Risk Assessment of Severe Accident-induced Steam Generator Tube Rupture


Book Description

This report describes the basis, results, and related risk implications of an analysis performed by an ad hoc working group of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to assess the containment bypass potential attributable to steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) induced by severe accident conditions. The SGTR Severe Accident Working Group, comprised of staff members from the NRC's Offices of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) and Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES), undertook the analysis beginning in December 1995 to support a proposed steam generator integrity rule. The work drew upon previous risk and thermal-hydraulic analyses of core damage sequences, with a focus on the Surry plant as a representative example. This analysis yielded new results, however, derived by predicting thermal-hydraulic conditions of selected severe accident scenarios using the SCDAP/RELAP5 computer code, flawed tube failure modeling, and tube failure probability estimates. These results, in terms of containment bypass probability, form the basis for the findings presented in this report. The representative calculation using Surry plant data indicates that some existing plants could be vulnerable to containment bypass resulting from tube failure during severe accidents. To specifically identify the population of plants that may pose a significant bypass risk would require more definitive analysis considering uncertainties in some assumptions and plant- and design-specific variables. 46 refs., 62 figs., 37 tabs.














Book Description




Effectiveness of Surveillance Sampling Strategies for Detecting Steam Generator Tube Degradation


Book Description

Nuclear power plants seeking to extend their operating license must first address the degradation of systems, structures, and components (SSCs) to ensure they can maintain a satisfactory level of reliability into the extended lifetime. Passive SSCs play an important role in determining the feasibility of life extension. Part of the feasibility analysis requires plants to demonstrate the viability and reliability of passive SSCs into the extended lifetime. The research carried out toward this thesis considers primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC) of steam generator (SG) tubes as an example degradation mechanism. An empirical model for PWSCC crack growth is adopted to simulate crack growth over a 40-year operating lifetime. Surveillance and maintenance strategies similar to those performed by the industry are integrated with the PWSCC crack growth model to determine the effectiveness of surveillance strategies for detecting SG tube degradation. The results of this analysis were applied to a specific accident scenario in which steam generator tubes rupture following a depressurization of the secondary side due to the sudden rupture of a steam-line caused by flow-accelerated corrosion. Likelihood of a spontaneous steam generator tube rupture is also assessed. The analysis and application of the specific accident scenario indicates a maximum core damage frequency in the 16th year. Sensitivity analyses into the probability of detection (POD) and crack growth rates were also performed. As expected, the likelihood of the accident scenario occurring increased significantly as the maximum POD was decreased. When crack growth rates were slowed down, the overall likelihood of the accident scenario decreased and the expected occurrence of the accident scenario was delayed.




Analysis of Steam-generator Tube-rupture Events Combined with Auxiliary-feedwater Control-system Failure for Three Mile Island-Unit 1 and Zion-Unit 1 Pressurized Water Reactors


Book Description

A steam-generator tube-rupture (SGTR) event combined with loss of all offsite alternating-current power and failure of the auxiliary-feedwater (AFW) control system has been investigated for the Three Mile Island-Unit 1 (TMI-1) and Zion-Unit 1 (Zion-1) pressurized water reactors. The Transient Reactor Analysis Code was used to simulate the accident sequence for each plant. The objectives of the study were to predict the plant transient response with respect to tube-rupture flow termination, extent of steam generator overfill, and thermal-hydraulic conditions in the steam lines. Two transient cases were calculated: (1) a TMI-1 SGTR and runaway-AFW transient, and (2) a Zion-1 SGTR and runaway-AFW transient. Operator actions terminated the tube-rupture flow by 1342 s (22.4 min) and 1440 s (24.0 min) for TMI-1 and Zion-1, respectively, but AFW injection was continued. The damaged steam generator (DSG) overfilled by 1273 s (21.2 min) for the TMI-1 calculation and by 1604 s (26.7 min) for the Zion-1 calculation. The DSG steam lines were completely filled by 1500 s (25 min) and 2000 s (33.3 min) for TMI-1 and Zion-1, respectively. The maximum subcooling in the steam lines was approx. 63 K (approx. 113°F) for TMI-1 and approx. 44 K (approx. 80°F) for Zion-1.