Book Description

Efficiency and security are major concerns with increasingly higher importance in modern wireless communications. These two concerns are especially significant for multi-user wireless communications where different users share or compete for resources. Among different users, there are possibilities of cooperation, competition, and/or malicious behavior. Due to the possibility of cooperation among the users, the spectral and energy efficiency in multi-user wireless communications could be boosted. Due to the possibility of competition, the resource allocation in multi-user wireless systems may reach certain equilibrium. Due to the possibility of malicious behavior, the security and reliability of wireless communications can be undermined. In this thesis, a comprehensive analysis on the issues of efficiency and security in multi-user wireless communications is developed for three systems in four scenarios. The first multi-user system of multiple-input multiple-output two-way relaying has the feature of cooperation including a limited coordination scenario and a full coordination scenario. It is shown that high spectral efficiency can be achieved with efficient energy consumption in this system due to the cooperation among the users. Moreover, full coordination yields better results in both spectral and energy efficiency than limited coordination at the cost of higher overhead. The second multi-user system of legitimate transceiver(s) with a jammer features the existence of malicious behavior. To measure the jamming threat, the worst-case jamming is studied for different cases according to the jammer's knowledge of the legitimate communication. The optimal/sub-optimal jamming strategy in each case is analyzed and derived. The third multi-user system of two-user interference channel features the competition of the users. The situation is modeled using noncooperative games with continuous mixed strategies. The outcomes of the games are analyzed through the establishment of the conditions for the existence and uniqueness of mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.