British Counterinsurgency in the Post-imperial Era


Book Description

This text covers the development of British counterinsurgency principles and practices since 1960. Through the study of conflicts in Borneo, South Arabia, Oman and Northern Ireland, the author explores how Britain's unique approach to internal conflict evolved and shows how the conflicts of this era can only be fully understood by stressing the links between colonial and post-colonial policy.




British Counterinsurgency


Book Description

British Counterinsurgency challenges the British Army's claim to counterinsurgency expertise. It provides well-written, accessible and up-to-date accounts of the post-1945 campaigns in Palestine, Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, South Yemen, Dhofar, Northern Ireland and more recently in Iraq and Afghanistan.




British Ways of Counter-insurgency


Book Description

This edited collection examines the British ‘way’ in counter-insurgency. It brings together and consolidates new scholarship on the counter-insurgency associated with the end of empire, foregrounding a dark and violent history of British imperial rule, one that stretched back to the nineteenth century and continued until the final collapse of the British Empire in the 1960s. The essays gathered in the collection cover the period from the late nineteenth century to the 1960s; they are both empirical and conceptual in tone. This edited collection pivots on the theme of the nature of the force used by Britain against colonial insurgents. It argues that the violence employed by British security forces in counter-insurgency to maintain imperial rule is best seen from a maximal perspective, contra traditional arguments that the British used minimum force to defeat colonial rebellions. Case studies are drawn from across the British Empire, covering a period of some hundred years, but they concentrate on the savage wars of decolonisation after 1945. The collection includes a historiographical essay and one on the ‘lost’ Hanslope archive by the scholar chosen by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to manage the release of the papers held. This book was published as a special issue of Small Wars and Insurgencies.




The Counter-insurgency Myth


Book Description

This book examines the complex practice of counter-insurgency warfare through the prism of the British experiences of irregular war in the post-war era, from Malaya up to the current Iraq war.




Counterinsurgency


Book Description

Controversial new history of counterinsurgency which challenges its claims as an effective strategy of waging war.




Fighting the Mau Mau


Book Description

This new study of Britain's counterinsurgency campaign in Kenya examines the difference between official and accepted methods of conquering insurgents.




The Oxford Handbook of the Ends of Empire


Book Description

The Oxford Handbook of the Ends of Empire offers the most comprehensive treatment of the causes, course, and consequences of the collapse of empires in the twentieth century. The volume's contributors convey the global reach of decolonization, analysing the ways in which European, Asian, and African empires disintegrated over the past century.




Disengaging From Insurgencies: Insights From History And Implications For Afghanistan


Book Description

To determine insights for future disengagements, this thesis examines four historical episodes in which Western nations withdrew from on-going conflicts against insurgent-like enemies. Relatively unsuccessful results flowed from the British withdrawal from Aden during the 1960’s and the American withdrawal from Vietnam during 1972-1973. As the last British troop departed Aden, a state of turmoil prevailed. Not only could the insurgents realistically claim victory in evicting the British by force, but also the territory later became the Arab world’s first Marxist state and a base for terrorists. America’s departure from Vietnam produced similar disappointment. More successful outcomes occurred during the British withdrawal from Malaya in the 1960’s and the American withdrawal from El Salvador in 1988-1989. After World War II, the British attempted to re-establish colonial control of Malaya and faced resistance from communist insurgents. In the midst of their counterinsurgency, the British government granted Malaya independence in August 1957. The Malayan government, backed by British support, continued its struggle against the communist insurgents for another three years. The Malayan government announced victory in 1960 and began to enjoy a relatively peaceful and prosperous aftermath. From kidnappings, assassinations, and other political-criminal activities, an insurgency emerged in El Salvador in 1979. As the movement transitioned to guerrilla warfare, the insurgent fighters rivaled the strength of the Salvadoran security forces. From 1980-1992, the government of the United States provided El Salvador extensive funding for social and political reforms, military material support, and training to counter the communist insurgents. These efforts, coupled with effective El Salvadoran governance, eventually led the communists to abandon their cause.




Indian National Security and Counter-Insurgency


Book Description

This book, based on extensive field research, examines the Indian state’s response to the multiple insurgencies that have occurred since independence in 1947. In reacting to these various insurgencies, the Indian state has employed a combined approach of force, dialogue, accommodation of ethnic and minority aspirations and, overtime, the state has established a tradition of negotiation with armed ethnic groups in order to bolster its legitimacy based on an accommodative posture. While these efforts have succeeded in resolving the Mizo insurgency, it has only incited levels of violence with regard to others. Within this backdrop of ongoing Indian counter-insurgency, this study provides a set of conditions responsible for the groundswell of insurgencies in India, and some recommendations to better formulate India’s national security policy with regard to its counter-insurgency responses. The study focuses on the national institutions responsible for formulating India’s national security policy dealing with counter-insurgency – such as the Prime Minister’s Office, the Cabinet Committee on Security, the National Security Council, the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Indian military apparatus. Furthermore, it studies how national interests and values influence the formulation of this policy; and the overall success and/or failure of the policy to deal with armed insurgent movements. Notably, the study traces the ideational influence of Kautilya and Gandhi in India’s overall response to insurgencies. Multiple cases of armed ethnic insurgencies in Assam, Manipur, Mizoram, and Nagaland in the Northeast of India and the ideologically oriented Maoist or Naxalite insurgency affecting the heartland of India are analysed in-depth to evaluate the Indian counter-insurgency experience. This book will be of much interest to students of counter-insurgency, Asian politics, ethnic conflict, and security studies in general.




Confronting the Colonies


Book Description

Moving the debate beyond the place of tactical intelligence in counterinsurgency warfare, Confronting the Colonies considers the view from Whitehall, where the biggest decisions were made. It reveals the evolving impact of strategic intelligence upon government understandings of, and policy responses to, insurgent threats. Confronting the Colonies demonstrates for the first time how, in the decades after World War Two, the intelligence agenda expanded to include non-state actors, insurgencies, and irregular warfare. It explores the challenges these emerging threats posed to intelligence assessment and how they were met with varying degrees of success. Such issues remain of vital importance today. By examining the relationship between intelligence and policy, Cormac provides original and revealing insights into government thinking in the era of decolonisation, from the origins of nationalist unrest to the projection of dwindling British power. He demonstrates how intelligence (mis-)understood the complex relationship between the Cold War, nationalism, and decolonisation; how it fuelled fierce Whitehall feuding; and how it shaped policymakers' attempts to integrate counterinsurgency into broader strategic policy.