2019 Antitrust Annual Report


Book Description

Last year, we provided an empirical analysis of private antitrust class action lawsuits and their resolutions in federal court from 2013 through 2018 (the 2018 Private Antitrust Enforcement Report). This Report (the 2019 Private Antitrust Enforcement Report) expands on that analysis significantly. It extends the period under consideration to include the years 2009 through 2019 and addresses new issues. To be sure, in part it revisits the same topics, including the number of antitrust class action complaints that are filed each year, the amount of time they took on average to reach a settlement, the mean and median recoveries, the attorneys' fees and costs awarded, and the total settlement amounts in each year and overall. The 2019 Private Antitrust Enforcement Report also analyzes the law firms that represented plaintiffs and defendants in antitrust class action settlements, describes cumulative results, and tabulates cumulative totals for claims administrators involved in the settlement process. The report also addresses new issues, such as distinguishing private antitrust enforcement by particular industries, by type of claim--conspiracy claims (under Section 1 of the Sherman Act) as opposed to claims based on unilateral conduct (Section 2 of the Sherman Act)--and by type of plaintiff--whether claims were brought on behalf of direct or indirect purchasers. The plan is to continue providing similar information on an annual basis. We hope that these reports will prove of interest to the academy and the public and private sectors, and that the data they analyze will provide a firmer empirical basis than would otherwise be possible for private decisions and for public policy discussions and actions related to enforcement of the antitrust laws through private class actions.




2021 Antitrust Annual Report


Book Description

The 2021 Private Antitrust Enforcement Report provides various empirical analyses of antitrust class actions litigated in federal court from 2009 through 2021. It addresses the number of antitrust class action complaints filed each year, the amount of time on average to reach a settlement, the mean and median recoveries, the attorneys' fees and costs awarded, the total settlement amounts in each year and overall, the law firms that represented plaintiffs and defendants in antitrust class action settlements, the cumulative totals for claims administrators involved in the settlement process, and related information. The Report also distinguishing private antitrust enforcement by industruy, by type of claim--conspiracy claims (under Section 1 of the Sherman Act) as opposed to claims based on unilateral conduct (Section 2 of the Sherman Act)--and by type of plaintiff--whether claims were brought on behalf of direct or indirect purchasers. We hope that these annual reports are valuable to the academy and the public and private sectors, and that they analyze offer a firmer empirical basis than would otherwise be possible for private and public discussions, including about enforcement of the antitrust laws through private class actions.




2018 Antitrust Annual Report


Book Description

Little empirical work has been done to analyze the filing and resolution of private antitrust class action lawsuits. This Report takes an important step toward rectifying that situation. It relies on data that is newly accessible in part through artificial intelligence. Some of the issues it addresses relate only to 2018 and others relate to the years 2013 through 2018. Topics include the number of antitrust class action complaints that are filed each year, the amount of time they took on average to reach a settlement, the mean and median recoveries, the attorney's fees and costs awarded, and the total settlement amounts in each year and overall. The report also analyzes the law firms that represented plaintiffs and defendants in antitrust class action settlements, describing particular cases as well some cumulative results, and also tabulates cumulative totals for claims administrators involved in the settlement process. The plan is to continue providing similar information on an annual basis. The hope is that this data will prove of interest to the academy and the public and private sectors, and that the data will provide a firmer empirical basis than would otherwise be possible for private decisions and for public policy discussions and actions related to enforcement of the antitrust laws through private class actions.




Reforming Antitrust


Book Description

Industrial consolidation, digital platforms, and changing political views have spurred debate about the interplay between public and private power in the United States and have created a bipartisan appetite for potential antitrust reform that would mark the most profound shift in US competition policy in the past half-century. While neo-Brandeisians call for a reawakening of antitrust in the form of a return to structuralism and a concomitant rejection of economic analysis founded on competitive effects, proponents of the status quo look on this state of affairs with alarm. Scrutinizing the latest evidence, Alan J. Devlin finds a middle ground. US antitrust laws warrant revision, he argues, but with far more nuance than current debates suggest. He offers a new vision of antitrust reform, achieved by refining our enforcement policies and jettisoning an unwarranted obsession with minimizing errors of economic analysis.




Populism and Antitrust


Book Description

Competition law is designed to promote a consumer-friendly economy, but for the law to work in practice, competition agencies - and the courts who oversee them - must enforce it effectively and impartially. Today, however, the rule of populist governments is challenging the foundations of competition law in unprecedented ways. In this comprehensive work, Maciej Bernatt analyses these challenges and describes how populist governments have influenced national and regional (EU) competition law systems. Using empirical findings from Poland and Hungary, Bernatt proposes a new theoretical framework that will allow the illiberal influence of populism on competition law systems to be better measured and understood. Populism and Antitrust will be of interest not only to antitrust and constitutional law scholars, but also to those concerned about the future of liberal democracy and free markets.







The Cambridge Handbook of Competition Law Sanctions


Book Description

This handbook brings together an international roster of competition law scholars and practitioners to address the issue of sanctions in competition law from all angles. Covering nineteen jurisdictions around the world, the book analyzes the theoretical foundations and practice of sanctioning competition law infringements and, most importantly, cartels. Contributors include a range of experts drawing on criminal law, company law, labor law, human rights, and law and economics, to determine what sanctions are available as a matter of positive law against corporations and individuals, including fines and other criminal, administrative, and civil law sanctions; whether law enforcers are using these sanctions effectively; and if new sanctions – including individual sanctions – should be introduced.




The Trillion Dollar Revolution


Book Description

Ten years after the landmark legislation, Ezekiel Emanuel leads a crowd of experts, policy-makers, doctors, and scholars as they evaluate the Affordable Care Act's history so far. In March 2010, the Affordable Care Act officially became one of the seminal laws determining American health care. From day one, the law was challenged in court, making it to the Supreme Court four separate times. It transformed the way a three-trillion-dollar sector of the economy behaved and brought insurance to millions of people. It spawned the Tea Party, further polarized American politics, and affected the electoral fortunes of both parties. Ten years after the bill's passage, a constellation of experts--insiders and academics for and against the ACA--describe the momentousness of the legislation. Encompassing Democrats and Republicans, along with legal, financial, and health policy experts, the essays here offer a fascinating and revealing insight into the political fight of a generation, its consequences for health care, politics, law, the economy-and the future.




Model Rules of Professional Conduct


Book Description

The Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides an up-to-date resource for information on legal ethics. Federal, state and local courts in all jurisdictions look to the Rules for guidance in solving lawyer malpractice cases, disciplinary actions, disqualification issues, sanctions questions and much more. In this volume, black-letter Rules of Professional Conduct are followed by numbered Comments that explain each Rule's purpose and provide suggestions for its practical application. The Rules will help you identify proper conduct in a variety of given situations, review those instances where discretionary action is possible, and define the nature of the relationship between you and your clients, colleagues and the courts.




Antitrust and Upstream Platform Power Plays


Book Description

Large digital platforms have been in the doghouse of antitrust decision-makers worldwide in recent years. Antitrust regulators agree, urgent intervention is needed. Interestingly, it is the plight of victimized suppliers--of merchants, app developers, publishers, platform labourers, and the like, who are upstream in the value chain--that has topped the policy agenda, prompting scrutiny of an almost unprecedented intensity. Amid such anxieties, Antitrust and Upstream Platform Power Plays asks a somewhat provocative question: Are upstream platform power plays really 'competition problems', and ones for antitrust, at that? The apparently obvious answer--'yes'--is deceptively simple for a number of reasons. Firstly, it contradicts contemporary antitrust's single-minded focus on consumers, which has all but erased supplier exploitation in the brick-and-mortar economy from the policy's radar. Secondly, the wider antitrust community remains bitterly divided when it comes to judging platform practices. In addition, if any consensus could be had, it would almost certainly confirm the longstanding tenet that antitrust cannot be about supplier welfare, as such. These paradoxes call for a policy introspection-precisely what this book provides. The analysis offered in Antitrust and Upstream Platform Power Plays is altogether normative, theoretical, and practical. Normative because it engages in a supplier-mindful soul-searching exercise, which advances our understanding of antitrust's foundations; theoretical as it sheds multidisciplinary insights on upstream effects in the platform economy and develops new frameworks for rationalizing them; and practical since it takes a deep dive into the complex antitrust machinery whilst staying attuned to other available levers of public action. Answering a compelling question with an equally compelling answer, this work will appeal to scholars and policymakers worldwide with a particular interest in platform regulation, antitrust, and powerful digital platforms.