Pioneers of Amphibious Warfare, 1898-1945


Book Description

The planning that allowed for the successful amphibious landings at the end of World War II actually began during the 1880s as the Marine Corps sought to define its role in the new Steel Navy. Officers braved skepticism, indifference and outright opposition to develop an amphibious warfare doctrine, with each service contributing. From the 1898 war with Spain through the disastrous 1915 Australian landing to the successful World War II assaults in the Pacific and northwest France, this chronological history explores the successes and failures pivotal to the concept of amphibious warfare through the lives and careers of fourteen officers instrumental to its development. Profiles include General George S. Patton, Jr.; Rear Admiral Walter C. Ansel, USN; Lieutenant General John A. Lejeune, USMC; Admiral William Sims, USN; and Colonel Robert W. Huntington, USMC.




Development Of Amphibious Doctrine


Book Description

Although the U.S. had conducted amphibious operations since the Revolutionary War, it was not until after the Spanish-American War that the military services attempted to codify procedures in doctrine. Early emphasis focused on command relationships and the responsibilities of commanders, eventually expanding to incorporate operational concepts, tactical techniques, and the necessary equipment. In an environment characterized by inter-service rivalry, as well as monetary and materiel constraints, dedicated individuals and organizations overcame numerous obstacles to develop, practice, and successfully execute amphibious operations in World War II. This thesis examines the evolutionary development of amphibious doctrine by the U.S. Marine Corps, Army, and Navy, and the employment of that doctrine during Operations Watchtower and Torch in World War II. The examination includes an analysis of the historical efforts to develop innovative solutions to a wide range of challenges the services faced at the beginning of the 20th Century leading up to World War II. How the leadership solved those challenges informs the efforts of current leadership in addressing contemporary doctrinal, operational, and tactical challenges and those of the future.




The Role of Amphibious Warfare in British Defense Policy


Book Description

This book breaks new ground as the first full account of the role of amphibious warfare in British strategy between VE Day and the Anglo-French assault on Suez in 1956. Ian Speller analyses the development of postwar strategic planning and the manner in which this influenced the nature of Britain's armed forces in the 1940s and 1950s. By detailing the development of equipment, doctrine and the role of the Royal Marines he sheds new light on the military response to a succession of overseas crises.




The Emergence of American Amphibious Warfare, 1898—1945


Book Description

The Emergence of American Amphibious Warfare, 1898–1945 examines how the United States became a military superpower through the use of amphibious operations. While other major world powers pursued and embraced different weapons and technologies to create different means of waging war, the United States was one of the few countries that spent decades training, developing, and employing amphibious warfare to pursue its national interests.Commonly seen as dangerous and costly, amphibious warfare was carefully modernized, refined, and promoted within American political and military circles for years by a small motley group of military mavericks, intellectuals, innovators, and crackpots. This generational cast of underdogs and unlikely heroes were able to do the impossible by predicting and convincing America’s leadership how the United States should fight World War II.David Nasca reveals that despite the new ways that states have to project military power today as seen with airpower, nuclear weapons, cyber warfare, and special operators, amphibious warfare has proven to be the most important element in transforming the theater of battle. In understanding how amphibious warfare allowed the United States to achieve geopolitical supremacy, competitor states are now looking at America’s amphibious past for clues in how to challenge the United States’ global leadership and expand its power and influence in the world.




US World War II Amphibious Tactics


Book Description

The US armed forces pioneered amphibious warfare in the Pacific and by the time of the D-day landings they had perfected the special equipment and tactics necessary for this extraordinarily difficult and risky form of warfare. This fact-packed study details the doctrine, equipment and tactics that evolved between the North African landings of November 1942 and those in the South of France in August 1944, and illustrates many aspects of the physical realities of assault landings through the use of photos, diagrams and color plates.




Military Innovation in the Interwar Period


Book Description

A study of major military innovations in the 1920s and 1930s.




The Royal Navy 1930-1990


Book Description

This book explores innovation within the Royal Navy from the financial constraints of the 1930s through to the refocusing of the Royal Navy after 1990.




The Royal Navy, 1930-2000


Book Description

This book explores innovation within the Royal Navy from the financial constraints of the 1930s through to the refocusing of the Royal Navy after 1990.




Why Gallipoli Matters: Interpreting Different Lessons From History


Book Description

After careful study of the Gallipoli Campaign of 1915, why did the British and the Americans come up to contradictory operational conclusions regarding the future applicability of amphibious operations? Divergent views from the lessons of Gallipoli campaign are the result of three differing operational approaches to strategic considerations that Britain and the Unites States faced in the 1920s and 1930s. The first were different theater strategic objectives that required different operational campaigns necessary to achieve each. The second was different operational experiences, which caused one side to focus on the past while the other to the future. The final was the different means available to operational commanders to execute their campaign. History can often provide contradictory lessons to those who wish to use it to practically apply operational art. Using analogies correctly is important. For the operational commander, drawing the correct lessons learned is made even more difficult by the very nature of inter-service rivalry. Derived from an analysis of the operational art and at operational level of war, the lessons learned from this campaign led directly to the development of sound doctrine, which developed in peacetime was absolutely essential in wartime. Finally, we continue to learn from failure more often than through success, but we must not allow ourselves to be intimidated by failure either.