Challenges for Civil-military Integration During Stability Operations


Book Description

The US military will continue to play the leading role in stabilization and reconstruction missions in hostile environments. Past efforts to achieve an effective integration of interagency capabilities for these missions have been limited at best. There is a critical need for fully integrated interagency efforts at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels that go well beyond past attempts at mere civil-military cooperation or collaboration. This paper focuses on how the military can better integrate civilian personnel and capabilities when it has the lead in stability operations. It also explores how to effectively transition to a civilian leading role in these missions. The paper first provides context by reviewing select lessons from several US operations executed since the end of the Cold War. Next, it assesses recent initiatives and military doctrinal changes that are designed to address these issues. It then explores several new civil-military organizational innovations that address these issues, such as US Africa Command and Provincial Reconstruction Teams. It also highlights the increasing reliance contractors who can fill the gaps in military and government civilian capabilities in these areas. Finally, it concludes with several recommendations for the Department of Defense to improve civil-military integration during stabilization missions.




The U.S. Army Stability Operations Field Manual


Book Description

Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations, represents a milestone in Army doctrine. With a focus on transforming conflict, managing violence when it does occur and maintaining stable peace, The U.S. Army Stability Operations Field Manual (otherwise known as FM 3-07) signals a stark departure from traditional military doctrine. The Army officially acknowledges the complex continuum from conflict to peace, outlines the military's responsibility to provide stability and security, and recognizes the necessity of collaboration, coordination, and cooperation among military, state, commercial, and non-government organizations in nation-building efforts. The manual reflects a truly unique collaboration between the Army and a wide array of experts from hundreds of groups across the United States Government, the intergovernmental and non-governmental communities, America's allies around the world, and the private sector. All branches of the armed forces, U.S. agencies ranging from the State Department to Homeland Security to Health and Human Services, international agencies from the United Nations to the Red Cross to the World Bank, countries from the United Kingdom to India to South Africa, private think tanks from RAND to the United States Institute of Peace to the Center for New American Security, all took part in the shaping of this document. The U.S. Army Stability Operations FieldManual, marks just the second time in modern history that the U.S. Army has worked with a private publisher to produce a military doctrinal document. Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell, IV is Commander of the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Michèle Flournoy, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Shawn Brimley, Fellow, Center for a New American Security Janine Davidson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans "It is a roadmap from conflict to peace, a practical guidebook for adaptive, creative leadership at a critical time in our history. It institutionalizes the hard-won lessons of the past while charting a path for tomorrow. This manual postures our military forces for the challenges of an uncertain future, an era of persistent conflict where the unflagging bravery of our Soldiers will continue to carry the banner of freedom, hope, and opportunity to the people of the world." —From the foreword by Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell, IV, Commander of the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas







Preparing the Army for Stability Operations


Book Description

In 2004-2006, the U.S. government acted to revise the way that the planning and implementation of Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations are conducted. The primary emphasis of the changes was on ensuring a common U.S. strategy rather than a collection of individual departmental and agency efforts and on mobilizing and involving all available U.S. government assets in the effort. The proximate reason for the policy shift stems from the exposing of gaps in the U.S. ability to administer Afghanistan and Iraq after the U.S.-led ousters of the Taliban and Ba'athist regimes. But the effort to create U.S. government capabilities to conduct SSTR operations in a more unified and coherent fashion rests on the deeper conviction that, as part of the U.S. strategy to deal with transnational terrorist groups, the United States must have the capabilities to increase the governance capacities of weak states, reduce the drivers of and catalysts to conflict, and assist in peacebuilding at all stages of pre- or post-conflict transformation. According to the Joint Operating Concept for Military Support to SSTR operations, these operations are civilian-led and conducted and coordinated with the involvement of all the available resources of the U.S. government (military and civilian), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and international partners. Although military assets are an essential component of many SSTR operations, specific military goals and objectives are only a portion of the larger SSTR operation.




Stability Operations (Field Manual No. 3-07)


Book Description

Field Manual (FM) 3-07 is the Army's keystone doctrinal publication for stability operations. FM 3-07 presents overarching doctrinal guidance and direction for conducting stability operations, setting the foundation for developing other fundamentals and tactics, techniques, and procedures detailed in subordinate field manuals. It also provides operational guidance for commanders and trainers at all echelons and forms the foundation for Army Training System curricula. The six chapters that make up this edition of Stability Operations constitute the Army's approach to the conduct of full spectrum operations in any environment across the spectrum of conflict. This doctrine focuses on achieving unity of effort through a comprehensive approach to stability operations, but remains consistent with, and supports the execution of, a broader “whole of government” approach as defined by the United States Government (USG). The core of this doctrine includes the following: • Chapter 1 describes the strategic context that frames the Army's comprehensive approach to stability operations. It includes discussion of the strategic environment, USG strategy and policy, and interagency efforts to define an integrated approach to stability operations that leverages the collective efforts of a wide array of actors toward a commonly understood and recognized end state. • Chapter 2 links full spectrum operations to broader efforts aiming to achieve stability, emphasizing the simultaneous nature of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks. It describes the phasing paradigm that defines stability operations activities conducted before, during, and after combat operations. Finally, the chapter links the primary stability tasks with broader interagency stability sectors to provide the foundation for civil-military integration at the tactical level. • Chapter 3 addresses the essential stability tasks that comprise military stability operations. It provides a detailed discussion of each of the five primary stability tasks, and describes the subordinate tasks that constitute the range of activities in stability operations. It includes doctrine that describes the role of civil affairs forces in stability operations as the commander's conduit for civil-military integration. Finally, it describes development of mission-essential and directed task list development to support stability operations. • Chapter 4 discusses the fundamental principles of the detailed component of planning, focused on the stability element of full spectrum operations. It builds on the precepts established in FMs 3-0 and 5-0, providing a systemic approach to planning and assessing stability operations. • Chapter 5 addresses transitional military authority and provides doctrine concerning command responsibility, establishment, and organization of military government to support stability operations. It includes principles for establishing judicial structures to enable transitional military authority. • Chapter 6 provides the doctrinal foundation for security sector reform, and introduces security force assistance as the capacity-building activity that encompasses organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding, and advising host-nation security forces. It also sets disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration as a fundamental element of security sector reform. Seven appendixes complement the body of the manual. Army doctrine is consistent and compatible with joint doctrine. FM 3-07 links stability operations doctrine to joint operations doctrine as expressed in joint doctrinal publications, specifically, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 and JP 5-0. FM 3-07 expands on the fundamental principles of operations expressed in FM 3-0 and links those principles to a comprehensive approach to stability operations within the framework of full spectrum operations. FM 3-07 also uses text and concepts developed in conjunction with North Atlantic Treaty Organization partners.




The Interagency and Counterinsurgency Warfare


Book Description

For decades since the formation of the defense establishment under the 1947 National Security Act, all U.S. cabinet departments, national security agencies, and military services involved in providing for the common defense have struggled to overcome differences in policy and strategy formulation, organizational cultures, and even basic terminology. Post-September 11, 2001, international systems, security environments, U.S. military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the greater Global War on Terrorism have confronted civilian policymakers and senior military officers with a complex, fluid battlefield which demands kinetic and counterinsurgency capabilities. This monograph addresses the security, stability, transition, and reconstruction missions that place the most pressure on interagency communication and coordination. The results from Kabul to Baghdad reveal that the interagency process is in need of reform and that a more robust effort to integrate and align civilian and military elements is a prerequisite for success.




Effective Civil-Military Interaction in Peace Operations


Book Description

This book contains unique, firsthand experiences of both the military and civilian actors involved in civil-military interaction processes. It presents lessons learned from a variety of situations, from both NATO-led operations and UN Integrated Missions, and in different geographical areas, such as the Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan and Africa. Rather than taking the improvisational approach, these lessons learned will enable military commanders and staff and their civilian counterparts in governments, International Organisations and NGOs to come fully prepared for the challenges of today's multifaceted missions. With a better understanding of the mandates and methods of the various civilian and military actors comes greater respect for each other's comparative advantages. With respect comes smoother cooperation. And with that, efficiency gains and enhanced overall mission effectiveness. Each chapter contains solid analysis and advice, specific to the functions found in military organizations, from Intelligence to Personnel and from Logistics to Engineering. Cross-cutting themes like Gender, Human Rights and Corruption are also included in this work that brings together some of the best that practitioners and academics can offer.




Civil-Military Operations (Joint Publication 3-57)


Book Description

This publication provides joint doctrine for the planning and conduct of civil-military operations (CMO) by joint forces, the use of civil affairs forces, the conduct of civil affairs operations, and the coordination with other capabilities contributing to the execution of CMO to achieve unified action. At the strategic, operational and tactical levels and across the full range of military operations, civil-military operations (CMO) are a primary military instrument to synchronize military and nonmilitary instruments of national power, particularly in support of stability, counterinsurgency and other operations dealing with “asymmetric” and “irregular” threats. Potential challenges include ethnic and religious conflict, cultural and socioeconomic differences, terrorism and insurgencies, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international organized crime, incidental and deliberate population migration, environmental degradation, infectious diseases, and sharpening competition/exploitation of dwindling natural resources. Opportunities, conversely, include the integration and comprehensive use of intergovernmental, regional, national, and local governmental and nongovernmental and private sector organizations, which have proliferated in number, variety, and capability. Recent policy initiatives, national security, military strategies, and military doctrine demonstrate a growing appreciation of the need to leverage more nonmilitary instruments of national power, reposed in the interagency process and the private sector, entailing a more holistic, and balance strategy. This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint for commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations, education, and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the joint staff, commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these command, and the Services. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.




Integrating Civilian Agencies in Stability Operations


Book Description

How can the Army help make key civilian agencies more capable partners in stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations? The authors identify the civilian agencies that should be involved in such operations, then locate the necessary skill sets. They then assess the capacity of the civilian agencies to participate in SSTR operations and analyze the recurring structural problems that have plagued their attempts to do so.




The Challenges of Civil-Military Relations in Operations at the Trailing Edge of War


Book Description

The U.S. military defines itself, almost exclusively, in terms of deterring or fighting and winning wars. In the past, it has not concerned itself with peace operations or a force structure focused exclusively toward them. In operations on the trailing edge of war, the interactions of military forces with Humanitarian Relief Organizations (HROs) must be complementary. Operation Restore Hope surfaced several aspects of these civil-military relationships that must be addressed when planning and training for future peace operations. This paper outlines them first in terms of identifying the problems that occurred, United Task Force (UNITAF) Somalia's solutions to them, and finally what future actions should be taken to prevent their reoccurrence. Specifically addressed are: the basic lack of understanding between the military forces and the HROs, weapons confiscation, and support requested by the HROs.