Three Essays in Ethnicity, Conflict and the Political Economy of Development


Book Description

In the second chapter, we consider the issue of artificial states, which are countries in which the political borders do not coincide with a division of nationalities desired by the people on the ground. We propose and compute for all countries in the world two new measures of the degree to which states are artificial. One index measures how borders split ethnic groups into two separate adjacent countries. The other index measures the straightness of land borders, under the assumption that the straight land borders are more likely to be artificial. We show that these two measures are highly correlated with several measures of political and economic success.







Three Essays on Development Economics and Political Economy


Book Description

The second essay investigates the impact of introducing village committee elections on the Communist Party's rule. This essay addresses this issue by examining the impact of electoral competition on village cadres' ties with the Party. I focus on two types of ties: village committee chairs' affiliation with Party branch and village cadres' Party membership. Using village and household survey data collected from 48 villages from 1995--2002, I find that introducing competitive elections tended to remove incumbents. Winners are less likely to belong to Party branches. Exploiting exogenous variations in the timing of implementation, I also find evidence suggesting that, although more non-Party members became cadres when competitive elections were first introduced, they are more likely to join the Party later on. It suggests that the Party may accommodate the new political forces by recruitment while elections prompt pluralization of power at village level.




Three Essays on Political Economy and Economic Development


Book Description

This thesis consists of three independent chapters. The first chapter examines the strategic choices of the targets and the intensity of violence by rebel groups. The chapter presents a theoretical framework that links a rebel group's targeting decisions to income shocks. It highlights that this relationship depends on the structure of the rebels' tax base. The hypotheses from the model are tested in the context of India's Naxalite conflict. The second chapter estimates the impact of military recruitment on human capital accumulation in colonial Punjab. In this context, I find that higher military recruitment was associated with increased literacy at the district-religion level. The final chapter presents a model that describes the optimal design of civil-military institutions in a setting where some control of the military over domestic politics is deemed desirable.