Spying Blind


Book Description

In this pathbreaking book, Amy Zegart provides the first scholarly examination of the intelligence failures that preceded September 11. Until now, those failures have been attributed largely to individual mistakes. But Zegart shows how and why the intelligence system itself left us vulnerable. Zegart argues that after the Cold War ended, the CIA and FBI failed to adapt to the rise of terrorism. She makes the case by conducting painstaking analysis of more than three hundred intelligence reform recommendations and tracing the history of CIA and FBI counterterrorism efforts from 1991 to 2001, drawing extensively from declassified government documents and interviews with more than seventy high-ranking government officials. She finds that political leaders were well aware of the emerging terrorist danger and the urgent need for intelligence reform, but failed to achieve the changes they sought. The same forces that have stymied intelligence reform for decades are to blame: resistance inside U.S. intelligence agencies, the rational interests of politicians and career bureaucrats, and core aspects of our democracy such as the fragmented structure of the federal government. Ultimately failures of adaptation led to failures of performance. Zegart reveals how longstanding organizational weaknesses left unaddressed during the 1990s prevented the CIA and FBI from capitalizing on twenty-three opportunities to disrupt the September 11 plot. Spying Blind is a sobering account of why two of America's most important intelligence agencies failed to adjust to new threats after the Cold War, and why they are unlikely to adapt in the future.




Intelligence Matters


Book Description

In this explosive, controversial, and profoundly alarming insider’s report, Senator Bob Graham reveals faults in America’s national security network severe enough to raise fundamental questions about the competence and honesty of public officials in the CIA, the FBI, and the White House. For ten years, Senator Graham served on the Senate Intelligence Committee, where he had access to some of the nation’s most closely guarded secrets. Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, Graham co-chaired a historic joint House-Senate inquiry into the intelligence community’s failures. From that investigation and his own personal fact-finding, Graham discovered disturbing evidence of terrorist activity and a web of complicity: • At one point, a terrorist support network conducted some of its operations through Saudi Arabia’s U.S. embassy–and a funding chain for terrorism led to the Saudi royal family. • In February 2002, only four months after combat began in Afghanistan, the Bush administration ordered General Tommy Franks to move vital military resources out of Afghanistan for an operation against Iraq–despite Franks’s privately stated belief that there was a job to finish in Afghanistan, and that the war on terrorism should focus next on terrorist targets in Somalia and Yemen. • Throughout 2002, President Bush directed the FBI to limit its investigations of Saudi Arabia, which supported some and possibly all of the September 11 hijackers. • The White House was so uncooperative with the bipartisan inquiry that its behavior bore all the hallmarks of a cover-up. • The FBI had an informant who was extremely close to two of the September 11 hijackers, and actually housed one of them, yet the existence of this informant and the scope of his contacts with the hijackers were covered up. • There were twelve instances when the September 11 plot could have been discovered and potentially foiled. • Days after 9/11, U.S. authorities allowed some Saudis to fly, despite a complete civil aviation ban, after which the government expedited the departure of more than one hundred Saudis from the United States. • Foreign leaders throughout the Middle East warned President Bush of exactly what would happen in a postwar Iraq, and those warnings went either ignored or unheeded. As a result of his Senate work, Graham has become convinced that the attacks of September 11 could have been avoided, and that the Bush administration’s war on terrorism has failed to address the immediate danger posed by al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, and Hamas in Afghanistan, Syria, Yemen, and Somalia. His book is a disturbing reminder that at the highest levels of national security, now more than ever, intelligence matters.




The Intelligence Community and 9/11


Book Description

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 led many to inquire whether there had been a failure by United States intelligence agencies to collect all available information about the plots that led to the attacks, to analyze it properly, and disseminate it in time to protect the American public. Congressional intelligence committees responded by launching an unprecedented Joint Inquiry to investigate the Intelligence Community's record in regard to the 9/11 attacks and make recommendations for further legislative action. The Joint Inquiry began its investigation in February 2002 and held public hearings in September and October. Findings, conclusions, and recommendations were made public in December 2002; release of the final report is anticipated in 2003. In public hearings, the Joint Inquiry's Staff Director traced salient aspects of the Inquiry's work and emphasized that, whereas the Intelligence Community provided ample warning of an impending attack in mid-2001 against the U.S. by the Islamic terrorist group headed by Osama Bin Laden, the Community did not learn in advance the plans for the aircraft hijackings that occurred on September 11. The Joint Inquiry focused on several underlying problems. For a number of Constitutional, statutory, and organization reasons, information collected by intelligence agencies has historically not been routinely used for law enforcement purposes. Similarly, information collected in preparation for trials has not been routinely forwarded to intelligence agencies. In an era in which terrorists work abroad to launch attacks in the U.S., some have argued that the "walls" between intelligence and law enforcement have complicated the ability of any agency to put together a complete picture of evolving plots. Explaining the complexity of this situation was a major contribution of the Inquiry, although the issue of breaching these "walls" remains complicated and controversial. In addition, the Inquiry examined the role of the FBI. There were criticisms of the Bureau's ability to: process and store information; provide communications links between field offices and headquarters; process applications for surveillance; and coordinate with intelligence agencies. More fundamentally, the intelligence committees examined priorities that, prior to September 11, 2001, did not emphasize counterterrorism to the extent that has subsequently been considered necessary. The Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2003 (P.L. 107-306) establishes an independent commission to assess the role of agencies throughout the government with regard to the 9/11 attacks. This independent commission, to be headed by former New Jersey Governor Thomas H. Kean, will build upon the investigatory record of the Joint Inquiry, but might reach further to assess organizational issues and the proper relationship of law enforcement and intelligence agencies. This report will be updated as circumstances dictate.




The U.S. Intelligence Community After 9/11


Book Description

"The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 on New York and Washington led to profound changes in U.S. foreign and defense policy, internal security practices, and organization for national security - including dramatic changes in the organization and operations of the U.S. Intelligence Community. Other changes have been the product of factors unrelated to the attacks. The U.S. Intelligence Community after 9/11 reflects the National Security Archive's interest in documenting the organizational and operational changes in the U.S. Intelligence Community since the attacks ... Targets of research included all 16 agencies that constitute the U.S. Intelligence Community - the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the national intelligence agencies (the Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation), and the intelligence components of Cabinet-level departments (including State, Defense, Homeland Security, Treasury), and the military services. Also included are the organizations (such as the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence) that supervise and manage the above agencies' activities as well as the means of management (such as departmental directives)"--Collections guide.




Blinking Red


Book Description

After the September 11 attacks, the 9/11 Commission argued that the United States needed a powerful leader, a spymaster, to forge the scattered intelligence bureaucracies into a singular enterprise to vanquish AmericaÆs new enemiesùstateless international terrorists. In the midst of the 2004 presidential election, Congress and the president remade the postûWorld War II national security infrastructure in less than five months, creating the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). Blinking Red illuminates the complicated history of the bureaucratic efforts to reform AmericaÆs national security after the intelligence failures of 9/11 and IraqÆs missing weapons of mass destruction, explaining how the NSC and Congress shaped the U.S. response to the 9/11 attacks. Michael Allen asserts that the process of creating the DNI position and the NCTC is a case study in power politics and institutional reform. By bringing to light the legislative transactions and political wrangling during the reform of the intelligence community, Allen helps us understand why the effectiveness of these institutional changes is still in question.




Intelligence and Surprise Attack


Book Description

How can the United States avoid a future surprise attack on the scale of 9/11 or Pearl Harbor, in an era when such devastating attacks can come not only from nation states, but also from terrorist groups or cyber enemies? Intelligence and Surprise Attack examines why surprise attacks often succeed even though, in most cases, warnings had been available beforehand. Erik J. Dahl challenges the conventional wisdom about intelligence failure, which holds that attacks succeed because important warnings get lost amid noise or because intelligence officials lack the imagination and collaboration to “connect the dots” of available information. Comparing cases of intelligence failure with intelligence success, Dahl finds that the key to success is not more imagination or better analysis, but better acquisition of precise, tactical-level intelligence combined with the presence of decision makers who are willing to listen to and act on the warnings they receive from their intelligence staff. The book offers a new understanding of classic cases of conventional and terrorist attacks such as Pearl Harbor, the Battle of Midway, and the bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The book also presents a comprehensive analysis of the intelligence picture before the 9/11 attacks, making use of new information available since the publication of the 9/11 Commission Report and challenging some of that report’s findings.




9/11 and its effects on US intelligence services


Book Description

Pre-University Paper from the year 2013 in the subject Politics - Region: USA, grade: 1,0, , course: Wissenschaftspropädeutisches Seminar US-Politics, language: English, abstract: September 11, 2001 represents the unpreparedness of the Government of the United States against terrorism on domestic territory. Four planes from domestic flights were hijacked by foreigners and used to kill thousands of citizens in the United States. The immense loss made people call for actions taken to defend the emerged danger with new strategies against terrorism respecting circumstances that led to the attacks. This research paper shows the effect of 9/11 on US intelligence services. Therefore there will be given an overview of intelligence services in the US, a short summary of the attacks and a detailed presentation of two essential laws made in response to the events. Spying is the world's second oldest profession, a saying goes. No matter what era, humans have always relied on information about rivals. The challenge of spying is to gain that information as it is usually covert by the enemy. In war, as known till the end of the 20th century, those enemies were usually identifiable as such by common characteristics like their culture, opinions or from previous conflicts. Governments therefore did not concentrate on finding new dangers, but on defending those already known. If enemies manage not to get attention, there is a chance the government is unprepared and doesn't fight them, so their attacks can have a bigger impact. The immense acceleration of communication in the last century along with globalization and its increased mobility for people all over the world, helps enemies to use that weak point for their purposes. They can spread and connect all over the world to avoid identification, but most drastic, threats can be performed right at the target by only few members without getting attention. Terrorism, previously seen as an affair between nations, became a domestic issue.




Breakdown


Book Description

New York Times bestselling author Bill Gertz uses his unparalleled access to America's intelligence system to show how this system completely broke down in the years, months, and days leading up to the deadly terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.




Imagine... an End to This Madness ~ TERRORISM


Book Description

This story is a compilation of visionary strategies, expedited to our Intelligence Community including the Oval Office ~ speaking truth to power-essentially to keep all Americans safe, especially our forces, currently in IRAQ. Unfortunately, this title has been assigned a rating of (9.5) on the Political Richter Scale in addition to the incredible unvarnished revelations involving IRAQ, and the Bush-Chaney Intelligence Community since the surprise lethal terrorist attacks, against America on that September 11, 2001. (Very Current Events).




Breakdown


Book Description

In a compelling new book, the Washington Times defense and national security reporter blows the lid off the U.S. Intelligence community's failure to prevent the September 11 attacks.