The Relevance of Economic-Efficiency Conclusions to Moral-Rights, Moral-Ought, and Legal-Rights Analysis


Book Description

After operationalizing the concept of "the effect of a choice on economic efficiency," this Article explains the basis of its author's conclusion that ours is a liberal, rights-based society as well as the implications of that conclusion for the structure and content of the analysis of moral rights in our culture, the analysis of what an individual or the State ought to do when the relevant choice is neither required nor prohibited by our society's moral-rights commitments, and the analysis of various types of legal rights?legal rights that are based on moral rights, legal rights that arise from legislation that is designed to secure various legitimate social goals, or legal rights that are created by legislation designed to further the narrowly-defined self-interest of its supporters. The Article then explains that economic efficiency is not an ultimate value (that increasing economic efficiency is not a goal that is desired in itself), that the fact that a choice increases economic efficiency does not guarantee its consistency with our rights-commitments, that the fact that a choice decreases economic efficiency does not guarantee its inconsistency with our rights-commitments, that these last two conclusions partly reflect the inability of economic-efficiency analysis to identify the creatures that are moral-rights' holders and partially reflects the insensitivity of economic-efficiency analysis to many factors that are relevant to the consistency of a choice with the moral rights of moral-rights holders, that the fact that a choice will increase (decrease) economic efficiency is not a necessary or sufficient condition for its desirability (undesirability) from any legitimate personal-ultimate-value perspective (rights-considerations aside), and partly for reasons that relate to the foregoing conclusion that the analysis of economic efficiency is also not an algorithm for the determination of legal rights of any kind (except in the rare instances in which the alleged legal right was created by a statute that contains ambiguous or open-textured language and was passed to achieve the possible proximate goal of increasing economic efficiency).




Truth Or Economics


Book Description

Is economic efficiency a sound basis upon which to make public policy or legal decisions? In this sophisticated analysis, Richard S. Markovits considers the way in which scholars and public decision-makers define, predict, and assess the moral and legal relevance of economic efficiency. The author begins by identifying imperfections in the traditional definition of economic efficiency. He then develops and illustrates an appropriate response to Second-Best Theory and investigates the moral and legal relevance of economic-efficiency analyses. Not only do virtually all economic, legal, and public policy thinkers misdefine economic efficiency, the author concludes, they also ignore or respond inadequately to Second-Best Theory when analyzing the economic efficiency of public choices and misassess the relevance of economic-efficiency conclusions both for moral evaluations and for the answer to legal-rights questions that is correct as a matter of law.




The Moral Conditions of Economic Efficiency


Book Description

Schultz argues that markets are not moral-free zones, and that achieving the economic common good does indeed require morality.




Economic Efficiency in Law and Economics


Book Description

Economic Efficiency in Law and Economics is an interesting and worthwhile book. Megan Richardson, Economic Record Zerbe s new book is high-powered and potentially important. Bill Goodman, Monthly Labor Review In this path-breaking book, Richard Zerbe introduces a new way to think about the concept of economic efficiency that is both consistent with its historical derivation and more useful than concepts currently used. He establishes an expanded version of Kaldor Hicks efficiency as an axiomatic system that performs the following tasks: the new approach obviates certain technical and ethical criticisms that have been made of economic efficiency; it answers critics of efficiency; it allows an expanded range for efficiency analysis; it establishes the conditions under which economists can reasonably say that some state of the world is inefficient. He then applies the new analysis to a number of hard and fascinating cases, including the economics of duelling, cannibalism and rape. He develops a new theory of common law efficiency and indicates the circumstances under which the common law will be inefficient. The book will be of great interest to scholars, students, and practitioners interested in the concept of economic efficiency and how it should be applied to law and economics.




Economics and the Interpretation and Application of U.S. and E.U. Antitrust Law


Book Description

This volume (1) defines the specific-anticompetitive-intent, lessening-competition, distorting-competition, and exploitative-abuse tests of illegality promulgated by U.S. and/or E.U. antitrust law, (2) compares the efficiency defenses promulgated by U.S. and E.U. antitrust law, (3) compares the conduct-coverage of the various U.S. and E.U. antitrust laws, (4) defines price competition and quality-or-variety-increasing-investment (QV-investment) competition and explains why they should be analyzed separately, (5) defines the components of individualized-pricing and across-the-board-pricing sellers’ price minus marginal cost gaps and analyses each’s determinants, (6) defines the determinants of the intensity of QV-investment competition and explains how they determine that intensity, (7) demonstrates that definitions of both classical and antitrust markets are inevitably arbitrary, not just at their periphery but comprehensively, (8) criticizes the various protocols for market definition recommended/used by scholars, the U.S. antitrust agencies, the European Commission, and U.S. and E.U. courts, (9) explains that a firm’s economic (market) power or dominance depends on its power over both price and QV investment and demonstrates that, even if markets could be defined non-arbitrarily, a firm’s economic power could not be predicted from its market share, (10) articulates a definition of “oligopolistic conduct” that some economists have implicitly used–conduct whose perpetrator-perceived ex ante profitability depended critically on the perpetrator’s belief that its rivals’ responses would be affected by their belief that it could react to their responses, distinguishes two types of such conduct–contrived and natural–by whether it entails anticompetitive threats and/or offers, explains why this distinction is critical under U.S. but not E.U. antitrust law, analyzes the profitability of each kind of oligopolistic conduct, examines these analyses’ implications for each’s antitrust legality, and criticizes related U.S. and E.U. case-law and doctrine and scholarly positions (e.g., on the evidence that establishes the illegal oligopolistic character of pricing), and (11) executes parallel analyses of predatory conduct--e.g., criticizes various arguments for the inevitable unprofitability of predatory pricing, the various tests that economists/U.S. courts advocate using/use to determine whether pricing is predatory, and two analyses by economists of the conditions under which QV investment and systems rivalry are predatory and examines the conditions under which production-process research, plant-modernization, and long-term full-requirements contracts are predatory.




Efficiency Instead of Justice?


Book Description

Economic analysis of law is an interesting and challenging attempt to employ the concepts and reasoning methods of modern economic theory so as to gain a deeper understanding of legal problems. According to Richard A. Posner it is the role of the law to encourage market competition and, where the market fails because transaction costs are too high, to simulate the result of competitive markets. This would maximize economic efficiency and social wealth. In this work, the lawyer and economist Klaus Mathis critically appraises Posner’s normative justification of the efficiency paradigm from the perspective of the philosophy of law. Posner acknowledges the influences of Adam Smith and Jeremy Bentham, whom he views as the founders of normative economics. He subscribes to Smith’s faith in the market as an ideal allocation model, and to Bentham’s ethical consequentialism. Finally, aligning himself with John Rawls’s contract theory, he seeks to legitimize his concept of wealth maximization with a consensus theory approach. In his interdisciplinary study, the author points out the possibilities as well as the limits of economic analysis of law. It provides a method of analysing the law which, while very helpful, is also rather specific. The efficiency arguments therefore need to be incorporated into a process for resolving value conflicts. In a democracy this must take place within the political decision-making process. In this clearly written work, Klaus Mathis succeeds in making even non-economists more aware of the economic aspects of the law.







Welfare Economics and Second-Best Theory


Book Description

This book examines the implications of The General Theory of Second Best for analyzing the economic efficiency of non-government conduct or government policies in an economically efficient way. It develops and legitimates an economically efficient economic-efficiency-analysis protocol with three unique characteristics: First, the protocol focuses separately on each of a wide variety of categories of economic inefficiency, many of which conventional analyses ignore. Second, it analyzes the impact of conduct or policies on each of these categories of economic inefficiency, primarily by predicting the respective conduct’s/policy’s impact on the distortion that the economy’s various Pareto imperfections generate in the profits yielded by the resource allocations associated with the individual categories of economic inefficiency—i.e., on the difference between their profitability and economic efficiency. And third, it is third-best—i.e., it instructs the analyst to execute a theoretical or empirical research project if and only if the economic-efficiency gains the project is expected to generate by increasing the accuracy of economic-efficiency conclusions exceed the predicted allocative cost of its execution and public financing. The book also uses the protocol to analyze the economic efficiency of specific policies so as to illustrate both how it differs from the protocols that most applied welfare economists continue to use and how its conclusions differ from those produced by standard analysis.




Economic Efficiency and the Parameters of Fairness


Book Description

This article provides resolutions to a number of conundrums that have vexed policy-makers and scholars for some decades. The most significant conclusion is that efficiency and fairness concerns do not conflict but rather mutually support each other in the goal of maximizing social welfare. This is contrary to the more widely-held view by both advocates of law and economic reasoning and those favoring deontological concerns that a trade-off between fairness and efficiency is inevitable. This article demonstrates how the coalescence of the two frameworks, the cultivation of fairness with law and economics' efficiency maximization, yields greater enhancements of social welfare than efficiency alone, by simultaneously satisfying the criteria of both. The analysis also points out that more than one state of the world likely exists that satisfies both sets of criteria and the selection is political, not determined by any objective criteria, but chosen by the subjective criteria of the decision-maker. This article also discusses Kaplow and Shavell's noted and contrary assertion that a rigourous demonstration (with mathematical formality) shows that fairness concerns should never enter as an independent factor when policy makers seek to maximize social welfare. I show, however, that Kaplow and Shavell's conclusion rests on a mathematical construction of fairness that essentially strips it of all social-welfare enhancing properties, which does not comport with usual notions and purposes of fairness. It is this faulty mathematical construction that leads them to the conclusions they reach. The indeterminacy inherent in the Pareto efficiency criteria leading to multiple efficient states not only characterizes efficiency analysis's limitations but also delineates the scope for deontological choices. This article shows that a decision regarding efficient states necessarily requires deontological decisions; deontological decisions do not substitute for efficiency but compliment it. Finally, the concept of “parameters of fairness” is introduced as a means to circumscribe the maximum efficient states that are also maximum fairness states. Considering excessive corporate harm by way of example, a matter mainstream economic analysis has failed to resolve, I employ feminist legal theory as the deontological construct to yield a range of satisfactory efficient and fair resolutions. Though any deontological system would do, the conflation of feminist legal theory and law and economic analysis is particularly significant because, historically, supporters in each camp have been diametrically opposed to the tenets of the other.




Law, Economics, and Morality


Book Description

Law, Economics, and Morality examines the possibility of combining economic methodology and deontological morality through explicit and direct incorporation of moral constraints into economic models. Economic analysis of law is a powerful analytical methodology. However, as a purely consequentialist approach, which determines the desirability of acts and rules solely by assessing the goodness of their outcomes, standard cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is normatively objectionable. Moderate deontology prioritizes such values as autonomy, basic liberties, truth-telling, and promise-keeping over the promotion of good outcomes. It holds that there are constraints on promoting the good. Such constraints may be overridden only if enough good (or bad) is at stake. While moderate deontology conforms to prevailing moral intuitions and legal doctrines, it is arguably lacking in methodological rigor and precision. Eyal Zamir and Barak Medina argue that the normative flaws of economic analysis can be rectified without relinquishing its methodological advantages and that moral constraints can be formalized so as to make their analysis more rigorous. They discuss various substantive and methodological choices involved in modeling deontological constraints. Zamir and Medina propose to determine the permissibility of any act or rule infringing a deontological constraint by means of mathematical threshold functions. Law, Economics, and Morality presents the general structure of threshold functions, analyzes their elements and addresses possible objections to this proposal. It then illustrates the implementation of constrained CBA in several legal fields, including contract law, freedom of speech, antidiscrimination law, the fight against terrorism, and legal paternalism.