Combinatorial Auctions


Book Description

A synthesis of theoretical and practical research on combinatorial auctions from the perspectives of economics, operations research, and computer science.




Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design


Book Description

An international team of experts covers the pros and cons of different auction formats and lessons learned in the field.




Auction Theory


Book Description

Auction Theory, Second Edition improves upon his 2002 bestseller with a new chapter on package and position auctions as well as end-of-chapter questions and chapter notes. Complete proofs and new material about collusion complement Krishna's ability to reveal the basic facts of each theory in a style that is clear, concise, and easy to follow. With the addition of a solutions manual and other teaching aids, the 2e continues to serve as the doorway to relevant theory for most students doing empirical work on auctions. - Focuses on key auction types and serves as the doorway to relevant theory for those doing empirical work on auctions - New chapter on combinatorial auctions and new analyses of theory-informed applications - New chapter-ending exercises and problems of varying difficulties support and reinforce key points




Putting Auction Theory to Work


Book Description

This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.




Putting Auction Theory to Work


Book Description

Table of contents




Twenty Lectures on Algorithmic Game Theory


Book Description

Computer science and economics have engaged in a lively interaction over the past fifteen years, resulting in the new field of algorithmic game theory. Many problems that are central to modern computer science, ranging from resource allocation in large networks to online advertising, involve interactions between multiple self-interested parties. Economics and game theory offer a host of useful models and definitions to reason about such problems. The flow of ideas also travels in the other direction, and concepts from computer science are increasingly important in economics. This book grew out of the author's Stanford University course on algorithmic game theory, and aims to give students and other newcomers a quick and accessible introduction to many of the most important concepts in the field. The book also includes case studies on online advertising, wireless spectrum auctions, kidney exchange, and network management.




The Handbook of Market Design


Book Description

Economists often look at markets as given, and try to make predictions about who will do what and what will happen in these markets. Market design, by contrast, does not take markets as given; instead, it combines insights from economic and game theory together with common sense and lessons learned from empirical work and experimental analysis to aid in the design and implementation of actual markets In recent years the field has grown dramatically, partially because of the successful wave of spectrum auctions in the US and in Europe, which have been designed by a number of prominent economists, and partially because of the increase use of the Internet as the platform over which markets are designed and run There is now a large number of applications and a growing theoretical literature. The Handbook of Market Design brings together the latest research from leading experts to provide a comprehensive description of applied market design over the last two decades In particular, it surveys matching markets: environments where there is a need to match large two-sided populations to one another, such as medical residents and hospitals, law clerks and judges, or patients and kidney donors It also examines a number of applications related to electronic markets, e-commerce, and the effect of the Internet on competition between exchanges.




Handbook of Procurement


Book Description

How can organizations ensure that they can get best value for money in their procurement decisions? How can they stimulate innovations from their dedicated suppliers? With contributions from leading academics and professionals, this 2006 handbook offers expert guidance on the fundamental aspects of successful procurement design and management in firms, public administrations, and international institutions. The issues addressed include the management of dynamic procurement; the handling of procurement risk; the architecture of purchasing systems; the structure of incentives in procurement contracts; methods to increase suppliers' participation in procurement contests and e-procurement platforms; how to minimize the risk of collusion and of corruption; pricing and reputation mechanisms in e-procurement platforms; and how procurement can enhance innovation. Inspired by frontier research, it provides practical recommendations to managers, engineers and lawyers engaged in private and public procurement design.




Stochastic Local Search


Book Description

Stochastic local search (SLS) algorithms are among the most prominent and successful techniques for solving computationally difficult problems. Offering a systematic treatment of SLS algorithms, this book examines the general concepts and specific instances of SLS algorithms and considers their development, analysis and application.




Internet and Network Economics


Book Description

This volume contains the papers presented at WINE 2009:the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics held December 14–18, 2009, in Rome,attheDepartmentofComputerandSystemSciences,SapienzaUniversity of Rome. Over the past decade there has been growing interaction between researchers in theoretical computer science, networking and security, economics, mathem- ics, sociology, and management sciences devoted to the analysis of problems arising in the Internet and the worldwide web. The Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE) is an interdisciplinary forum for the exchange of ideas and results arising in these varied ?elds. There were 142 submissions to the workshop including regular and short - pers.Allsubmissionswererigorouslypeer reviewedandevaluatedonthebasisof the quality of their contribution, originality,soundness, and signi?cance. Almost all submissions were reviewed by at least three Program Committee members. The committee decided to accept 34 regular papers and 29 short papers. The Best Student Paper award sponsored by Google Inc. was given to Saeed Alaei and AzarakhshMalekianfor the paper β€œAn Analysisof Troubled Assets Reverse Auction.” The program also included three invited talks by S. Muthukrishnan (Google Inc.and RutgersUniversity),H. PeytonYoung (OxfordandJohns Hopkins U- versity)andEvaTardos(CornellUnversity).Threetutorialswerealsoo?eredon the days before the workshop, from Andrei Broder (Yahoo! Research) on C- putational Advertising, Nikhil Devanur and Kamal Jain (Microsoft Research) on Computational Issues in Market Equilibria, and Tim Roughgarden(Stanford University) on Bayesian and Worst-Case Revenue Maximization.