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Blockholder Heterogeneity, CEO Compensation, and Firm Performance

Author : Christopher P. Clifford

Publisher :

Page : 55 pages

File Size : 15,38 MB

Release : 2017

Category :

ISBN :

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Book Description

This paper examines heterogeneity in blockholder monitoring across investor type. We document which blockholder types (e.g. mutual funds, hedge funds) are more likely to be associated with active monitoring and show that firms targeted by such blockholders are more likely to increase the equity portion of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) pay. Further, using market-wide and exogenous shocks to liquidity to identify differences in efficacy across blockholder types, we observe greater operating performance improvements in actively monitored firms when passive monitoring is less effective, suggesting causal impact. We propose differences in compensation arrangements across blockholder types as a mechanism underlying blockholders' heterogeneous role.



Executive Compensation and Shareholder Value

Author : Jennifer Carpenter

Publisher : Springer Science & Business Media

Page : 159 pages

File Size : 41,67 MB

Release : 2013-04-17

Category : Business & Economics

ISBN : 1475751923

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Book Description

Executive compensation has gained widespread public attention in recent years, with the pay of top U.S. executives reaching unprecedented levels compared either with past levels, with the remuneration of top executives in other countries, or with the wages and salaries of typical employees. The extraordinary levels of executive compensation have been achieved at a time when U.S. public companies have realized substantial gains in stock market value. Many have cited this as evidence that U.S. executive compensation works well, rewarding managers who make difficult decisions that lead to higher shareholder values, while others have argued that the overly generous salaries and benefits bear little relation to company performance. Recent conceptual and empirical research permits for the first time a truly rigorous debate on these and related issues, which is the subject of this volume.



Large Shareholders and Corporate Policies

Author : Henrik Cronqvist

Publisher :

Page : 50 pages

File Size : 45,31 MB

Release : 2008

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ISBN :

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Book Description

We develop an empirical framework that allows us to analyze the effects of heterogeneity across large shareholders, and we construct a new blockholder-firm panel data set in which we can track all unique blockholders among large U.S. public firms. We find statistically significant and economically important blockholder fixed effects in investment, financial, and executive compensation policies. This evidence suggests that blockholders vary in their beliefs, skills, or preferences. Different large shareholders have distinct investment and governance styles: they differ in their approaches to corporate investment and growth, their appetites for financial leverage, and their attitudes towards CEO pay. We also find blockholder fixed effects in firm performance measures, and differences in style are systematically related to firm performance differences. Our results are consistent with influence for activist, pension fund,corporate, individual, and private equity blockholders, but consistent with systematic selection for mutual funds. Finally, we analyze sources of the heterogeneity, and find that blockholders with a larger block size, board membership, direct management involvement as officers, or with a single decision maker are associated with larger effects on corporate policies and firm performance.





Determinants of Executive Compensation

Author : Ellen Pavlik

Publisher : Praeger

Page : 182 pages

File Size : 40,99 MB

Release : 1991-06-21

Category : Business & Economics

ISBN :

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Book Description

This book is a thorough study of what determines executive compensation levels, challenging prior research which tended to focus solely on the influence of corporate financial performance.



The CEO Compensation System of New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) Technology Companies

Author : Yusuf Nulla

Publisher :

Page : 10 pages

File Size : 18,5 MB

Release : 2013

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ISBN :

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Book Description

This study investigated the CEO Compensation system of the NYSE Technology companies. It attested the relationship between the CEO compensation, the firm size, the accounting performance, and the corporate governance. The research question for this study was -- is there a relationship between the CEO cash compensation, the firm size, the accounting performance, and the corporate governance? It was found that there was a relationship between the CEO salary, the total CEO compensation, the firm size, the accounting performance, and the corporate governance. It was found that there was no relationship between the CEO Bonus, the firm size, and the firm performance.



CEO Option Pay, Risk Taking, and Firm Performance

Author : Hussam A. Al-Shammari

Publisher : ProQuest

Page : pages

File Size : 20,43 MB

Release : 2006

Category : Economics

ISBN : 9780542863424

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Book Description

The ever-increasing levels of executive compensation in North America have attracted the growing attention of researchers, policy makers, and the general public. This dissertation reviews the literature on executive compensation and proposes two theoretical models that seek to explain the relationship between CEO option pay, firm risk and performance. Prior empirical research has failed to produce consistent relationships between executive compensation and firm performance. This dissertation opens the "black box" between executive compensation and firm performance and empirically tests the intervening effect of risk-taking behavior on this relationship. It also examines the moderating effects of firm governance systems, strategy and the environment on the relationship between CEO option pay and risk taking. The population for this study is U.S. publicly-traded manufacturing companies. A sample of 204 companies were drawn from the Fortune 1000 for testing the hypothesized relationships. Data were retrieved from various archival sources including Compustat, ExecuComp, Mergent Online, Census for Manufacturing, Thompson Financial, and Value line databases. The dissertation uses both mediated hierarchical regression analyses and moderated hierarchical regression analyses to test the hypothesized relationships suggested in the first and second models, respectively. Results reveal a strong, positive relationship between CEO option pay and a firm's strategic risk, stock returns risk, and income stream risk. Results also showed that firm strategic risk, measured by R & D expenditure, mediates the CEO option pay-firm performance relationship, either fully or partially, depending on which type of performance is being examined. Further, a moderating effect is unveiled for CEO duality, insider ownership, and firm strategy. However, empirical analyses fail to provide adequate evidence to support the expected moderating effect of board independence, institutional and blockholder ownership, and environment.





The Impact of CEO Compensation on Firm Performance

Author : Sandra Kagango

Publisher :

Page : 21 pages

File Size : 21,77 MB

Release : 2017

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ISBN :

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Book Description

This study examines the impact of CEO compensation on firm performance from the gender perspective. The impact of CEO power on firm performance is tested by using the performance measures of Return on Equity (ROE) and Return on Assets (ROA). There are two reasons for choosing ROE and ROA as the firm performance measures. The first reason is the availability of the data from the source that has been used in this research. The second reason is because it has been used many times in previous studies. In this way comparing this research to the existing literature will be done in a more efficient way. Two important theories will be discussed: agency theory and shareholders theory. The findings provide evidence identifying CEO compensation as a determinant of firm performance, and suggest more CEO power is more likely to beneficial to firm performance and therefore to shareholders, as opposed to an agency cost. My contribution to this topic will feature the gender lens and examine the impact of male CEO compensation versus that of female CEO compensation on firm performance. The findings do not provide concrete evidence on the influence of male CEO compensation against female CEO compensation on firm performance.