Underdetermination


Book Description

This timely book offers a wide-ranging study of the thesis that scientific theories are systematically "underdetermined" by the data they account for. After analyzing the epistemological and ontological aspects of the topic in detail, and reviewing pertinent logical facts and selected scientific cases, the author carefully examines the merits of arguments for and against the thesis. Along the way, he investigates methodological proposals and recent theories of confirmation.




Underdetermination and Indirect Measurement


Book Description

We have been astonishingly successful in gathering knowledge about certain objects or systems to which we seemingly have extremely limited access. Perhaps the most difficult problem in the investigation of such systems is that they are extremely underdetermined. What are the methods through which these cases of underdetermination are resolved? I argue in chapter 1 that these methods are best understood by thinking of what scientists are doing as gaining access to the previously inaccessible parts of these systems through a series of indirect measurements. I then discuss two central problems with such indirect measurements, theory mediation and the combining of effects, and ways in which these difficulties can be dealt with. In chapter 2, I examine the indirect measurement of planetary distances in the solar system in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by Copernicus and Kepler. In this case, there was an underdetermination between three different theories about the motions of the planets, which can be partly resolved by the measurement of distances between the planets. The measurement of these distances was enabled by making certain assumptions about the motions of the planets. I argue that part of the justification for making these assumptions comes from decompositional success in playing off measurements of the earth's orbit and the Mars orbit against each other. In chapter 3, I examine the indirect measurement of mechanical properties such as mass and forces in the solar system by Newton. In this case, there were two underdeterminations, the first an underdetermination between two theories about the true motion of the sun and the earth, and the second an underdetermination between various theories for calculating planetary orbits. Newton resolves these two problems of underdetermination through a research program where the various sources of force are identified and accounted for. This program crucially requires the third law of motion to apply between celestial objects, an issue about which Newton was criticized by his contemporaries. I examine the justification for the application of the third law of motion through its successful use for decomposition of forces in the solar system in a long-term research program. I further discuss comments by Kant on the role of the third law of motion for Newton, in which Kant recognizes its indispensability for a long-term program for determining the center of mass of the solar system and thus defining a reference point relative to which forces can be identified. Chapter 4 covers the indirect measurement of density in the earth's interior using observations of seismic waves. One of the difficult problems in this case is that we can think of the interior density of the earth as a continuous function of radius—in order to determine this radius function, you are in effect making a measurement of an infinite number of points. The natural question to ask here is how much resolution the observations give you. I focus on the work of geophysicists who were concerned with this problem, out of which a standard model for the earth's density was developed.




A Case for Underdetermination: Consequences of Opposing the Distinction between Quantum Mechanics and Bohmian Mechanics


Book Description

Seminar paper from the year 2011 in the subject Philosophy - Theoretical (Realisation, Science, Logic, Language), grade: A, Indiana University (History and Philosophy of Science), course: Demons in Physics, language: English, abstract: In his article Must Evidence Underdetermine Theory? John D. Norton attempts to refute a certain version of the underdetermination thesis. He attacks the idea that all evidence necessarily underdetermines any scientific theory. In the first part of this paper, I want to call into question part of his argument in some general terms and then focus on a particular case of possible underdetermination, namely Quantum mechanics (QM) and Bohmian mechanics (BM), in order to strengthen my criticism of Norton. Norton himself does not take sides in the debate over the question whether or not QM and BM are essentially the same theory, but says the possibility that they are cannot be ruled out. I will show that Norton, both in his general argument as well as in his judgment in the ‘QM/BM case’, takes a certain notion of theory for granted that his opponents would not agree with. In addition, I will investigate further consequences resulting from his position. This part makes up the bulk of my paper. In a second part I attempt to refute Norton on his own grounds. That is, on the basis of his idea of what a theory is, I will show that one can preclude the possibility that QM and BM are the same theory. To be clear: This paper is not a defense of the underdetermination thesis, but rather a critique of Norton’s attack.










Understanding Philosophy of Science


Book Description

Few can imagine a world without telephones or televisions; many depend on computers and the Internet as part of daily life. Without scientific theory, these developments would not have been possible. In this exceptionally clear and engaging introduction to philosophy of science, James Ladyman explores the philosophical questions that arise when we reflect on the nature of the scientific method and the knowledge it produces. He discusses whether fundamental philosophical questions about knowledge and reality might be answered by science, and considers in detail the debate between realists and antirealists about the extent of scientific knowledge. Along the way, central topics in philosophy of science, such as the demarcation of science from non-science, induction, confirmation and falsification, the relationship between theory and observation and relativism are all addressed. Important and complex current debates over underdetermination, inference to the best explaination and the implications of radical theory change are clarified and clearly explained for those new to the subject.




A Companion to the Philosophy of Science


Book Description

Unmatched in the quality of its world-renowned contributors, this companion serves as both a course text and a reference book across the broad spectrum of issues of concern to the philosophy of science.




The Web of Belief


Book Description

The Web of Belief provides a philosophical base for the study and practice of the art of argumentation. Stressing the importance of language in understanding and expressing ideas, the authors explore such questions as: What concepts do we believe to be true and why? And how can we convince others to accept our own beliefs? Drawing on everyday problems of communication, creative exercises give the student practice in formulating and testing his own arguments, as well as those of others. --




Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition


Book Description

Radical skepticism endorses the extreme claim that large swaths of our ordinary beliefs, such as those produced by perception or memory, are irrational. The best arguments for such skepticism are, in their essentials, as familiar as a popular science fiction movie and yet even seasoned epistemologists continue to find them strangely seductive. Moreover, although most contemporary philosophers dismiss radical skepticism, they cannot agree on how best to respond to the challenge it presents. In the tradition of the 18th century Scottish philosopher, Thomas Reid, Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition joins this discussion by taking up four main tasks. First, it identifies the strongest arguments for radical skepticism, namely, underdetermination arguments, which emphasize the gap between our evidence and our ordinary beliefs based on that evidence. Second, it rejects all inferential or argument-based responses to radical skepticism, which aim to lay out good noncircular reasoning from the evidence on which we base our ordinary beliefs to the conclusion that those beliefs are probably true. Third, it develops a commonsense noninferential response to radical skepticism with two distinctive features: (a) it consciously and extensively relies on epistemic intuitions, which are seemings about epistemic goods, such as knowledge and rationality, and (b) it can be endorsed without difficulty by both internalists and externalists in epistemology. Fourth, and finally, it defends this commonsense epistemic-intuition-based response to radical skepticism against a variety of objections, including those connected with underdetermination worries, epistemic circularity, disagreement problems, experimental philosophy, and concerns about whether it engages skepticism in a sufficiently serious way.




Epistemic Luck


Book Description

Offering a philosophical examination of the concept of luck and its relationship to knowledge, this text demonstrates how a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between knowledge and luck can enable us to see past some of the most intractable disputes in the contemporary theory of knowledge.