Book Description

Syrian President Hafez Assad has established himself as the virtual arbiter of the peace process; whether the process succeeds or fails to a large extent depends on him. Given the difficulties that Assad confronted when the talks first began 4 years ago, it is extraordinary that he has been able to maneuver himself into this position. This study attempts to show how he did it, and, in the process, clarify the realities of power in the Middle East. According to the author, with the coming of groups like Hizbollah the Middle East power balance has changed, and U.S. policymakers need to appreciate this fact if they are not to be overwhelmed by the new situation that has come into being. At the start of the peace process Israel appeared to be holding all of the cards, and thus saw itself under no compulsion to make accommodations to its enemies. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Israel's main antagonist, Syria, was bereft of international support; it could not look to Moscow to bolster its weak position. Along with that, Syria could not hope to coerce the Israelis by holding out the threat of resumed hostilities. After Egypt had concluded a separate peace with the Jewish state, Syria's ability to make war was severely compromised. Given this situation (Syria's loss of Soviet patronage and its inability to play the war card), the peace process appeared, from the Israelis' standpoint, to be a win-win situation. However it has not evolved that way. It is now apparent that it is Tel Aviv, not Damascus, that is most anxious for a settlement; the Israeli government is the one that is importuning the United States to move the talks along.1 Assad has held back, refusing to cooperate unless and until he can obtain his minimum requirement. Assad wants the Golan Heights back (after Damascus lost it to Israel in 1967). Israel's leaders are loath to hand it over--at least all at once. They have hinted that they might be willing to return it incrementally (the Israeli Defense Force [ IDF] could make staged withdrawals from the Heights over a period of, say, 3-8 years). That, for Assad, is not good enough; he wants an almost immediate withdrawal of the Israeli forces. The maximum waiting period that he is willing to entertain is 1 year. Assad's position is that Syrian sovereignty must be reestablished over the Heights by the close of 1995. Where did Assad get the idea that he could hold out like this?