American Perspectives on the Vagaries of Soviet Negotiating Behavior


Book Description

Because of their behavior in negotiations from World War II through the 1960s, the Soviets have been widely perceived in the United States as predictably uncooperative. In the 1980's it is important to determine whether this popular image of Soviet negotiating behavior remains consistent, or, as this thesis examines, the possibility that there are significant variations in more recent Soviet arms control negotiating behavior which must be recognized and addressed. Variations in Soviet negotiating behavior may yield important insights regarding Soviet arms control objectives. This thesis attempts, first, to produce a comprehensive picture of post World War II Soviet negotiating behavior prior to the Limited Test Ban Treaty negotiations. This consists of detailed analysis of specific Soviet negotiating techniques. Through studying the frequency of Soviet use of these techniques a comprehensive picture of what why be considered typical Soviet negotiating behavior may be derived. What may be considered significant variations in Soviet negotiating behavior may then be identified by applying/comparing post WWII typical behavior with usage in subsequent negotiating encounters. Specific arms control negotiations examined are those of the Limited Test Ban Treaty and the first set of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I).




American Perspectives on the Vagaries of Soviet Negotiating Behavior


Book Description

Because of their behavior in negotiations from World War II through the 1960s, the Soviets have been widely perceived in the United States as predictably uncooperative. In the 1980's it is important to determine whether this popular image of Soviet negotiating behavior remains consistent, or, as this thesis examines, the possibility that there are significant variations in more recent Soviet arms control negotiating behavior which must be recognized and addressed. Variations in Soviet negotiating behavior may yield important insights regarding Soviet arms control objectives. This thesis attempts, first, to produce a comprehensive picture of post World War II Soviet negotiating behavior prior to the Limited Test Ban Treaty negotiations. This consists of detailed analysis of specific Soviet negotiating techniques. Through studying the frequency of Soviet use of these techniques a comprehensive picture of what why be considered typical Soviet negotiating behavior may be derived. What may be considered significant variations in Soviet negotiating behavior may then be identified by applying/comparing post WWII typical behavior with usage in subsequent negotiating encounters. Specific arms control negotiations examined are those of the Limited Test Ban Treaty and the first set of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I).




Soviet Diplomacy And Negotiating Behavior


Book Description

"The foreign affairs book of the season ... an absorbing review of the nitty-gritty of Soviet-American diplomacy over the years."—Stephen S. Rosenfeld, The Washington Post "Vast in its historical sweep. . . . Focusing on the period since the Bolshevik Revolution, Whelan stresses five themes: the nature of negotiating behavior, its principal characteristics, elements contributing to its formation, aspects of continuity and change during more than 60 years, and the implications of the record for U.S. foreign policy in the 1980s. "The bulk of the book traces Soviet diplomacy under Chicherin and Litvinov, the enormously complex and detailed wartime conferences with Stalin, the descent into the cold war, the transition to peaceful coexistence with Nikita Krushchev (including fascinating details on the Cuban Missile Crisis), peaceful coexistence with Leonid Brezhnev (including extensive chronological analysis of the SALT process) and finally, judgements about how U.S. policy should be informed in future un- dertakings with the Soviets."—Nish Jamgotch, Jr., The American Political Science Review




Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiating Behavior


Book Description




Negotiating with the Soviets


Book Description

"Smith's book contains a wealth of insights into Soviet negotiating style... " -- Foreign Service Journal "Smith, a professional diplomat, has made a timely and substantial contribution to a well-explored area.... his prescription for a more 'bipartisan' American foreign policy is especially convincing." -- Library Journal ..". this is a surprisingly good monograph.... the writing is lively and open." -- World Affairs Report "Smith is on solid ground in pointing to the factors of authority, risk-avoidance and control as keys to understanding Soviet negotiating behavior. He does have something new to say, and American diplomats should be listening." -- Foreign Affairs "Raymond Smith's book, Negotiating with the Soviets, should be a required primer for new Foreign Service officers before their first negotiations with Soviet counterparts as well as mandatory reading for policymakers in the White House." -- The Russian Review ..". a wealth of insights into Soviet negotiating style... " -- Foreign Service Journal Drawing on his extensive experience "negotiating with the Soviets," Smith argues that a unique political culture and ideology have produced a Soviet approach to international negotiations often dramatically different from that of the West.







Behavior & Society


Book Description







Reagan and Gorbachev


Book Description

“[Matlock’s] account of Reagan’s achievement as the nation’s diplomat in chief is a public service.”—The New York Times Book Review “Engrossing . . . authoritative . . . a detailed and reliable narrative that future historians will be able to draw on to illuminate one of the most dramatic periods in modern history.”—Los Angeles Times Book Review In Reagan and Gorbachev, Jack F. Matlock, Jr., a former U.S. ambassador to the U.S.S.R. and principal adviser to Ronald Reagan on Soviet and European affairs, gives an eyewitness account of how the Cold War ended. Working from his own papers, recent interviews with major figures, and unparalleled access to the best and latest sources, Matlock offers an insider’s perspective on a diplomatic campaign far more sophisticated than previously thought, waged by two leaders of surpassing vision. Matlock details how Reagan privately pursued improved U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations even while engaging in public saber rattling. When Gorbachev assumed leadership, however, Reagan and his advisers found a willing partner in peace. Matlock shows how both leaders took risks that yielded great rewards and offers unprecedented insight into the often cordial working relationship between Reagan and Gorbachev. Both epic and intimate, Reagan and Gorbachev will be the standard reference on the end of the Cold War, a work that is critical to our understanding of the present and the past.