Author : Celeste Ward Gventer
Publisher : Springer
Page : 364 pages
File Size : 40,58 MB
Release : 2014-01-21
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 1137336943
The notion of counter-insurgency has become a dominant paradigm in American and British thinking about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This volume brings together international academics and practitioners to evaluate the broader theoretical and historical factors that underpin COIN, providing a critical reappraisal of counter-insurgency thinking.
Author : Celeste Ward Gventer
Publisher : Springer
Page : 384 pages
File Size : 37,91 MB
Release : 2014-01-21
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 1137336943
The notion of counter-insurgency has become a dominant paradigm in American and British thinking about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This volume brings together international academics and practitioners to evaluate the broader theoretical and historical factors that underpin COIN, providing a critical reappraisal of counter-insurgency thinking.
Author : Douglas Porch
Publisher : Cambridge University Press
Page : 449 pages
File Size : 50,38 MB
Release : 2013-07-11
Category : History
ISBN : 1107027381
Controversial new history of counterinsurgency which challenges its claims as an effective strategy of waging war.
Author : Beatrice Heuser
Publisher : Cambridge University Press
Page : 399 pages
File Size : 34,60 MB
Release : 2016
Category : History
ISBN : 1107135044
A study of the evolving 'national styles' of conducting insurgencies and counter-insurgency, as influenced by transnational trends, ideas and practices.
Author : Robert Egnell
Publisher : Columbia University Press
Page : 249 pages
File Size : 41,42 MB
Release : 2013-10-08
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 0231535414
Long considered the masters of counterinsurgency, the British military encountered significant problems in Iraq and Afghanistan when confronted with insurgent violence. In their effort to apply the principles and doctrines of past campaigns, they failed to prevent Basra and Helmand from descending into lawlessness, criminality, and violence. By juxtaposing the deterioration of these situations against Britain's celebrated legacy of counterinsurgency, this investigation identifies both the contributions and limitations of traditional tactics in such settings, exposing a disconcerting gap between ambitions and resources, intent and commitment. Building upon this detailed account of the Basra and Helmand campaigns, this volume conducts an unprecedented assessment of British military institutional adaptation in response to operations gone awry. In calling attention to the enduring effectiveness of insurgent methods and the threat posed by undergoverned spaces, David H. Ucko and Robert Egnell underscore the need for military organizations to meet the irregular challenges of future wars in new ways.
Author : Roger Trinquier
Publisher : DIANE Publishing
Page : 131 pages
File Size : 39,96 MB
Release : 1964
Category : France
ISBN : 142891689X
Author : John Nagl
Publisher : Bloomsbury Publishing USA
Page : 273 pages
File Size : 16,51 MB
Release : 2002-10-30
Category : History
ISBN : 0313077037
Armies are invariably accused of preparing to fight the last war. Nagl examines how armies learn during the course of conflicts for which they are initially unprepared in organization, training, and mindset. He compares the development of counterinsurgency doctrine and practice in the Malayan Emergency from 1948-1960 with that developed in the Vietnam Conflict from 1950-1975, through use of archival sources and interviews with participants in both conflicts. In examining these two events, he argues that organizational culture is the key variable in determining the success or failure of attempts to adapt to changing circumstances. Differences in organizational culture is the primary reason why the British Army learned to conduct counterinsurgency in Malaya while the American Army failed to learn in Vietnam. The American Army resisted any true attempt to learn how to fight an insurgency during the course of the Vietnam Conflict, preferring to treat the war as a conventional conflict in the tradition of the Korean War or World War II. The British Army, because of its traditional role as a colonial police force and the organizational characteristics that its history and the national culture created, was better able to quickly learn and apply the lessons of counterinsurgency during the course of the Malayan Emergency. This is the first study to apply organizational learning theory to cases in which armies were engaged in actual combat.
Author : Akali Omeni
Publisher : Routledge
Page : 203 pages
File Size : 10,31 MB
Release : 2017-09-08
Category : History
ISBN : 1351597639
This book offers a detailed examination of the counter-insurgency operations undertaken by the Nigerian military against Boko Haram between 2011 and 2017. Based on extensive fieldwork conducted with military units in Nigeria, Counter-Insurgency in Nigeria has two main aims. First, it seeks to provide an understanding of the Nigerian military’s internal role – a role that today, as a result of internal threats, pivots towards counter-insurgency. The book illustrates how organizational culture, historical experience, institutions, and doctrine, are critical to understanding the Nigerian military and its attitudes and actions against the threat of civil disobedience, today and in the past. The second aim of the book is to examine the Nigerian military campaign against Boko Haram insurgents – specifically, plans and operations between June 2011 and April 2017. Within this second theme, emphasis is placed on the idea of battlefield innovation and the reorganization within the Nigerian military since 2013, as the Nigerian Army and Air Force recalibrated themselves for COIN warfare. A certain mystique has surrounded the technicalities of COIN operations by the Army against Boko Haram, and this book aims to disperse that veil of secrecy. Furthermore, the work’s analysis of the air force’s role in counter-insurgency is unprecedented within the literature on military warfare in Nigeria. This book will be of great interest to students of military studies, counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism, African politics and security studies in general.
Author : David H. Ucko
Publisher : Georgetown University Press
Page : 270 pages
File Size : 17,14 MB
Release : 2009-07-02
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 1589017285
Confronting insurgent violence in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military has recognized the need to “re-learn” counterinsurgency. But how has the Department of Defense with its mixed efforts responded to this new strategic environment? Has it learned anything from past failures? In The New Counterinsurgency Era, David Ucko examines DoD’s institutional obstacles and initially slow response to a changing strategic reality. Ucko also suggests how the military can better prepare for the unique challenges of modern warfare, where it is charged with everything from providing security to supporting reconstruction to establishing basic governance—all while stabilizing conquered territory and engaging with local populations. After briefly surveying the history of American counterinsurgency operations, Ucko focuses on measures the military has taken since 2001 to relearn old lessons about counterinsurgency, to improve its ability to conduct stability operations, to change the institutional bias against counterinsurgency, and to account for successes gained from the learning process. Given the effectiveness of insurgent tactics, the frequency of operations aimed at building local capacity, and the danger of ungoverned spaces acting as havens for hostile groups, the military must acquire new skills to confront irregular threats in future wars. Ucko clearly shows that the opportunity to come to grips with counterinsurgency is matched in magnitude only by the cost of failing to do so.
Author : Douglas S. Blaufarb
Publisher : Simon & Schuster Books For Young Readers
Page : 392 pages
File Size : 26,72 MB
Release : 1977
Category : Political Science
ISBN :
Forfatteren behandler generelt og i en række eksempler amerikansk intervention i nationale opstande, befrielseskampe m.v. Analyserer endvidere årsager og resultater af denne - i det store og hele - fejlslagne politik.
