Author : Humphrey Wynn
Publisher :
Page : 728 pages
File Size : 34,80 MB
Release : 1994
Category : History
ISBN :
This official history, previously not available to the general public, records the events that led to the RAF handing over responsibility for British strategic nuclear deterrence to the Royal Navy.
Author : Great Britain: Ministry of Defence
Publisher : The Stationery Office
Page : 44 pages
File Size : 41,87 MB
Release : 2006-12-04
Category : Technology & Engineering
ISBN :
In this White Paper, the Government reaffirms its commitment to maintain Britain's independent nuclear capability by investing in a new generation of ballistic missile-carrying submarines and extending the life of the Trident D5 missile. However, in order to ensure the deterrent system is the minimum necessary to provide effective deterrence, there will be a further 20 per cent reduction in operationally available warheads. The Government believes this decision balances the interests of national security against its undertaking to work towards multilateral disarmament and to counter nuclear proliferation, and it is fully compatible with Britain's international legal obligations. The White Paper discusses the policy context and sets out the reasons why decisions on the future of the UK's nuclear deterrent system are needed now, as well as considering the various options and their costs, and the industrial aspects involved in building the new submarines in the UK.
Author : Matthew Jones
Publisher : Routledge
Page : 576 pages
File Size : 13,14 MB
Release : 2017-05-12
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 1351755390
Volume I of The Official History of the UK Strategic Nuclear Deterrent provides an authoritative and in-depth examination of the British government’s strategic nuclear policy from 1945 to 1964. Written with full access to the UK documentary record, this volume examines how British governments after 1945 tried to build and then maintain an independent, nationally controlled strategic nuclear capability, and the debates this provoked in official circles. Against a background of evolving British ideas about deterrence during the Cold War, it focuses on the strategic, political and diplomatic considerations that compelled governments, in the face of ever-increasing pressures on the defence budget, to persist in their efforts to develop nuclear weapons and to deploy a credible nuclear force, as the age of the manned bomber gave way to the ballistic missile. Particular attention is given to controversies over the portion of the defence budget devoted to the deterrent programme, the effects of the restoration of Anglo-American nuclear collaboration after 1958, increasing reliance on the United States for nuclear delivery systems, the negotiations that led to the Nassau Agreement of 1962 and the supply of Polaris, and discussions within the Western Alliance over the control of nuclear forces. By the time of the October 1964 election, when this volume concludes, previous dismissal of the prospects for successful ballistic missile defence were giving way to growing doubts over the long-term effectiveness of the Polaris system in its role as an independent deterrent, several years before it was due to enter service with the Royal Navy. This book will be of much interest to students of British politics, Cold War history, nuclear proliferation and international relations.
Author : Barry R. Schneider
Publisher :
Page : 466 pages
File Size : 38,65 MB
Release : 2012
Category : Arms control
ISBN : 9780974740386
Author :
Publisher : DIANE Publishing
Page : 369 pages
File Size : 47,32 MB
Release : 2004
Category :
ISBN : 1428910336
Nearly 40 years after the concept of finite deterrence was popularized by the Johnson administration, nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) thinking appears to be in decline. The United States has rejected the notion that threatening population centers with nuclear attacks is a legitimate way to assure deterrence. Most recently, it withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, an agreement based on MAD. American opposition to MAD also is reflected in the Bush administration's desire to develop smaller, more accurate nuclear weapons that would reduce the number of innocent civilians killed in a nuclear strike. Still, MAD is influential in a number of ways. First, other countries, like China, have not abandoned the idea that holding their adversaries' cities at risk is necessary to assure their own strategic security. Nor have U.S. and allied security officials and experts fully abandoned the idea. At a minimum, acquiring nuclear weapons is still viewed as being sensible to face off a hostile neighbor that might strike one's own cities. Thus, our diplomats have been warning China that Japan would be under tremendous pressure to go nuclear if North Korea persisted in acquiring a few crude weapons of its own. Similarly, Israeli officials have long argued, without criticism, that they would not be second in acquiring nuclear weapons in the Middle East. Indeed, given that Israelis surrounded by enemies that would not hesitate to destroy its population if they could, Washington finds Israel's retention of a significant nuclear capability totally "understandable."
Author : Chris Adams
Publisher :
Page : 200 pages
File Size : 49,87 MB
Release : 2004-12-01
Category : History
ISBN : 9781410218919
General Adams reflects on his experiences in the cold war, during which he served in both manned bombers and missile silos. He tells stories of famous and not-so-famous cold warriors, including some from the US Navy. Some stories are humorous; some stories are tragic. Having traveled extensively in Russia and some former Soviet Union states after retirement, General Adams tells us about his former adversaries, the Soviet cold warriors. In the process, he leaves no doubt about his respect for all who served so valiantly in the "strategic triad"-- the strategic command, the ICBM force, and the submarine Navy.
Author : Humphrey Wynn
Publisher :
Page : 732 pages
File Size : 23,16 MB
Release : 1997
Category : History
ISBN :
Author : Todd S. Sechser
Publisher : Cambridge University Press
Page : 349 pages
File Size : 17,50 MB
Release : 2017-02-02
Category : History
ISBN : 110710694X
Are nuclear weapons useful for coercive diplomacy? This book argues that they are useful for deterrence but not for offensive purposes.
Author : Peter Malone
Publisher : Routledge
Page : 192 pages
File Size : 45,17 MB
Release : 2022-02-16
Category : History
ISBN : 100054950X
The United Kingdom was the first country to undertake atomic energy research and development for military purposes. In April 1940 the British government commissioned a group of scientists to study the possibilities of manufacturing a ‘uranium bomb’ in wartime. Originally published in 1984, this book traces the development of British nuclear weapons from those early times to the present. It examines the decisions of Atlee and the MacMillan governments in sustaining the nuclear deterrent through the hydrogen bomb and the Polaris programme, and discusses in detail the decision to proceed with Trident. Throughout the narrative is set against the background of British domestic politics and Anglo-American relations. The book demonstrates why for nearly forty years British governments remained committed to an independent nuclear deterrent as the last line of defence should NATO fail.
Author : Thomas M. Nichols
Publisher :
Page : 0 pages
File Size : 46,5 MB
Release : 2013-05-26
Category : Education
ISBN : 9781304074850
"NATO has been a "nuclear" alliance since its inception. Nuclear weapons have served the dual purpose of being part of NATO military planning as well as being central to the Alliance's deterrence strategy. For over 4 decades, NATO allies sought to find conventional and nuclear forces, doctrines, and agreed strategies that linked the defense of Europe to that of the United States. Still, in light of the evolving security situation, the Alliance must now consider the role and future of tactical or non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs). Two clear conclusions emerge from this analysis. First, in the more than 2 decades since the end of the Cold War, the problem itself -- that is, the question of what to do with weapons designed in a previous century for the possibility of a World War III against a military alliance that no longer exists -- is understudied, both inside and outside of government. Tactical weapons, although less awesome than their strategic siblings, carry significant security and political risks, and they have not received the attention that is commensurate to their importance. Second, it is clear that whatever the future of these arms, the status quo is unacceptable. It is past the time for NATO to make more resolute decisions, find a coherent strategy, and formulate more definite plans about its nuclear status. Consequently, decisions about the role of nuclear weapons within the Alliance and the associated supporting analysis are fundamental to the future identity of NATO. At the Lisbon Summit in Portugal in November 2010, the Alliance agreed to conduct the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR). This effort is designed to answer these difficult questions prior to the upcoming NATO Summit in May 2012. The United States and its closest allies must define future threats and, in doing so, clarify NATO's identity, purpose, and corresponding force requirements. So far, NATO remains a "nuclear alliance," but it is increasingly hard to define what that means."--Publisher's website
