Book Description

This book contains all three White Papers by Dr. David Charney that provide a full-spectrum solution for managing insider threat: 1) True Psychology of the Insider Spy 2) NOIR: A White Paper Proposing a New Policy for Improving National Security by Fixing the Problem of Insider Spies and 3) Prevention: The Missing Link for Managing Insider Threat in the Intelligence Community. The author of the White Papers, David Charney, M.D., is a psychiatrist who had the unique experience of interviewing former FBI counterintelligence officer Robert Hanssen in jail, weekly, for approximately two hours per visit, for a year. Dr. Charney did the same with two other incarcerated insider spies: Earl Pitts (former FBI Special Agent revealed as a KGB spy), and Brian Regan (former Air Force/NRO). Dr. Charney's interest was to better understand the minds of spies for the sake of strengthening our national security. Over the eighteen years of his work with these cases, Dr. Charney developed a greater understanding of insider spy psychology and formulated new approaches and fresh proposals for better managing the problem of insider spies. Most Insider Threat management initiatives have been technology driven. While clever and useful up to a point, they are subject to the Law of Diminishing Returns and can backfire by creating a negative, distrustful workplace atmosphere. A well-motivated insider can defeat nearly any technology-based system. They will always find a way. By contrast, Dr. Charney's NOIR proposals center on the minds of potential or current insider threats: their psychologies and their inner worlds. The battle must be won there. The second white paper proposed an off-ramp exit solution, which does not yet exist, for those who have crossed the line. Quoting Sun Tzu: "Always leave your enemy an exit." Extending the logic, why not off-ramp exits, meaning robust prevention mechanisms, for BEFORE they cross the line? Security breaches and other insider threat events are the endpoints that indicate a failure occurred somewhere along the sequence of links in security chains. These links are the protective measures intended to counter potentially disastrous breaches. Breaches are proof that the links failed. Failed security chains in the Intelligence Community (IC) should be analyzed the same way the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) goes about studying aircraft disasters. The NTSB seeks to understand how each link failed in chains that resulted in disasters and whether protective links that should have been built into security chains were simply missing. The third white paper asserts that there are two critical missing links in Intelligence Community security chains. These missing links can be described as two types of off-ramp exits: exits for BEFORE someone crosses the line and exits for AFTER someone crosses the line. The absence of these two links in IC security chains weakens effective management of IC insider threat. If both missing links were added to the considerable number of existing and planned detection links-which at present seem to be the only game in town- a full spectrum solution would come into existence for the comprehensive management of insider threat. This part of the paper is proposes how to achieve this full spectrum solution. NOIR for USA is a 501(c)3 entity to educate the US Intelligence Community, other government components, including the Congress, the courts, responsible journalists, and the general public, about the NOIR concepts and proposals. Dr. Charney and his colleagues at NOIR For USA would appreciate any comments, criticisms, or additional thoughts you may have about NOIR concepts and proposals: [email protected]