Book Description

ABSTRACT: Resolving ethnic conflicts is no easy task. In the 1990s, civil wars engulfed Somalia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Cambodia, Yugoslavia...the list goes on. In the Balkans, the disintegration of Josip Tito's pan-Slavic dream destabilized the security of the region and relations between the people living in the Yugoslav republics. Minorities stranded on the other side of the border following the secession of the former Yugoslav republics were skeptical of the new governments in their internal policies fueled by nationalistic overtones. This caused a backlash of self-determined autonomy of minorities within the newly seceded republics The paper provides a theoretical application of crisis bargaining to explain the wars in Yugoslavia caused by the commitment issues among the dyadic couple. Crisis bargaining between civil war combatants is hindered by incredible commitments, issues of uncertainty and lack of third-party guarantees to safeguard ceasefires and military disengagement. Parties to a civil conflict are therefore unable to successfully commit to peaceful negotiations during periods of heightened vulnerability. Commitment issues arise during such periods which cause prolonged fighting for better position at the bargaining table, and are most likely to prevail in the absence of credible guarantees and honest communication.