Book Description

If there is one constant in expert analyses of the history of modern China, it is the characterization of a country perpetually in the throes of crises. And in nearly all crises, the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) has played an instrumental role. While China at the mid-point of the 21st century's first decade is arguably the most secure and stable it has been in more than a century, crises continue to emerge with apparent frequency. Consequently, the study of China's behavior in conditions of tension and stress, and particularly how the PLA is a factor in that behavior, is of considerable importance to policymakers and analysts around the world. This volume represents the fruits of a conference held at the U.S. Army War College in September 2004 on the theme of "Chinese Crisis Management." One of the major debates that emerged among participants was whether all the case studies under examination constituted crises in the eyes of China's leaders. The consensus was that not all of these incidents were perceived as crises, a key case in point being the three Iraq wars (1980-88, 1990-91, and 2003). As a result, the rubric of "decisionmaking under stress" was adopted as presenters revised their papers for publication. No matter what rubric is employed, however, the chapters in this volume shed light on patterns of Chinese behavior in crisis-like situations and decisionmaking under stress. Michael Swaine's contributed chapter first establishes a general framework for understanding crisis management based on previous work by Alexander George and J. Philip Rogers. He then proceeds to apply this framework to Chinese crisis management in particular. Swaine identifies five basic variables that influence crisis management behavior, subjective views of leaders and public, domestic environment, decisionmaking structure, information receipt and processing, and idiosyncratic features. In the case of China, he argues, the country often views itself as a victim and therefore strongly reacts to what it perceives as "unjust actions" on the part of other countries. Chinese leaders are thereby compelled to signal their firm resolve on serious issues through words and actions. However, decisionmaking is centralized in the hands of a small number of Party cadre, who work to develop a consensus, while China's bureaucratic Party and intelligence system severely compartmentalizes the flow of information, especially to senior leaders. This limits and sometimes distorts the information they receive during crisis situations. Swaine then raises a number of questions about the factors that influence the Chinese framework for decisionmaking. He concludes that, if we can better understand the broad tendencies that affect China's crisis management style, we may be able to reduce the likelihood of undesirable situations in which a Sino-U.S. crisis would erupt. Larry Wortzel presented a paper on Chinese decisionmaking and the Tiananmen Square Massacre. In Wortzel's opinion, at the time of Hu Yaobang's death, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was under intense public pressure to reform and reduce corruption. Hu's death acted as a catalyst, leading to student demonstrations, which were encouraged by reformist members of the CCP. As the protests became larger, several conservative factions, normally at odds with one another, closed ranks and sought to end the demonstrations, first through police, then military, means. However, the consensus decision to use force took time, and the apparent lack of action by the Party was seen by protestors to be tacit approval of their actions.