Antitrust Federalism in the EU and the US


Book Description

The EU and the US are the preeminent examples of multi-level polities and both have highly developed competition policies. Despite these similarities however, recent developments suggest that they are moving in different directions in the area of antitrust federalism. This book examines multi-level governance in competition policy from a comparative perspective. The book analyses how competition laws and authorities of different levels - the federal and the state levels in the US and the national and the supranational levels in the EU - interact with each other. Inspired by the increasingly divergent policy developments taking place on both sides of the Atlantic, the author asks whether the EU and the US can draw policy lessons from each other’s experiences in antitrust federalism. Antitrust Federalism in the EU and the US reveals the similarities and differences between the European and American models of antitrust federalism whilst employing policy network models in its comparative analysis of issues such as opacity and accountability in networks. The book is essentially multidisciplinary in its effort to initiate dialogue between the Law and Political Science literatures in this field. This book will be of particular interest to academics, students and practitioners of Competition Law, Constitutional Law and Political Science.




Comparative Antitrust Federalism and the Error-Cost Framework Or


Book Description

The aim of this paper is threefold. First, it seeks to contribute to a more fine-grained comparison between US antitrust and EU competition law by (selectively) including state antitrust laws as well as laws that pursue objectives different from the antitrust laws but interfere with the aims of the antitrust laws, such as sale-below-cost statutes, car dealer and franchise statutes, or general contract law invalidating resale price maintenance agreements ("non-antitrust laws"). Secondly, the paper highlights the degree to which such state antitrust laws and non-antitrust laws may interfere with the error-cost framework employed in antitrust law which finely balances Type I and Type II errors. Thirdly, as a consequence of the first two points, the paper seeks to raise awareness of the importance of clearly defining the relationship between antitrust law on the federal (or EU) level and antitrust laws as well as non-antitrust laws on the (Member) state level. Neither the US approach nor the current EU approach to this relationship are considered satisfactory.




Comparative Antitrust Federalism


Book Description

This brief essay reviews Firat Cengiz's book “Federalism in the EU and the US” (2012), which compares the role of federalism in the competition law of the European Union and the United States. Both of these systems are “federal,” of course, because both have individual nation-states (Europe) or states (US) with their own individual competition provisions, but also an overarching competition law that applies to the entire group. This requires a certain amount of cooperation with respect to both territorial reach and substantive coverage. Cengiz distinguishes among “markets,” “hierarchies,” and “networks” as forms of federalism. Markets are the least centralized and have more episodic, or ad hoc, control. As a result they are more prone to policy “races” among sovereigns in the system. Cengiz concludes that the EU and US systems are similar in that both begin with a set of system-wide policies that are broad and strong, with internal unification as a primary objective. Where they tend to differ is in areas governing conflicts between the laws at the different levels. Here, the US system is more structured and hierarchical, while the EU system tends to rely more on cooperation.




Antitrust Federalism


Book Description

This work examines the role that state antitrust law plays in our national competitve policy and surveys the similarities and differences between state and federal antitrust laws.










Antitrust Federalism


Book Description




Federalism in Antitrust


Book Description

Several scholars have suggested that states should play a much more limited role in antitrust enforcement, especially in matters that are national or global in scope. In this paper, we analyze the states' part in the Microsoft case - a case that illustrates the costs of state intervention in antitrust matters that extend beyond state borders. Here, the states' involvement lengthened the lawsuit, complicated the settlement process, and increased both legal uncertainty and litigation costs. These results followed from the states' focus on parochial interests rather than broader concerns for efficiency and equity. We conclude that a state's antitrust enforcement authority should be restricted in matters that extend beyond its borders. After analyzing the motivations for state behavior in federal antitrust, we consider whether restrictions should apply to federal antitrust authorities in cases with international implications. Though a global competition authority could, in principle, be designed to maximize economic well-being, practical and political obstacles appear to rule this option out, at least in the short term.




Free Market State (Of Mind)


Book Description

The Utah Constitution states that “[i]t is the policy of the state of Utah that a free market system shall govern trade and commerce in this state to promote the dispersion of economic and political power and the general welfare of all the people.” Utah's so-called Free Market Clause, adopted in 1992, is unique among the constitutions of the fifty states. Through an excavation of the historical record and contemporary literature, this article shows that the Free Market Clause owes its existence to the influence of Professor John J. Flynn of the University of Utah, whose pioneering work on antitrust federalism was rooted in Rawlsian notions of distributive justice and economic equality. One of the early critics of the Chicago School's output-based economic approach to antitrust analysis, Flynn actively sought to infuse antitrust regulation, primarily at the state level, with notions of wealth inequality, distributive justice and individual liberty. Yet in recent years conservative groups have taken up the Free Market Clause as a potential deterrent to progressive regulation. And in the three decades since it was enacted, the courts of Utah have all but forgotten the origin and purpose of this unique and empowering constitutional pronouncement, finding it to be non-self-executing and thereby non-judiciable. This Article, for the first time, unearths the forgotten intellectual history of Utah's Free Market Clause and explores its three principal applications: (1) an interpretive aid to Utah's Antitrust Act, which was modeled on the federal Sherman Antitrust Act, (2) a standalone constitutional claim against anticompetitive state regulations and private conduct, and (3) an alternative approach to federal antitrust analysis that supplements neoclassical economics with concerns over wealth inequality, distributive justice and individual liberty.




Antitrust, Federalism, and the Regulatory Process


Book Description

This article, published in 1981, examines the two-part Midcal Aluminum standard for state action antitrust immunity. Under that standard, private actors are immune from antitrust liability if (1) they act pursuant to a regulatory policy that is clearly articulated by the state as sovereign and (2) the state actively supervises their conduct. The article endorses the clear articulation requirement, but argues for abandonment of the active supervision requirement. Clear articulation provides an appropriate basis for deference to state economic choices made through legitimate political processes. Active supervision, however, the article argues, bears no necessary relationship to the legitimacy of the state's regulatory scheme. It unjustifiably relies on command-and-control regulatory structures as a measure of the substantive legitimacy of the state's regulatory policy. For the more recent views of the author on the state action doctrine, see William H. Page and John E. Lopatka, State Action and the Meaning of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: An Approach to Hybrid Restraints, 20 Yale J. Reg. 269 (2003) and William H. Page and John E. Lopatka, State Regulation in the Shadow of Antitrust: FTC v. Ticor Title Insurance Co., 3 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 189 (1993).