Agricultural Development Teams and the Counterinsurgency Effort in Afghanistan


Book Description

This paper will explore how the Agricultural Development Teams (ADTs) are contributing to the [counterinsurgency] and nation-building efforts in Afghanistan by helping to synthesize all elements of national power in those efforts. Agriculture development teams can and should be used to assist and develop counterinsurgency doctrinal concepts. This paper briefly examines the fundamental systemic and operational dilemmas the United States Military faces when attempting to engage in counterinsurgency and nation-building, then proposes the increased utilization of ADTs to better synchronize and synergize all elements of power in Afghanistan.




The Kunar ADT and The Afghan COIN Fight


Book Description

The Kunar Agribusiness Development Team (ADT) was created from volunteers from the 40th Infantry Division and Task Force Warrior of the California National Guard. ADTs are special units, which only exist in Afghanistan. The Kunar ADT supported Battle Space owners in the Kunar and Pech River valleys in north eastern Afghanistan. During the Kunar ADT's deployment between September 2009 and August 2010 they saw combat 19 times while working in remote villages. This book is the chronicle of the Kunar ADT's deployment and operations in support of counter insurgency (COIN) operations by working with farmers to stabilizing the economies of remote villages.




Agribusiness Development Teams in Afghanistan


Book Description

Agriculture accounts for 45 percent of Afghanistan's gross domestic product and is the main source of income for the Afghan economy. Over 80 percent of the Afghan population is involved in farming, herding, or both. However, decades of war, drought, and security challenges have devastated the country's agricultural sector, and the current level of U.S. government civilian support has been unable to keep pace with the tremendous need for assistance in this region. Revitalizing Afghanistan's agricultural sector is critical to building the government's capacity and to stabilizing the country. In 2007 the Secretary of the Army, Director of the Army National Guard, Missouri Farm Bureau President, and the Adjutant General of the Missouri National Guard developed an idea to deploy Soldiers with agricultural expertise and organic security capabilities to Afghanistan. They realized the development of Afghanistan's agriculture and agricultural products distribution capabilities was vital to long-term economic development and that governmental civilians (United States, Afghanistan, and other countries) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) were not resourced for the massive amount of work necessary in these areas as well as for the security they required. Collectively, these leaders saw the farming expertise contained within the National Guard to be the solution-farming skills to grow the Afghan agribusiness economy and Soldier skills vital to operating in a counterinsurgency environment.




Shades of CORDS in the Kush


Book Description

"Counterinsurgency (COIN) requires an integrated military, political, and economic program best developed by teams that field both civilians and soldiers. These units should operate with some independence but under a coherent command. In Vietnam, after several false starts, the United States developed an effective unified organization, Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), to guide the counterinsurgency. CORDS had three components absent from our efforts in Afghanistan today: sufficient personnel (particularly civilian), numerous teams, and a single chain of command that united the separate COIN programs of the disparate American departments at the district, provincial, regional, and national levels. This paper focuses on the third issue and describes the benefits that unity of command at every level would bring to the American war in Afghanistan. The work begins with a brief introduction to counterinsurgency theory, using a population-centric model, and examines how this warfare challenges the United States. It traces the evolution of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and the country team, describing problems at both levels. Similar efforts in Vietnam are compared, where persistent executive attention finally integrated the government's counterinsurgency campaign under the unified command of the CORDS program. The next section attributes the American tendency towards a segregated response to cultural differences between the primary departments, executive neglect, and societal concepts of war. The paper argues that, in its approach to COIN, the United States has forsaken the military concept of unity of command in favor of 'unity of effort' expressed in multiagency literature. The final sections describe how unified authority would improve our efforts in Afghanistan and propose a model for the future."--Page iii.




Unity of Effort


Book Description

This study ascribes the lack of progress in Afghanistan more to forces and donors working at cross-purposes than to insufficient resources. The authors call for an indirect approach that emphasizes working through indigenous forces. They cite U.S. special operations forces (SOF) failure to support counterinsurgency objectives as an example of military units working at cross-purposes. The authors recommend three ways to improve unity of effort: all Operation ¿Enduring Freedom¿ forces (except SOF) should be merged into one common mission with international forces; decisionmaking authority between U.S. military and civilian leaders should be clarified; and SOF operations must focus on the indirect approach. Illustrations.




Agribusiness Development Teams in Afghanistan


Book Description

Agriculture accounts for 45% of Afghanistan's gross domestic product and is the main source of income for the Afghan economy. Over 80% of the Afghan population is involved in farming, herding, or both. However, decades of war, drought, and security challenges have devastated the country's agricultural sector, and the current level of U.S. government civilian support has been unable to keep pace with the tremendous need for assistance in this region. Revitalizing Afghanistan's agricultural sector is critical to building the government's capacity and to stabilizing the country. In 2007 the Secretary of the Army, Pete Geren; Director of the Army National Guard, Lieutenant General Clyde Vaughn; Missouri Farm Bureau President, Charles Kruse; and the Adjutant General of the Missouri National Guard, Major General King Sidwell developed an idea to deploy Soldiers with agricultural expertise and organic security capabilities to Afghanistan. They realized the development of Afghanistan's agriculture and agricultural products distribution capabilities was vital to long-term economic development and that governmental civilians (United States, Afghanistan, and other countries) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) were not resourced for the massive amount of work necessary in these areas as well as for the security they required. Collectively, these leaders saw the farming expertise contained within the National Guard to be the solution farming skills to grow the Afghan agribusiness economy and Soldier skills vital to operating in a counterinsurgency environment. The 935th ADT, Missouri Army National Guard (MOARNG), had the distinct honor of being the first military ADT created and deployed by the United States. The 935th ADT was comprised of Soldiers from 16 different MOARNG units. The Soldiers who volunteered for this mission not only possessed a broad spectrum of military occupational skills but also were selected based upon their civilian-acquired farming skills and agribusiness knowledge. The ADT partnered with the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the affected Afghan provincial government, various Afghan colleges and universities, and other governmental and NGOs to maximize the use of resources, affect efficient coordination, and avoid conflict with other projects. The success of the 935th ADT was through identifying the farming deficiencies in its area of operations, obtaining funding and other resources, training and updating the agribusiness skills of the Afghan farmers and educators, and showing how to do these actions through hands-on training. The ADT's efforts included repair and maintenance of farm equipment; veterinarians to aid sick animals and provide techniques to enhance the quality and reproductive capabilities of livestock; repair and improvement of irrigation systems destroyed by decades of war; and instruction on various farming techniques for fertilizing, planting, marketing, storage, and distribution of crops. Projects and training undertaken by the ADT must be sustainable with local assets, as the ADT is only in the province for 10 to 11 months. Ideally, follow-on ADTs will deploy to back-fill the departing ADTs to continue the agribusiness training and improvements initiated by the redeploying ADTs. However, whether it is a follow-on ADT or an ADT deploying to an area for the first time, the ADTs must deploy with sufficient time available to affect the next growing season and subsequent harvest. The future of ADT service in Afghanistan is projected to diminish as civilian government agencies grow their capabilities to assist the Afghan agricultural economy reestablish itself. While this will take several years, ADTs will continue to serve U.S. and Afghan interests by helping farmers return the fertile Afghan countryside to the green and productive environment it was prior to the invasion of Soviet forces almost 40 years ago.







Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan


Book Description

This study explores the nature of the insurgency in Afghanistan, the key challenges and successes of the U.S.-led counterinsurgency campaign, and the capabilities necessary to wage effective counterinsurgency operations. By examining the key lessons from all insurgencies since World War II, it finds that most policymakers repeatedly underestimate the importance of indigenous actors to counterinsurgency efforts. The U.S. should focus its resources on helping improve the capacity of the indigenous government and indigenous security forces to wage counterinsurgency. It has not always done this well. The U.S. military-along with U.S. civilian agencies and other coalition partners-is more likely to be successful in counterinsurgency warfare the more capable and legitimate the indigenous security forces (especially the police), the better the governance capacity of the local state, and the less external support that insurgents receive.




Agribusiness Development Teams (ADT) in Afghanistan Handbook


Book Description

Agriculture accounts for 45 percent of Afghanistan's gross domestic product and is the main source of income for the Afghan economy. Over 80 percent of the Afghan population is involved in farming, herding, or both. However, decades of war, drought, and security challenges have devastated the country's agricultural sector, and the current level of U.S. government civilian support has been unable to keep pace with the tremendous need for assistance in this region. Revitalizing Afghanistan's agricultural sector is critical to building the government's capacity and to stabilizing the country.The symbol of the National Guard depicts the Concord Minuteman, one hand carrying a rifle and the other resting on a plow. It graphically depicts the fact that from the earliest days of America's history, farmers have played key roles in the militia. This proud lineage continues today as we perform operations in Afghanistan.In assessing the current situation in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, International Security Assistance Force Commander, says that "the fight is not a cyclical campaign driven by an insurgent 'fighting season.' Rather, it is ayear-round struggle, often conducted with little apparent violence to win the support of the people." A guiding principle is to "change the operational culture to connect with the people." The National Guard agribusiness development teams(ADTs) exemplify this premise and have proven their value.This handbook is a product of the National Guard Agribusiness Development Team Coordination Office with input from current and previously deployed ADTs. It contains information and lessons to assist ADTs preparing for deployment and those already deployed.




Provincial Reconstruction Teams


Book Description

The first provincial reconstruction team (PRT) stood up in January 2003 in the city of Gardez. A novel concept, PRTs combined civilian and military personnel into a single entity with the purpose of improving security, governance, and economic development. The idea was that PRTs would be able to get into areas where there was little or no presence on the part of the Afghan government or the development community and jumpstart reconstruction. In short order, the PRTs blossomed: seven more were established in 2003 and 11 were added to the list in 2004. Today there are 26 in Afghanistan: 12 under U.S. commanders and 14 under commanders from another country within the Coalition. In the meantime, the PRTs evolved into much more than an agency with guns that could go to areas too dangerous for civilians and jumpstart development. No longer do they simply pave the way for civilian agencies to step in and do the real reconstruction work. Instead, the PRTs have become America's primary tool for using large scale reconstruction to improve security in Afghanistan; the executors of the softer side of counterinsurgency. Yet questions remain. It is not clear that PRTs should be filling such a large role. Do they really make a difference, particularly in terms of improving security or the capacity of the Afghan government to govern? Even if they do, could not another organization, like the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) or the Afghan government itself, do the job just as well, if not better? The PRTs hardly stand alone. In addition, USAID, the Afghan government, and even U.S. battalions do reconstruction work in Afghanistan's provinces. USAID has been conducting projects in Afghanistan since 2002. Few provinces have not benefited from their work. The Afghan government has the National Solidarity Program, which attempts to connect local villages and shuras with the central government. These are just the most prominent development players. Numerous nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) plus the United Nations (UN) do a wide range of reconstruction work as well. The answers to the questions about the usefulness of PRTs affect U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. Any surge of U.S. forces could be accompanied by an increase in reconstruction funding. If the PRTs make a difference and are unique, then arguably a large share of new reconstruction activities should be handled by them. If, on the other hand, PRTs do not make a difference and are not unique, then new reconstruction should be handled by other organizations. We conducted field research for over two months in 2007 and two months in 2008 with four different PRTs-Khost, Kunar, Ghazni, and Nuristan. We then augmented that field research with interviews with the leadership of 10 other PRTs. That research suggests PRTs do make a difference, at least in three provinces- Khost, Kunar, and Ghazni. In Khost, an aggressive project "blitz" corresponded with fewer attacks and the emergence of a real partnership between tribes and the government. In Kunar, road projects in two major river valleys led to a rise in local community political participation and local resistance to insurgent activity. Tribes in at least five different districts responded to attacks on projects-roads, bridges, and schools-by coming out of their homes and shooting at insurgents. In Ghazni, PRT projects appear to have helped counter rising violence, and the PRT's focus on reducing corruption and improving Afghan public health capacity can be said to have improved governance. Though we have not reviewed the history of the other PRTs in detail, our interviews with commanders and civilian representatives from PRTs in the east, south, and west do not disprove what we found and, in some cases, even support it.