The Effects of Insider and Blockholder Ownerships on Firm Performance


Book Description

The present study tests the effect of insider and blockholder ownerships on firm performance. It argues that both parties influence firm performance through the adoption of internal governance mechanisms which reflect their investment interests. The sample consists of 177 firms listed on the Bursa Malaysia, with data gathered from their 2004 and 2005 annual reports. Statistical results support the hypothesis that board-related governance mechanisms and executive compensation mediate the relationship between the ownership variables and firm performance. Furthermore, insiders and blockholders were found to compete for board dominance, as each is driven to advance their interests. The fraction of insiders on board was found to exert the strongest positive effect on firm performance. This conforms to the stewardship theory which holds that insiders are in the strongest position to maximize firm wealth as they possess superior information about the firm.




Blockholder Heterogeneity, CEO Compensation, and Firm Performance


Book Description

This paper examines heterogeneity in blockholder monitoring across investor type. We document which blockholder types (e.g. mutual funds, hedge funds) are more likely to be associated with active monitoring and show that firms targeted by such blockholders are more likely to increase the equity portion of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) pay. Further, using market-wide and exogenous shocks to liquidity to identify differences in efficacy across blockholder types, we observe greater operating performance improvements in actively monitored firms when passive monitoring is less effective, suggesting causal impact. We propose differences in compensation arrangements across blockholder types as a mechanism underlying blockholders' heterogeneous role.




The Influence of Blockholders on Agency Costs and Firm Value


Book Description

Markus P. Urban investigates the influence of large shareholders (the so-called blockholders) on agency costs and firm value, thereby accounting for blockholder characteristics and blockholder interrelationships. The work provides a profound theoretical and empirical analysis on the nature and effect of shareholder engagement with due regard to the specifics of the German institutional environment. Its empirical results illustrate that the effect of shareholder engagement depends on the characteristics of the specific blockholder as well as on interrelationships with additional blockholders.







Managing for the Long Run


Book Description

Fidelity, Hallmark, Michelin, and Wal-Mart are renowned industry powerhouses with long leadership track records. Yet these celebrated companies are united by another factor not generally equated with competitive success: They are all family-controlled businesses. While many view the hallmarks of family businesses—stable strategies, clan cultures, and unencumbered family ownership—as weaknesses, Danny Miller and Isabelle Le Breton-Miller argue that it is these very characteristics that create formidable competitive advantages for many such firms. Managing for the Long Run draws from a worldwide study of enduring, family-run organizations—including Cargill, Timken, L.L. Bean, The New York Times, and IKEA—to reveal their unconventional success strategies and how these strategies can be adopted and applied in any organization. Miller and Le Breton-Miller show how four driving passions of family-run firms—command, continuity, community, and connection—give rise to a set of practices that defy modern management thinking yet ensure a company’s long term competitive advantage. Outlining how these practices can enhance strategic efforts from operations to brand leadership to innovation, this book shows what every company must do to manage for the long run.







Does the Proxy for Shareholders' Control Make a Difference in Firm-Performance Regressions? Evidence from a Blockholder System of Corporate Governance


Book Description

One of the critical determinants of firm performance in corporate governance investigations is the degree of control exercised by large shareholders. This paper empirically assesses the use of ultimate-ownership shares and solutions of voting games (i.e. power indices) as alternative proxies for this control. Estimates from a panel of Spanish listed firms show that both proxies provide similar results. Also, paying no heed to the potential endogeneity of the degree of control may result in misleading inferences. These conclusions are likely to hold for other blockholder systems of corporate governance.




Blockholder and Firm Performance


Book Description

Using the Japanese bank merger dataset for the 2000s, this paper investigates whether the reduction of the ownership ratio by the blockholder affects companies' operating performance and bank-firm relationships. In Japan, banks are prohibited from holding more than 5% of the business company's equity. When two or more banks consolidate, the post-merged bank must sell up to 5% of its shares. This rule enables us to remove the endogeneity between the block-shareholder and operating performance, which is where previous literature suffers endogeneity problems. The findings can be summarized as follows. First, to mitigate the endogeneity concern, we employ the regression discontinuity design (RDD) and find that subsequent operating performance has a non-linear relationship with the cumulative shareholding ratio in the pre-merger period. Second, we investigate the bank-firm relationship and find that the lending amount from banks suffers a decline due to the 5% rule after the banks merger.




The Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance


Book Description

The Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance, Volume One, covers all issues important to economists. It is organized around fundamental principles, whereas multidisciplinary books on corporate governance often concentrate on specific topics. Specific topics include Relevant Theory and Methods, Organizational Economic Models as They Pertain to Governance, Managerial Career Concerns, Assessment & Monitoring, and Signal Jamming, The Institutions and Practice of Governance, The Law and Economics of Governance, Takeovers, Buyouts, and the Market for Control, Executive Compensation, Dominant Shareholders, and more. Providing excellent overviews and summaries of extant research, this book presents advanced students in graduate programs with details and perspectives that other books overlook. Concentrates on underlying principles that change little, even as the empirical literature moves on Helps readers see corporate governance systems as interrelated or even intertwined external (country-level) and internal (firm-level) forces Reviews the methodological tools of the field (theory and empirical), the most relevant models, and the field’s substantive findings, all of which help point the way forward