Akrasia in Greek Philosophy


Book Description

The 13 contributions of this collective offer new and challenging ways of reading well-known and more neglected texts on akrasia (lack of control, or weakness of will) in Greek philosophy (Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Plotinus).




Akrasia in Greek Philosophy


Book Description

Discussions on akrasia (lack of control, or weakness of will) in Greek philosophy have been particularily vivid and intense for the past two decades. Standard stories that presented Socrates as the philosopher who simply denied the phenomenon, and Plato and Aristotle as rehabilitating it straightforwardly against Socrates, have been challenged in many different ways. Building on those challenges, this collective provides new, and in some cases opposed ways of reading well-known as well as more neglected texts. Its 13 contributions, written by experts in the field, cover the whole history of Greek ethics, from Socrates to Plotinus, through Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics (Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Epictetus).




Weakness of Will in Renaissance and Reformation Thought


Book Description

The question of why people act against their better judgment has always been prominent in philosophy. Risto Saarinen presents the first study of ideas about weakness of the will between 1350 and 1650. He shows how the understanding of human conduct and free will changed in this formative period between medieval times and modernity.







Evil in Aristotle


Book Description

Provides the first full study of Aristotle's notion of evil and sheds light on its content, potential, and influence.




Ancient Philosophy


Book Description

In Ancient Philosophy (2012), Christopher Shields expanded on the coverage of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle in his earlier book, Classical Philosophy (2003), to include the philosophy of the Hellenistic era. In this new edition (2023), Shields reaches even further to include material on Neoplatonism and on Augustine and Proclus, capturing—from Thales of Miletus to the end of the sixth century CE—all of what might be called ancient philosophy. It traces the important connections between the periods and individuals of more than 1,200 years of philosophy’s history without losing sight of the novelties and dynamics unique to each. The coverage of the Presocratics, Sophists, Plato, and Stoicism has also been expanded so as to highlight Plato’s responses to the Sophistic movement in the development of his Theory of Forms. And, finally, a valuable companion volume, with Shields’s focused translations of the important sources referred to in Ancient Philosophy, Second Edition, will soon be published, obviating the need for a massive anthology of discordant voices. Ancient Philosophy, Second Edition, retains its helpful structure: each philosophical position receives: (1) a brief introduction, (2) a sympathetic review of its principal motivations and primary supporting arguments, and (3) a short assessment, inviting readers to evaluate its plausibility. The result is a book that brings the ancient arguments to life, making the introduction truly contemporary. It continues to serve as both a first stop and a well-visited resource for any student of the subject. Key updates in the second edition Extends the range of coverage well into the sixth century CE by offering a new chapter on Neoplatonism and early Christian philosophy, featuring discussions of Proclus and Augustine. Explains the conflicts between Plato and the Sophists by highlighting their approaches to rhetoric as an instrument of persuasion, offering a helpful explanation of two senses of argument. Includes new coverage of Plato’s argument from the Simplicity of the Soul, Argument from Affinity, and Argument against Rhetoric. Includes coverage of Aristotle’s political naturalism . May be used with a soon-to-be-published companion volume of primary source material, all of it translated by Christopher Shields specifically for the reader of this Second Edition.




Nicomachean Ethics


Book Description




The Passion of Infinity


Book Description

The Passion of Infinity generates a historical narrative surrounding the concept of the irrational as a threat which rational culture has made a series of attempts to understand and relieve. It begins with a reading of Sophocles' Oedipus as the paradigmatic figure of a reason that, having transgressed its mortal limit, becomes catastrophically reversed. It then moves through Aristotle's ethics, psychology and theory of tragedy, which redefine reason's collapses in moral-psychological rather than religious terms. By changing the way in which the irrational is conceived, and the nature of its relation to reason, Aristotle eliminates the concept of an irrationality which reason cannot in principle dissolve. The book culminates in an extensive reading of Kierkegaard's pseudonyms, who, in a critical retrieval of both Greek tragedy and Aristotle, prescribe their apparently pathological age a paradoxical task: develop a finite form of subjectivity willing to undergo an unthinkable thought ‐ allow the transcendence of a god to enter into the mind as well as the marrow, to make a tragic appearance in which a limit to the immanence of human reason can again be established.




Reading Aristotle's Ethics


Book Description

Presents the Nicomachean Ethics as a work of political philosophy, emphasizing the interplay between its practical political concerns and its underlying philosophic perspective and arguing that it is rhetorical in the precise Aristotelian meaning of the term.




Irrationality


Book Description

Although much human action serves as proof that irrational behavior is remarkably common, certain forms of irrationality--most notably, incontinent action and self-deception--pose such difficult theoretical problems that philosophers have rejected them as logically or psychologically impossible. Here, Mele shows that, and how, incontinent action and self-deception are indeed possible. Drawing upon recent experimental work in the psychology of action and inference, he advances naturalized explanations of akratic action and self-deception while resolving the paradoxes around which the philosophical literature revolves. In addition, he defends an account of self-control, argues that "strict" akratic action is an insurmountable obstacle for traditional belief-desire models of action-explanation, and explains how a considerably modified model accommodates action of this sort.