There is room for improvement in the document itself and how it is used. Users find it hard to understand, for example, why the Government debt and deficit highlighted in the WGA differ from those reported in the ONS's National Accounts. Also, by changing definitions in its commentary published alongside the WGA, the Treasury makes it difficult to track changes over time. The Treasury's introduction in the commentary of a new concept of so-called 'direct' expenditure leaves out key costs such as the interest paid on the National Debt. The publicly owned and controlled bodies - such as Network Rail and the taxpayer owned banks - are still being excluded, in defiance of normal accounting rules. The usefulness of the WGA is also being limited by the length of time it takes to produce the document and by poor quality data from some of the bodies. The accounts have again been qualified over the completeness, timeliness and accuracy of the information supplied for schools and academies




House of Commons - Public Accounts Committee: The Border Force: Securing the Border - HC 663


Book Description

The Border Force's 7,600 staff operate immigration and customs controls at 138 air, sea and rail ports across the UK. It has a budget of £604 million for 2013-14, but is facing cuts. It has had to prioritise passenger checks at the expense of its other duties thereby weakening security at the border by neglecting other duties, such as the examination of freight for illicit goods, and checks in Calais on lorries to detect concealed illegal entrants. It was not able to meet and check up to 90,000 private planes or private boats arriving in the UK each year, leaving the UK border vulnerable and raising issues about resourcing and how priorities are set. The Border Force acknowledged that it had missed 8 of its 19 seizure and detection targets. Recommendations: set out how it will ensure that it delivers its full range of duties across all ports to provide the required level of national security; demonstrate that it can deliver its workload within the resources available; must address the gaps in the data it receives on people arriving in the UK, and the existing data needs to be cleansed to increase the quality, reliability and usefulness of the intelligence generated; set out how, and by when, it will have in place the functional IT systems it needs to underpin the security of the UK border; senior management must provide the organisation with a clear sense of purpose and tackle those barriers which inhibit the flexible and effective deployment of its staff.




House of Commons - Committee of Public Accounts: Progress in Delivering the Thameslink Programme - HC 296


Book Description

The first proposals to modernize the Thameslink route and increase capacity were developed by a succession of rail industry sponsors but nothing much happened until the Department for Transport became sponsor in 2005. The Department has delivered the first phase of the infrastructure project under budget and on time. The other two aspects of the programme are going less well. The procurement of new trains through a £1.6 billion PFI deal has taken over three years longer than expected. And the timetable and approach for letting the new franchise have been revised. The planned completion date has been put back to 2018. But meeting the timetable for delivering the new trains will be very demanding and risky. The Committee is also sceptical about using PFI to fund this project. It is alarming that the Department compared the PFI option against only one other private sector option and did not construct a public sector comparator to understand better the relative costs, risks and rewards of choosing a PFI funding route over a public one. Another source of worry is the small size of the Department's core Thameslink team - just five people for a programme of this size and complexity. The impression that there is a scarcity of these skills is reinforced by the apparent need to move the key civil servant leading the Thameslink team, the man whose experience, skills and continuity have been crucial to the delivery of the programme, over to the High Speed 2 team




House of Commons - Committee of Public Accounts: The New Homes Bonus - HC 114


Book Description

The New Homes Bonus was introduced as a financial incentive for local authorities to encourage the building of new homes. The scheme is funded from existing local authority grants. £7.5 billion will have been redistributed between councils by 2018-19, so there is a lot of money at stake. It is clearly vital that the incentives work and the Government achieves its aim. It is therefore disappointing that after more than two years of the scheme being up and running, no evaluation is in place and no credible data is available to show whether the scheme is working or not. So far the areas which have gained most money tend to be the areas where housing need is lowest. The areas that have lost most tend to be those where needs are greatest. The Department has yet to demonstrate whether the New Homes Bonus works. Is it helping to create more new homes than would have been built anyway? Is it the best way for Government to use its limited resources to create more homes where they are needed most? Its planned evaluation of the Bonus scheme is now urgent




House of Commons - Committee of Public Accounts: The Duchy of Cornwall - HC 475


Book Description

The Duchy of Cornwall (the Duchy) delivered a good financial performance in 2012-13, increasing its total income and also its net revenue after taking account of costs. However, the Treasury is not doing enough to scrutinise the Duchy's financial strategy or transactions-it does not independently verify information offered by the Duchy, and details of its approvals for the Duchy's land transactions over £500,000 are not published. The Duchy has a Crown Exemption from tax, but there is no clear understanding of any consequences for its competitors, which are subject to corporation and capital gains tax. The transparency of The Prince of Wales's tax payments is limited by reporting only a combined amount for income tax and VAT. The Duchy's charter rules that each future Duke of Cornwall will be the eldest son and heir of the Monarch, which is out of line with the Succession to the Crown Act 2013.