Book Description

What does non-hierarchical governance mean? Under what conditions are actors more likely to engage in non-hierarchical processes? Which trajectories best capture their long-term evolution? Through which mechanisms do they overcome gridlock? To respond to these questions at the heart of regulatory governance, the book develops an analytical framework that draws on contemporary debates but seeks to overcome their limitations. Notably, it offers a definition of non-hierarchical (experimentalist) governance that goes beyond institutional structures, giving due attention to actors' choices and strategies. It shows that contrary to expectations, functional and political pressures were more influential than distributions of legal power, and bolstered one another. Strong functional demands and political opposition affect actors' de facto capacity of using powers that, de jure, might be in their own hands. Indeed, actors can use non-hierarchical governance to aid learning as well as the creation of political support. Conversely, they may override legal constraints and impose their views on others, if they are equipped with confidence and powerful reform coalitions beforehand. The book also challenges conservative views that non-hierarchical governance is doomed to wither away, showing that, on the contrary, it is often self-reinforcing. Finally, the book shows that far from being mutually exclusive, positive (shadow of hierarchy) and negative (penalty default) mechanisms typically combine to avoid gridlock. The book examines when, how, and why non-hierarchical institutions affect policy processes and outcomes by analysing five crucial domains (electricity, gas, communications, finance, and pharmaceuticals) in the European Union. It combines temporal, cross-sectoral, and within-case comparisons with process-tracing to show the conditions, trajectories, and mechanisms of non-hierarchical governance.