US Foreign Policy and the Multinational Force in Lebanon


Book Description

This book offers a fresh perspective on the impact of the US intervention in Lebanon in 1982 and the decision-making drivers that led the Reagan Administration into the Lebanese Civil War. Based on newly released archival materials from high level Washington officials such as President Reagan, Secretary of State Shultz and Secretary of Defense Weinberger, it argues that the failure of the Reagan Administration to accurately understand the complex political landscape of the Lebanese Civil War resulted in the US-led Multinational Force becoming militarily intertwined in the conflict. This book challenges the notion that Reagan deployed US Marines under the ideals of international peacekeeping, asserting that the US Administration hoped that the Multinational Force would create the political capital that Reagan needed to strengthen the US’ position both in the Middle East and globally. Ultimately, the peacemakers were forced to withdraw as they evolved into antagonists. A case study in the foreign policy doctrines of key Washington decision-makers throughout the 1980s, this project is perfect for any International Relations scholar or interested reader seeking to understand the links between the mistakes of the Reagan Administration and contemporary US interventions in the Middle East.




International Peacekeeping In Lebanon


Book Description

Examining the efficacy of U.N. peace efforts, Dr. Ramesh Thakur compares limited peacekeeping through U.N. authority with more coercive means such as the Multinational Force (MNF) in Lebanon. He finds that the role of the U.S.-led MNF coalition cannot be justified in terms of great-power responsibility for ensuring a stable international order, since the coalition has attempted to substitute military power for authoritative peacekeeping. When MNF legitimacy was questioned and authority was challenged, the MNF's use of force in response to those challenges switched the coalition's role from third-party peacekeeper to factional participant. As a result, every successive attempt to strengthen the MNF mandate has further subordinated the concept of neutral international peacekeeping to calculated support of national interests. If reasoned attempts to keep the peace are not to collapse into exercises in national self-interest, then peacekeeping responsibilities must remain with the U.N., supported by the great powers: Only the U.N. can provide an authoritative exposition of values within the context of international society and bestow international legitimacy upon peacekeeping activities; only the great powers can back the U.N. with requisite force.




McWp 3-35.3 - Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (Mout)


Book Description

This manual provides guidance for the organization, planning, and conduct of the full range of military operations on urbanized terrain. This publication was prepared primarily for commanders, staffs, and subordinate leaders down to the squad and fire team level. It is written from a Marine air-ground task force perspective, with emphasis on the ground combat element as the most likely supported element in that environment. It provides the level of detailed information that supports the complexities of planning, preparing for, and executing small-unit combat operations on urbanized terrain. It also provides historical and environmental information that supports planning and training for combat in built-up areas




The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon


Book Description

This book analyzes the UNIFIL as a multinational peacekeeping force deployed in a highly strained context. It investigates the defining features of UNIFIL's environment, the multicultural challenges to its smooth operation and the pattern and impact of the rise of non-European countries.







Military Coercion and US Foreign Policy


Book Description

This book examines the use of military force as a coercive tool by the United States, using lessons drawn from the post-Cold War era (1991–2018). The volume reveals that despite its status as sole superpower during the post-Cold War period, US efforts to coerce other states failed as often as they succeeded. In the coming decades, the United States will face states that are more capable and creative, willing to challenge its interests and able to take advantage of missteps and vulnerabilities. By using lessons derived from in-depth case studies and statistical analysis of an original dataset of more than 100 coercive incidents in the post-Cold War era, this book generates insight into how the US military can be used to achieve policy goals. Specifically, it provides guidance about the ways in which, and the conditions under which, the US armed forces can work in concert with economic and diplomatic elements of US power to create effective coercive strategies. This book will be of interest to students of US national security, US foreign policy, strategic studies and International Relations in general.







The Powell Doctrine and US Foreign Policy


Book Description

The Vietnam War is one of the longest and most controversial in US history. This book seeks to explore what lessons the US military took from that conflict as to how and when it was appropriate for the United States to use the enormous military force at its disposal and how these lessons have come to influence and shape US foreign policy in subsequent decades. In particular this book will focus on the evolution of the so called ’Powell Doctrine’ and the intellectual climate that lead to it. The book will do this by examining a series of case studies from the mid-1970s to the present war in Afghanistan.




Military Force as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy


Book Description

Although over six years have passed since the Lebanon intervention ended, American leaders appear to be no closer to an appreciation of what went wrong than they were in 1984. Ralph Hallenbeck's authoritative account of the American intervention in Lebanon fills this significant void. His study goes a long way toward explicating those factors that contributed most to this foreign policy failure. America's role in Lebanon is examined in four chapters, with each chapter recounting the events that occurred during the successive phases of the intervention. At various junctures in the analysis, Hallenbeck compares his findings to those of other authors writing about the Vietnam War, an intervention that he feels strongly parallels the American experience in Lebanon. He also refers to the relevant body of politico-military and decision-making theory. The author's ultimate purpose in using this comparative approach is to suggest that conclusions derived from the study of the Lebanon intervention may be relevant both to an understanding of the past and to future attempts to achieve limited ends through the measured application of military force. Hallenbeck's case study is useful as both source material for students and scholars concerned with examining national security policy-making and as a critical discussion of recent events.




When Reagan Sent In the Marines


Book Description

"In this formidable narrative, the prize-winning and super honest reporter, Patrick Sloyan, adds the depth of a scholar's context to produce a gripping reminder of why we should never forget history. He makes readers feel like they were eye witnesses." —Ralph Nader From a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist who reported on the events as they happened, an action-packed account of Reagan's failures in the 1983 Marines barracks bombing in Beirut. On October 23, 1983, a truck bomb destroyed the U.S. Marines barracks in Beirut. 241 Americans were killed in the worst terrorist attack our nation would suffer until 9/11. We’re still feeling the repercussions today. When Reagan Sent In the Marines tells why the Marines were there, how their mission became confused and compromised, and how President Ronald Reagan used another misguided military venture to distract America from the attack and his many mistakes leading up to it. Pulitzer Prize-winning author Patrick J. Sloyan uses his own contemporaneous reporting, his close relationships with the Marines in Beirut, recently declassified documents, and interviews with key players, including Reagan’s top advisers, to shine a new light on the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and Reagan’s doomed ceasefire in Beirut. Sloyan draws on interviews with key players to explore the actions of Kissinger and Haig, while revealing the courage of Marine Colonel Timothy Geraghty, who foresaw the disaster in Beirut, but whom Reagan would later blame for it. More than thirty-five years later, America continues to wrestle with Lebanon, the Marines with the legacy of the Beirut bombing, and all of us with the threat of Mideast terror that the attack furthered. When Reagan Sent In The Marines is about a historical moment, but one that remains all too present today.