A Better Measure of Institutional Informed Trading


Book Description

Although many studies show that the presence of institutional investors facilitates the incorporation of accounting information into financial markets, the evidence of informed trading by institutions is rather limited in the extant literature. We address these inconsistent findings by proposing PC_NII, percentage changes in the number of a stock's institutional investors, as a novel informed trading measure. PC_NII is better able to detect informed trading than are changes in institutional ownership (∆IO) -- the measure commonly used in previous studies -- because (1) entries and exits are usually triggered by substantive private information and (2) only a small fraction of institutions have superior information. As conjectured, PC_NII subsumes the information content of ∆IO and other institutional trading and herding measures in the forecast of stock returns, and its strong predictive power for stock returns reflects mainly its close correlation with future earnings surprises. We also show that PC_NII helps address empirical issues that require a reliable measure of institutional informed trading.




Informed Institutional Trading and News Announcements


Book Description

This dissertation studies the daily institutional investors trading patterns before and after public news announcements in the US equity market, such as Merger and Acquisition announcement and release of macroeconomic indicators. Do institutional investors have inside information, or do they have superior models before news announcement? Using a high frequency institutional trading dataset that combines intraday NYSE Trades and Quotes (TAQ) data with the quarterly institutional ownership report (13F) by a reduced-form model, this dissertation tests the hypothesis of institutional investors trading on inside information 1993 to 2004. I find that most institutional investors are informed traders who accumulate shares before good news or before takeover announcements as early as 30 days ahead. Institutional investors do not have superior models in that they only buy the actual future targets and sell the forecasted "rumor" stocks from an acquisition probability model. By reversing their positions on and after the announcement day, they realize positive profits. Further, I confirm that the pre-event trading pattern of institutional investors is associated with stocks that have high probability of informed trading.




Institutional Stakeholdings and Better-Informed Traders at Earnings Announcements


Book Description

Utama and Cready (1997) use total institutional ownership to proxy for the proportion of better-informed traders, an important determinant of trading around earnings announcements. We argue that institutions holding small stakes cannot justify the fixed cost of developing private predisclosure information. Also, institutions with large stakes generally do not trade around earnings announcements since they are dedicated investors or face regulations that make informed trading difficult. However, institutions holding medium stakes have incentives to develop private predisclosure information and trade on it; we show that their ownership is a finer proxy for the proportion of better-informed traders at earnings announcements.




Does the Probability of Informed Trading Measure Informed Trading?


Book Description

Recent research has raised concerns over whether the probability of informed trading model (PIN) is an appropriate proxy of information asymmetry. We investigate PIN and test whether the model can detect illegal insider trading prior to M&A announcements. We then compare the performance of PIN to an alternative proxy, the PIN asymmetric autoregressive conditional duration model (PIN-AACD), to determine if this model offers a better proxy for informed trading. We find that PIN does not measure informed trading prior to M&A announcements, and that PIN-AACD offers a better measure of information asymmetry.




Individual and Institutional Informed Trading in Competing Firms Around Earnings Announcements


Book Description

This study investigates individual and institutional trading activities in competing firms to infer informed trading. We find evidence for individual and institutional informed trading in competing firms around earnings announcements. The evidence is stronger prior to announcements than after announcements. Magnitude of institutional (individual) net order flow coefficient decreases (increases) with lag length, suggesting that institutional trading captures information faster than individual trading. Individual net order flow transmit information cross-stock when competitor is a small firm while institutional net order flow conveys information cross-stock irrespective of firm size. Our results will be informative for regulators with regard to insider trading laws and provide insights for market participants on the impact of individual and institutional trading on cross-stock price discovery process.




Which Institutional Investors Trade Based on Private Information About Earnings and Returns?


Book Description

Recent work presents evidence that certain groups of institutional investors are able to trade profitably based on private information about earnings and returns. We contribute to this literature in three ways. First, we test whether certain private information proxies are consistent with the creation and liquidation of positions based on private information. Second, we introduce private information proxies that reflect the size and nature of an institution's position in each portfolio firm. Third, we use a methodology that examines multiple investor characteristics simultaneously at the institution-firm-level. We find that changes in ownership by institutions that have large positions in a specific firm are consistent with trading based on private information. However, other previously-documented proxies for private information produce results that are more consistent with risk-based trading (e.g., investment style, portfolio turnover) or that are insignificant in the presence of the other proxies (e.g., fiduciary type). We also find that informed trading is more prevalent in return-based measures (vs. earnings-based measures) and in smaller firms. Tests for interactions among private information proxies reveal that informed trading is most evident when the large positions in firms are newly initiated and when they are taken by investment advisers and by large institutions. Finally, we find that institutions following growth strategies exhibit momentum trading in positions held less than one year and informed trading in positions held more than one year, suggesting that the information advantages to investment styles accrue over time.




Informed Trading, Institutional Trading, and Spread


Book Description

We use transactions data from TORQ and present empirical evidence on the cross sectional relation between institutional trading and effective spread after controlling for trading volume denoting inventory and order processing costs and probability of informed trading (PIN) denoting risk of informed trading. We find that volume, information risk premium denoted by PIN times price, and institutional trading are significant determinants of bid ask spreads for a sample of 65 NYSE listed securities. We also find that institutional trading increases the adverse selection component but does not have a significant effect on order processing costs. The net effect of institutional trading on spread depends on the dominant effect, information increasing adverse selection costs or liquidity decreasing order processing costs. In our sample the increase in adverse selection costs trumps the decrease in order processing costs and as a consequence spread increases as institutional trading rises.







Empirical Market Microstructure


Book Description

The interactions that occur in securities markets are among the fastest, most information intensive, and most highly strategic of all economic phenomena. This book is about the institutions that have evolved to handle our trading needs, the economic forces that guide our strategies, and statistical methods of using and interpreting the vast amount of information that these markets produce. The book includes numerous exercises.




Measuring the Probability of Informed Trading in an Order-Driven Auction Market and a Comprehensive Analysis on the Determinants of Informed Trading


Book Description

In this study, we are able to estimate the probability of informed trading on a transactional basis, which makes the hitherto difficult task of examining the transactional dynamics between informed trading, market depth and spread feasible. In addition, we have integrated the determinants of informed trading by a comprehensive analysis.We find that, as informed traders arrive, current volume and spread increase. This supports the clustering of trading hypothesis and provides empirical evidence to Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) viewpoint that both volatility and volume increase with informed trading. The VAR result suggests that uninformed traders avoid trading with the informed, and the decision of the uninformed depends on previous condition. The decision of the informed is based more on current situation and is attracted by price volatility.Overall, it is clear that the ultimate determinants of informed trading lies with the firm's financial quality and ownership structure. The condition of the market influences the timing of the informed trading, rather than the level of informed trading between firms.