Book Description

The compliance of international human rights treaties largely depends on states' periodic reports and treaty bodies' monitoring systems. Yet the treaty bodies do not have coercive means of enforcement, and their recommendations lack legal-binding force in domestic legal systems. The implementation of recommendations needs the complex process of domestic mobilization for human rights. When do international recommendations make a difference in mobilizing for human rights changes? When do states listen to treaty bodies' recommendations? This research aims to answer these questions by examining recommendations and follow-up measures by states with a focus on the Human Rights Committee ("HRC") established by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"). This research employs two methodologies: qualitative and quantitative analysis. Firstly, for qualitative analysis, I conduct in-depth case studies of South Korea and Japan. I analyze all reports submitted by various stakeholders in the state reporting system of the HRC. The case studies include 32 interviews with activists, lawyers, scholars, judges, and other practitioners. Secondly, for quantitative analysis, I conduct a content analysis on all reports from different stages of the monitoring system for all countries. I look at the recommendations that the HRC adopted from July 2006 to July 2015, and for which it completed the follow-up procedure by April 2018. The dataset includes 103 countries and 393 issues in total. The comparative case studies show that the implementations of international human rights recommendations were different in South Korea and Japan in terms of process, institutions, and actors since their domestic political mechanisms and institutions are different. The findings show three distinctive features to explain the implementation of international human rights law: the availability of individual communications, the activeness of courts, and the functioning of national human rights institutions. The case study of South Korea provides examples of how these mechanisms empowered individuals and served as platforms where civil society organizations and individuals can present arguments relying on international human rights law. The institutions were adopted and played their role in the democratization process of South Korea. Meanwhile, Japan, which does not have equivalent mechanisms, showed small but incremental implementation through legislative changes by the Diet, driven by the government/bureaucrats. Japanese civil society has fewer domestic means to promote discussions about human rights issues within the country; therefore, they are motivated to turn to international treaty bodies to pressure the government. Comparing South Korea and Japan, I conclude that the mechanisms that allow more use of international human rights law make a difference in the implementation of international human rights recommendations. Quantitative analysis of the dataset using logistic regression confirms that such institutions make a difference depending on the level of democracy. In new democracy countries, international engagement of the high court and the individual communication system are associated with better implementation of recommendations. In authoritarian regimes, national human rights institutions and NGOs' participation in the monitoring system are correlated with positive human rights changes. However, authoritarian regimes tend to implement recommendations worse when the high court engages in international activities. More importantly, the frequent dialogue among state, treaty body, and civil society organizations is positively associated with the implementation of recommendations, especially for authoritarian regimes and new democracies. The treaty monitoring system contributes to domestic human rights changes by generating substantive review of new developments made within the country. States do not implement recommendations merely from the fact they receive recommendations from treaty bodies. States implement recommendations better when domestic dynamics enable a spiral use of international human rights law. When the dialogue among treaty bodies, state parties, and civil society organizations continues in a constructive and effective manner, and when there are institutional protections that enable domestic mobilization for human rights, the recommendations lead to visible human rights changes.