Antitrust, Federalism, and the Regulatory Process


Book Description

This article, published in 1981, examines the two-part Midcal Aluminum standard for state action antitrust immunity. Under that standard, private actors are immune from antitrust liability if (1) they act pursuant to a regulatory policy that is clearly articulated by the state as sovereign and (2) the state actively supervises their conduct. The article endorses the clear articulation requirement, but argues for abandonment of the active supervision requirement. Clear articulation provides an appropriate basis for deference to state economic choices made through legitimate political processes. Active supervision, however, the article argues, bears no necessary relationship to the legitimacy of the state's regulatory scheme. It unjustifiably relies on command-and-control regulatory structures as a measure of the substantive legitimacy of the state's regulatory policy. For the more recent views of the author on the state action doctrine, see William H. Page and John E. Lopatka, State Action and the Meaning of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: An Approach to Hybrid Restraints, 20 Yale J. Reg. 269 (2003) and William H. Page and John E. Lopatka, State Regulation in the Shadow of Antitrust: FTC v. Ticor Title Insurance Co., 3 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 189 (1993).







Antitrust Federalism


Book Description

This work examines the role that state antitrust law plays in our national competitve policy and surveys the similarities and differences between state and federal antitrust laws.







Federal Antitrust Policy


Book Description

Policy and Measurement: Basic Economics of Antitrust; History and Ideology in Antitrust Policy; Market Power and Market Definition; The Substance of Antitrust: Antitrust Policy Toward Collusion and Oligopoly; Joint Ventures of Competitors, Concerted Refusals, Patent Licensing, and Rule of Reason; Exclusionary Practices and the Dominant Firm: Basic Doctrine of Monopolization and Attempt; Exclusionary Practices in Monopolization and Attempt Cases; Predatory Pricing; Vertical Integration and Vertical Mergers; Tie-Ins, Reciprocity, Exclusive Dealing and the Franchise Contract; Intrabrand Restraints on Distribution; Mergers of Competitors; Conglomerate Mergers; Price Discrimination and the Robinson-Patman Act; Antitrust as a Regulatory Institution: Public Enforcement of the Federal Antitrust Laws; Private Enforcement; Damages; Antitrust and the Process of Democratic Government; Antitrust and Federal Regulatory Policy; Antitrust Federalism and the "State Action" Doctrine; Reach of the Federal Antitrust Laws.




Antitrust Federalism in the EU and the US


Book Description

This book analyses multi-level governance in competition policy, or "antitrust federalism", in the US and the EU from a comparative perspective. The book compares how competition laws and authorities of different levels - the federal and the state levels in the US and the national and the supranational levels in the EU - interact with each other. The book compares how competition laws and authorities of different levels - the federal and the state levels in the US and the national and the supranational levels in the EU - interact with each other. The EU and the US stand among the strongest existing examples of multi-level polities and they developed mature competition policies. Despite such similarities, however, recent developments imply that they are moving in different directions in the field of antitrust federalism. Inspired by these divergent policy developments taking place at both sides of the Atlantic, the book addresses three principal research questions: firstly, what are the key similarities and differences between the US and the EU in terms of antitrust federalism; secondly, what are the reasons for differences (if any), and finally, can the US and the EU draw any policy lessons from each others' experiences in antitrust federalism? The book is essentially multidisciplinary in nature and it aims to initiate a dialogue between the law and political science literatures in its field.




Antitrust Federalism in the EU and the US


Book Description

The EU and the US are the preeminent examples of multi-level polities and both have highly developed competition policies. Despite these similarities however, recent developments suggest that they are moving in different directions in the area of antitrust federalism. This book examines multi-level governance in competition policy from a comparative perspective. The book analyses how competition laws and authorities of different levels - the federal and the state levels in the US and the national and the supranational levels in the EU - interact with each other. Inspired by the increasingly divergent policy developments taking place on both sides of the Atlantic, the author asks whether the EU and the US can draw policy lessons from each other’s experiences in antitrust federalism. Antitrust Federalism in the EU and the US reveals the similarities and differences between the European and American models of antitrust federalism whilst employing policy network models in its comparative analysis of issues such as opacity and accountability in networks. The book is essentially multidisciplinary in its effort to initiate dialogue between the Law and Political Science literatures in this field. This book will be of particular interest to academics, students and practitioners of Competition Law, Constitutional Law and Political Science.




Interest Groups, Antitrust, and State Regulation


Book Description

This article, published in 1987, responds to John Shepard Wiley, A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 713 (1986). In an earlier article, I argued that the "clear articulation" requirement is the best criterion for "state action" antitrust immunity because it reinforces representative (as opposed to administrative) political processes. Wiley argued, however, that even clearly articulated state economic choices are illegitimate, and should therefore not be immune, if they are the product of capture by interest groups. I argue in response that the Madisonian gauntlet of state legislative processes provides a more appropriate basis for deference to state economic choices than the theory of legislative capture.







Federalism and Antitrust Reform


Book Description

Currently the Antitrust Modernization Commission is considering numerous proposals for adjusting the relationship between federal antitrust authority and state regulation. This essay examines two areas that have produced a significant amount of state-federal conflict: state regulation of insurance and the state action immunity for general state regulation. It argues that no principle of efficiency, regulatory theory, or federalism justifies the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which creates an antitrust immunity for state regulation of insurance. What few benefits the Act confers could be fully realized by an appropriate interpretation of the state action doctrine. Second, the current formulation of the antitrust state action doctrine creates approximately the correct balance between state and federal authority where competition is concerned, although both its clear articulation and active supervision prongs need to be strengthened and refined. In addition, basing state action immunity on the degree to which a state imposes the burden of in-state monopoly on out-of-state interests very likely comes with greater costs than any benefit that is likely to result.