Bidder Rivalry


Book Description

When Rudy enters Elvis’s Vegas Sing-Along Bar, where Gideon works as an Elvis impersonator, the two get caught up in the magic of yuletide melodies and a spark as bright as the star atop the Christmas tree is lit. But soon the two men discover they’re online auction rivals, both angling for memorabilia from their favorite childhood TV show The Fun Family, and that’s when the evening goes from magical to explosive. Over the course of the holiday season, the two can’t stay away from one another. Soon they begin to understand why the memorabilia they fight over online means so much to each of them. Will the spark between them reignite? Can anger turn to passion, and love bloom with the help of a little Christmas magic?




The Economics of Collusion


Book Description

An examination of collusive behavior: what it is, why it is profitable, how it is implemented, and how it might be detected. Explicit collusion is an agreement among competitors to suppress rivalry that relies on interfirm communication and/or transfers. Rivalry between competitors erodes profits; the suppression of rivalry through collusion is one avenue by which firms can enhance profits. Many cartels and bidding rings function for years in a stable and peaceful manner despite the illegality of their agreements and incentives for deviation by their members. In The Economics of Collusion, Robert Marshall and Leslie Marx offer an examination of collusive behavior: what it is, why it is profitable, how it is implemented, and how it might be detected. Marshall and Marx, who have studied collusion extensively for two decades, begin with three narratives: the organization and implementation of a cartel, the organization and implementation of a bidding ring, and a parent company's efforts to detect collusion by its divisions. These accounts—fictitious, but rooted in the inner workings and details from actual cases—offer a novel and engaging way for the reader to understand the basics of collusive behavior. The narratives are followed by detailed economic analyses of cartels, bidding rings, and detection. The narratives offer an engaging entrée to the more rigorous economic discussion that follows. The book is accessible to any reader who understands basic economic reasoning. Mathematical material is flagged with asterisks.




Marketing Intelligent Systems Using Soft Computing


Book Description

Dr. Jay Liebowitz Orkand Endowed Chair in Management and Technology University of Maryland University College Graduate School of Management & Technology 3501 University Boulevard East Adelphi, Maryland 20783-8030 USA jliebowitz@umuc. edu When I first heard the general topic of this book, Marketing Intelligent Systems or what I’ll refer to as Marketing Intelligence, it sounded quite intriguing. Certainly, the marketing field is laden with numeric and symbolic data, ripe for various types of mining—data, text, multimedia, and web mining. It’s an open laboratory for applying numerous forms of intelligentsia—neural networks, data mining, expert systems, intelligent agents, genetic algorithms, support vector machines, hidden Markov models, fuzzy logic, hybrid intelligent systems, and other techniques. I always felt that the marketing and finance domains are wonderful application areas for intelligent systems, and this book demonstrates the synergy between marketing and intelligent systems, especially soft computing. Interactive advertising is a complementary field to marketing where intelligent systems can play a role. I had the pleasure of working on a summer faculty f- lowship with R/GA in New York City—they have been ranked as the top inter- tive advertising agency worldwide. I quickly learned that interactive advertising also takes advantage of data visualization and intelligent systems technologies to help inform the Chief Marketing Officer of various companies. Having improved ways to present information for strategic decision making through use of these technologies is a great benefit.




The Economics of Collusion


Book Description

An examination of collusive behavior: what it is, why it is profitable, how it is implemented, and how it might be detected. Explicit collusion is an agreement among competitors to suppress rivalry that relies on interfirm communication and/or transfers. Rivalry between competitors erodes profits; the suppression of rivalry through collusion is one avenue by which firms can enhance profits. Many cartels and bidding rings function for years in a stable and peaceful manner despite the illegality of their agreements and incentives for deviation by their members. In The Economics of Collusion, Robert Marshall and Leslie Marx offer an examination of collusive behavior: what it is, why it is profitable, how it is implemented, and how it might be detected. Marshall and Marx, who have studied collusion extensively for two decades, begin with three narratives: the organization and implementation of a cartel, the organization and implementation of a bidding ring, and a parent company's efforts to detect collusion by its divisions. These accounts—fictitious, but rooted in the inner workings and details from actual cases—offer a novel and engaging way for the reader to understand the basics of collusive behavior. The narratives are followed by detailed economic analyses of cartels, bidding rings, and detection. The narratives offer an engaging entrée to the more rigorous economic discussion that follows. The book is accessible to any reader who understands basic economic reasoning. Mathematical material is flagged with asterisks.




The American Reports


Book Description




The Southeastern Reporter


Book Description




The South Western Reporter


Book Description

Includes the decisions of the Supreme Courts of Missouri, Arkansas, Tennessee, and Texas, and Court of Appeals of Kentucky; Aug./Dec. 1886-May/Aug. 1892, Court of Appeals of Texas; Aug. 1892/Feb. 1893-Jan./Feb. 1928, Courts of Civil and Criminal Appeals of Texas; Apr./June 1896-Aug./Nov. 1907, Court of Appeals of Indian Territory; May/June 1927-Jan./Feb. 1928, Courts of Appeals of Missouri and Commission of Appeals of Texas.




EU Law of Competition and Trade in the Pharmaceutical Sector


Book Description

This book provides a systematic analysis of the law and practice of EU competition and trade in the pharmaceutical sector. Authored by leading private practitioners, economists, scholars and high-level officials at competition regulators, this work provides valuable insider knowledge on the application of law and policies to the pharmaceutical industry. The work contains extensive commentary on the legislation and the latest case law and administrative precedents in this sector, at both EU and national level, including certain significant jurisdictions (e.g., the US, China). Coverage of various key developments includes the recent pay-for-delay antitrust investigations, the perennial issues around parallel trade, and an examination of mergers among pharmaceutical companies and medical devices manufacturers. In addition to the legal analysis, it offers vital economic and business perspectives to ensure that the reader has the full range of tools with which to prepare for cases and conduct transactions within the pharmaceutical industry.




The New Competition


Book Description




The Consistent Application of EU Competition Law


Book Description

In recent years, there has been a decentralisation of the enforcement of the EU competition law provisions, Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Consequently, the national application of these provisions has become increasingly more common across the European Union. This national application poses various challenges for those concerned about the consistent application of EU competition law. This edited collection provides an in-depth analysis of the most important limitations of, and the challenges concerning, the applicability of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU at national level. Divided into five parts, the book starts out by examining how the consistent enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU operates as a general EU competition policy. It then discusses several recent landmark cases of the European Court of Justice on Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, before proceeding to analyse certain additional, unique jurisdictional challenges to the uniform application of the EU competition law provisions. Subsequently, it focuses on one of the most important instruments that can help to achieve the uniform application of EU competition law in cases handled by the national courts: preliminary rulings. Finally, it provides selective examples of how Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are effectively applied at national level, thereby providing additional input into how problematic the issue of consistent application of EU competition law is in practice.