(Optimal) Monetary Policy with and Without Debt


Book Description

'We propose a framework of optimal monetary policy where debt sustainability may, or may not, be a relevant constraint for the central bank. We show analytically that in each environment the optimal interest rate path consists of a Taylor rule augmented with forward guidance terms. These terms arise either i) from 'twisting interest rates' when the central bank ensures debt sustainability, or ii) under no debt concerns, from committing to keep interest rates low at the exit of the liquidity trap. The optimal policy is isomorphic to Leeper's (1991) 'passive monetary/active fiscal policy' regime in the first instance, or 'active monetary/passive fiscal policy' regime in the second. We insert our framework into a standard medium scale DSGE model calibrated to the US. Optimal passive monetary policy with debt concerns is ineffective in stabilizing inflation, whereas under no debt concerns, monetary policy is very effective in stabilizing the macroeconomy'--Abstract, page ii.




Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy, Debt Crisis and Management


Book Description

The initial government debt-to-GDP ratio and the government’s commitment play a pivotal role in determining the welfare-optimal speed of fiscal consolidation in the management of a debt crisis. Under commitment, for low or moderate initial government debt-to-GPD ratios, the optimal consolidation is very slow. A faster pace is optimal when the economy starts from a high level of public debt implying high sovereign risk premia, unless these are suppressed via a bailout by official creditors. Under discretion, the cost of not being able to commit is reflected into a quick consolidation of government debt. Simple monetary-fiscal rules with passive fiscal policy, designed for an environment with “normal shocks”, perform reasonably well in mimicking the Ramsey-optimal response to one-off government debt shocks. When the government can issue also long-term bonds–under commitment–the optimal debt consolidation pace is slower than in the case of short-term bonds only, and entails an increase in the ratio between long and short-term bonds.




Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy with Nominal and Indexed Debt


Book Description

This paper highlights the importance of debt composition in setting optimal fiscal and monetary policy over short-run business cycles and in the long run. Nominal debt as state-contingent debt can be a significant policy tool to reduce the volatility of distortionary government policy, thereby reducing macroeconomic volatility while increasing equilibrium output and consumption. The welfare gain from using nominal debt to hedge against shocks to the government budget is as large as the welfare gain from the ability to issue debt.




Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy in an Economy with Endogenous Public Debt


Book Description

This paper uses a New Keynesian framework to study the coordination of fiscal and monetary policies, in response to an inflation shock when the policymaker acts with commitment. We first show that, in the simplest New Keynesian model, fiscal policy plays no part in the optimal policy response, because of the comparative advantage which monetary policy has in the control of inflation. We then add endogenous public debt and show that the above result is no longer true. When the initial stock of debt is low, it is optimal for government spending to remain largely inactive, but when the initial stock of debt is high, government spending should play a significant stabilisation role in the first period. This finding is robust to adding endogenous capital accumulation and inflation persistence in the Phillips curve.




Optimal Monetary Policy and Fiscal Interactions in a Non-Ricardian Economy


Book Description

This paper studies optimal discretionary monetary policy and its interaction with fiscal policy in a New Keynesian model with finitely-lived consumers and government debt. Optimal discretionary monetary policy involves debt stabilization to reduce consumption dispersion across cohorts of consumers. The welfare relevance of debt stabilization is proportional to the debt-to-output ratio and inversely related to the households probability of survival that affects the household's propensity to consume out financial wealth. Debt stabilization bias implies that discretionary optimal policy is suboptimal compared with the inflation targeting rule that fully stabilizes the output gap and the inflation rate while leaving debt to freely fluctuate in response to demand shocks.




Jointly Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy Rules under Borrowing Constraints


Book Description

We study the welfare properties of an economy where both monetary and fiscal policy follow simple rules, and where a subset of agents is borrowing constrained. The optimized fiscal rule is far more aggressive than automatic stabilizers, and stabilizes the income of borrowingconstrained agents, rather than output. The optimized monetary rule features super-inertia and a very low coefficient on inflation, which minimizes real wage volatility. The welfare gains of optimizing the fiscal rule are far larger than the welfare gains of optimizing the monetary rule. The preferred fiscal instruments are government spending and transfers targeted to borrowing-constrained agents.




Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy with Limited Asset Market Participation


Book Description

This paper characterises the jointly optimal monetary and fiscal stabilisation policy in a new Keynesian model that allows for consumers who lacking access to asset markets consume their disposable income each period. With full asset market participation, the optimal policy relies entirely on the interest rate to stabilise cost-push shocks and government expenditure is not changed. When asset market participation is limited, there is a case for fiscal stabilisation policy. Active use of public spending raises aggregate welfare because it enables a more balanced distribution of the stabilisation burden across asset-holding and non-asset-holding consumers. The optimal response of government expenditure is sensitive to the financing scheme and whether the policymaker has access to a targeted transfer that can directly redistribute resources between consumers.




Optimal Monetary Policy Under Uncertainty


Book Description

Froyen and Guender have provided a thorough and careful analysis of optimal monetary policy over most of the range of theoretical models that have been used in modern macroeconomics. By providing a comprehensive and clear comparative framework they will help the student of monetary policy understand why there have been conflicting views of what policy makers should do. Central Banking In Optimal Monetary Policy Under Uncertainty, academicians and economists Richard T. Froyen and Alfred V. Guender have collaborated on presenting an informed and informative survey of optimal monetary policy literature arising during the 1970s and 1980s as a ground work for understanding current market and other economic influences on such germane issues as discretion versus commitment, target versus instrument rules, and the delegation of policy making authority within the private and public sectors. With meticulous attention to scholarship and objectivity. . . Optimal Monetary Policy Under Uncertainty is a thoughtful and thought-provoking body of work that is very strongly recommended for professional, academic, corporate and governmental economic reference collections and supplemental reading lists. Midwest Book Review Recently there has been a resurgence of interest in the study of optimal monetary policy under uncertainty. This book provides a thorough survey of the literature that has resulted from this renewed interest. The authors ground recent contributions on the science of monetary policy in the literature of the 1970s, which viewed optimal monetary policy as primarily a question of the best use of information, and studies in the 1980s that gave primacy to time inconsistency problems. This broad focus leads to a better understanding of current issues such as discretion versus commitment, target versus instrument rules, and the merits of delegation of policy authority. Casting a wide net, the authors survey the recent literature on the New Keynesian approach to optimal monetary policy in the context of the earlier literature. They emphasize the relationship between policy decisions and the information set available to the policymaker, a central focus of the earlier literature, obscured in much recent work. Optimal policy questions are considered in open as well as closed economy models and the often confusing terminology in the literature is sorted and clarified. Questions are considered within easily analysed models and the authors clearly show why these models lead to different (or equivalent) policy conclusions. Recent policy issues such as desirability of inflation targeting and the relative merits of target versus instrument rules are covered in detail. Economists in academia and in policymaking organizations who want to learn about recent developments in the area of optimal monetary policy, as well as graduate and advanced undergraduate students in macroeconomic and monetary economics, will find this volume a clear and thorough examination of the topic.




Coordination of Monetary and Fiscal Policies


Book Description

Recently, monetary authorities have increasingly focused on implementing policies to ensure price stability and strengthen central bank independence. Simultaneously, in the fiscal area, market development has allowed public debt managers to focus more on cost minimization. This “divorce” of monetary and debt management functions in no way lessens the need for effective coordination of monetary and fiscal policy if overall economic performance is to be optimized and maintained in the long term. This paper analyzes these issues based on a review of the relevant literature and of country experiences from an institutional and operational perspective.




Optimal Monetary Policy in a Collateralized Economy


Book Description

Abstract: In the last forty or so years the U.S. financial system has morphed from a mostly insured retail deposit-based system into a system with significant amounts of wholesale short-term debt that relies on collateral, and in particular Treasuries, which have a convenience yield. In the new economy the quality of collateral matters: when Treasuries are scarce, the private sector produces (imperfect) substitutes, mortgage-backed and asset-backed securities (MBS). When the ratio of MBS to Treasuries is high, a financial crisis is more likely. The central bank's open market operations affect the quality of collateral because the bank exchanges cash for Treasuries (one kind of money for another). We analyze optimal central bank policy in this context as a dynamic game between the central bank and private agents. In equilibrium, the central bank sometimes optimally triggers recessions to reduce systemic fragility